

NEW IRELAND FORUM

The Cost of Violence
arising from
the Northern Ireland Crisis
since 1969

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The New Ireland Forum was established for consultations on the manner in which lasting peace and stability can be achieved in a new Ireland through the democratic process. The opening meeting of the Forum was held on 30 May, 1983. This report by the Forum on "The Costs of Violence arising from the Northern Ireland Crisis since 1969", was adopted at the Forum's meeting on 3 November 1983 in Dublin Castle.

1. Introduction

1.1 There have been periods of violence in the Northern part of the island for many years, both before and after partition in 1920. The people of the North, and to a lesser extent, of the South and of Britain have, during these periods, suffered death, maiming and bombing. The violence has destroyed jobs and economic opportunities. But the most sustained and atrocious period of violence has been that of the past 14 years since 1969. This paper outlines the terrible effects of that violence and estimates its costs in human and economic terms for the people of Ireland, North and South, and for the people of Britain.

1.2 The sources for the various tables in this study are listed in Appendix II. References to figures "at current prices" relate, in the case of a single figure, to the money values of that year and, in the case of a period of years, to the money values of each succeeding year in the period in question.

2. Deaths and Injuries in the North

2.1 The most tragic cost of violence since 1969 is that of the deaths of over 2,300 men, women and children in the North. In addition, over 24,000 people have been injured or maimed. During the past 14 years there have been over 43,000 separate incidents of shootings, bombings and arson. The effect on society has been appalling and there is hardly a family that has not been touched to some degree by death, injury or intimidation. The killing of over 2,300 people in the North, with a population of one and a half million, is equivalent in proportionate terms to the killing of approximately 81,000 in Britain, 80,000 in France or 325,000 in the United States.

Table 1 gives a classification of the 2,304 fatal casualties from 1 January 1969 to 30 June 1983 under the general categories of civilians, security forces and paramilitary groups. The category 'civilian' specifies those persons killed who do not belong to the following categories: a) members of the security forces; b) prison officers; c) acknowledged members of paramilitary groups; d) individuals engaged in criminal activity (e.g. robbery); e) individuals whose role at time of death was uncertain (e.g. riot situations). As the more

detailed table in Appendix I illustrates, 44 persons in this category were former members of the security forces and 20 were elected representatives or political activists. Additional details for this table are given in table 1 in Appendix I.

Table 1: Loss of life arising from violence in the North, 1 January 1969 to 30 June 1983¹

Classification	YEAR													Total		
	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81		'82	'83 ¹
Civilian	13	17	96	242	130	149	177	221	55	31	31	42	42	39	12	1297
Security Forces	1	2	59	149	79	51	31	54	46	31	68	31	44	41	15	702
Paramilitaries	1	5	17	75	40	21	35	19	12	7	5	5	19	13	4	278
Unclassified		1	1	8	3		1	2	1	1	2		3	2	2	27
Total	15	25	173	474	252	221	244	296	114	70	106	78	108	95	33	2304

¹ **Note:** Reference to 1983 in tables 1-4 includes from 1 January to 30 June only.

2.2 Of the total 2,304 fatalities 1,907 were born in the North; Table 2 gives a breakdown of their religious affiliation. It can be seen that both communities have suffered from the violence.

Table 2: Religious affiliation of 1,907 fatalities, born in the North, 1 January 1969 to 30 June 1983¹

Religious Affiliation	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83 ¹	Total
Catholic	8	15	85	243	106	114	126	142	43	17	26	28	48	32	10	1043
Protestant	7	9	48	124	81	75	101	139	53	39	42	36	49	41	20	864

2.3 Table 3 provides a further breakdown of the religious affiliation of 1,297 fatalities designated as civilians in table 1.

Table 3: Religious affiliation of 1,297 civilians who were killed

Religion	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83	Total
Catholic	7	8	62	166	75	95	104	124	33	9	17	20	27	20	6	773
Protestant	6	8	31	74	50	50	69	95	19	21	14	19	15	18	6	495
Civilians not natives of the North		1	3	2	5	4	4	2	3	1		3		1		29

2.4 Table 4 provides a classification of all fatal casualties on the basis of the agencies responsible for the loss of life under the categories republican paramilitary groups, loyalist paramilitary groups and security forces. 163 cases are included under a non-classified heading*. Additional details for this table are given in table 2 Appendix I.

Table 4: Agencies responsible for loss of life, 1 January 1969 to 30 June 1983

Agency	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83	Total
Republican Paramilitary Groups	4	18	96	255	128	98	102	142	70	52	88	49	67	72	23	1264
Loyalist Paramilitary Groups	2	2	21	103	80	94	115	111	24	6	14	14	11	11	5	613
Security Forces	9	5	41	74	32	17	7	16	9	10	1	9	18	11	5	264
Non classified*			15	42	12	12	20	27	11	2	3	6	12	1		163
Total	15	25	173	474	252	221	244	296	117	70	106	78	108	95	33	2304

*Note: The non-classified total embraces three distinct groups:

- (1) Those incidents where it is not possible to attribute responsibility.
- (2) Those incidents where there is no direct line of responsibility e.g. certain affrays or riot situations.
- (3) The deaths of the ten hunger strikers. However, accidentally self-inflicted deaths (e.g. premature explosions) have been attributed to the agency initiating the action.

3. Spillover of Violence from the North to the South and to Britain

3.1 Since 1972 some 45 people have been killed in terrorist explosions in the South and 8 members of the Garda Siochana have been murdered by terrorist activity. Terrorist organisations have been responsible for a substantial share of the armed robberies which increased from 11 in 1970 to 306 in 1981 but fell to 158 in 1982. Because of tighter and costly bank security measures the number of armed bank robberies has fallen in recent years with 20 recorded in 1982. This fall has however, coincided with an increase in the number of armed robberies and armed aggravated burglaries of post offices and private dwellings.

3.2 The people of Britain, while they are physically more remote from the violence than the people of Ireland, have also suffered in human and financial terms. Over 370 members of the British army have been killed in the North and additional members of the army and police have been killed in Britain. British citizens have died in sporadic terrorist bombing campaigns in major cities. There have also been murders of leading political and official figures. In all, it is estimated that 72 persons have died in Britain since 1973 because of violence arising from the Northern Ireland situation.

4. Psychological and Social Impact of the Violence

4.1 The violence in the North has undoubtedly had a psychological impact on its population, particularly in Belfast and Derry and in some border areas. Those directly exposed to the campaign of violence suffer much anguish. Some psychiatrists argue that it has been in those areas bordering on the scenes of greatest violence that one will find the most significant increase in tension and anxiety. The violence has often succeeded in its aim of alienating sections of the community from each other and in fostering misunderstanding, fear and hatred. During the seventies, sectarian rioting and terrorist violence from the extremists of both traditions resulted in the largest single displacement of civilian population in Western Europe in peacetime. In Belfast alone over 60,000 people moved residence, largely because of

violence and intimidation. There were also extensive security force operations involving widespread arrests and house searches. In 1971 there were 17,262 house searches in the North; two years later in 1973 this had risen to 75,000, one fifth of all houses in the North. The violence has also resulted in the introduction of special legislation to cope with the intimidation of witnesses and jurors.

4.2 Between 1971 and 1981 the North, by contrast with the South (which experienced an annual net immigration of 10,000 annually), had a net outward emigration of about 8,000 per annum. Labour Force Surveys and censuses of population carried out in the South and other indications suggest that between 20,000 and 25,000 persons migrated from the North to the South between 1971 and 1981. Furthermore, a study from the New University of Ulster in 1982 showed that between 2,000 and 3,000 young people who leave the North each year for further education never return. While the North's population increased by 0.8 per cent annually from 1961 to 1971, from 1971 to 1981 the growth rate fell to 0.2 per cent compared with a growth rate of 1.5 per cent in the South.

5. The Demography of Violence

5.1 Various studies to determine which areas of the North have suffered most from the violence conclude that the worst affected areas are urban areas, particularly Derry and Belfast. Dr. Michael Poole of the New University of Ulster analysed the total of 2,161 deaths that occurred between 1969 and 1981 in 1,715 separate fatal incidents. Of these fatal incidents, 1,260 (73.5 per cent) were urban in the sense of occurring within the 27 towns in the North.

5.2 Table 5 shows that there is a tremendous concentration of urban violence in Belfast and Derry and that there is a variation among other towns ranging from 28 incidents in Lurgan to none in as many as four towns. It is

Table 5: Fatal Incidents (1969-1981) and fatal incidents per 1,000 people in towns with over 5,000 people in 1971

Town	Fatal incidents	Fatal incidents per 1,000 people	Town	Fatal incidents	Fatal incidents per 1,000 people
Derry	127	1.91	Larne	3	0.16
Belfast	980	1.77	Cookstown	1	0.14
Armagh	21	1.54	Bangor	5	0.14
Strabane	14	1.49	Ballymena	3	0.13
Portadown	25	1.13	Lisburn	4	0.13
Dungannon	9	1.10	Banbridge	1	0.13
Lurgan	28	1.00	Coleraine	2	0.12
Newry	20	0.99	Antrim	1	0.07
Limavady	2	0.33	Newtownards	1	0.06
Carrickfergus	5	0.30	Ballyclare	—	—
Omagh	4	0.27	Downpatrick	—	—
Enniskillen	2	0.21	Portrush	—	—
Comber	1	0.18	Portstewart	—	—
Ballymoney	1	0.18			

notable that there is a large gap between the 8 towns which have suffered the most violence and the remaining 19. In the earlier period of violence from 1969-74 Strabane actually experienced the highest level of violence and in the later period from 1975-81 Portadown moved from eighth place to fourth. If recent fatal incidents up to 1983 are included the only notable change is that Armagh shows the highest level of violence.

5.3 Table 3 in Appendix I complements Table 5 by illustrating the recent industrial and commercial sector damage in 4 of the 8 urban areas with high-level violence. (A comprehensive picture of compensation paid for damage to property is given in Table 8.) It can be noted that areas such as Derry, Strabane and Newry, already suffering from regional disadvantages, have been further set back by the campaign of bombing and destruction. If one takes only the amounts paid since 1978/79 the sum paid for damage to these four cities and towns comes to IR£92 million in current prices.

5.4 In addition Table 4 in Appendix I shows the pattern of killings in the North from 1980 to 1982 in four areas: Belfast and adjacent towns; rural towns and country areas — non-border; border towns; and rural border areas. It can be seen from this table that the number of killings in non-border rural towns/villages and in border towns has increased recently.

6. Direct Cost of Security Operations in the North and South

6.1 The violence in the North has resulted in a major extra financial burden to the Irish and British economies. For the South it is estimated by the relevant Government Departments that the extra security costs arising from the violence amounted in current prices to IR£724 million between 1969 and

Table 6: Security Costs in the South

	Total expenditure on security in South*	Extra security costs due to violence	Extra costs as percentage of total expenditure	Extra costs per head of population in the South
	IR£m	IR£m	%	IR£/head
1969/70	31	2	6.5	1
1970/71	39	3	7.7	1
1971/72	46	7	15.2	2
1972/73	63	11	17.4	4
1973/74	76	15	19.7	5
1974 (9 months)	70	15	21.4	5
1975	131	33	25.2	10
1976	149	40	26.8	12
1977	168	47	28.0	14
1978	195	55	28.2	17
1979	241	60	24.9	18
1980	325	79	24.3	24
1981	424	98	23.1	29
1982	488	125	25.6	36
1983	506	134	26.5	38
Total	IR£2,952m	IR£724m		

* Figures from 1969 to 1981 are from the Appropriation Accounts. The estimated outturn for 1982 and expenditure plans for 1983 are taken from the Book of Estimates for 1983.

1982 or IR£1,050 million in 1982 prices. These extra costs were incurred by the Defence Forces, the Gardaí and the Prison Service. Table 6 illustrates the additional expenditure in current prices since the violence began in 1969. It will be noted, for example, that the extra costs in 1982 were IR£125 million or 26 per cent of the total security budget costs in the South.

6.2 In the North there are no separate figures available for the extra expenditure on law enforcement and the courts arising from the violence. However, on the basis of an officially estimated IR£308 million (Stg.£250m) for extra law enforcement costs in 1982-83 (which amounted to about 68 per cent of total expenditure under this item) and if it is assumed that this proportion applied for previous years, it is possible to derive an estimate of IR£2,808 million (Stg.£2,642m) in 1982 prices as the order of magnitude of the *additional expenditure* incurred on security arising from the violence. In addition, the *extra costs* of maintaining the British army in the North amounted to IR£1,650 million (Stg.£1,550m) in 1982 prices. Combining these figures gives an estimate of some IR£4,458 million or Stg.£4,192m for the *total security costs* in the North over the period 1969-1982 arising from the violence.

Table 7: Security Costs in the North (current prices)

	Expenditure on law, order and protective services and NI courts. [A separate breakdown of the extra costs of violence not available]		Extra costs of British Army in Northern Ireland arising from violence	
	Stg.£m.	IR£m.	Stg.£m.	IR£m.
1969/70	15	15	2	2
1970/71	21	21	6	6
1971/72	29	29	14	14
1972/73	60	60	29	29
1973/74	73	73	33	33
1974/75	109	109	45	45
1975/76	150	150	60	60
1976/77	168	168	65	65
1977/78	178	178	69	69
1978/79	206	206	81	81
1979/80	250	259	96	100
1980/81	312	352	111	125
1981/82	344	430	149*	186
1982/83	369	454	143	176
	(extra costs£250m)			

*New basis for calculation introduced in 1981/82.

6.3 It should be noted that although the absolute security cost to the British Government of the violence in 1982/83 is estimated as three and a half times that of the Irish Government in 1982 the proportionate expenditure on a per capita basis was equivalent to IR£9 in the UK compared to IR£36 in the South.

7. Compensation for criminal injuries (including deaths) to persons and criminal damage to property in the North and South

7.1 Very considerable payments have been paid in the North and the South as official compensation for criminal injuries to persons or for criminal damage to property. Up to the end of March 1982 over IR£73 million (Stg.£70m) was paid in compensation for criminal injuries (including deaths) to persons in the North. The Northern authorities do not provide separate statistics for compensation arising out of the violence alone but the dramatic increase in payments in the early 1970's strongly suggests that most of the payments made related to the violence of that or later periods.

7.2 Table 8 gives an annual breakdown of payments in the North for criminal injuries to persons and for criminal damage to property since 1968. The total comes to Stg.£498 million or, in present-day values, IR£1,040 million (Stg.1,008m) in 1982 prices. The figures for criminal damage to property are conservative as they do not include the cost of damage to Government owned property in the North which has been considerable.

The figures do not include compensation payments by the British Ministry of Defence in settlement of claims either private or arising from civil court actions and relating to the death or injury of citizens or damage to private property since 1969. In response to a parliamentary question the British Secretary of State for Defence stated that this information is not available and could only be obtained at 'disproportionate cost'.

Table 8: Compensation paid in each financial year in the North

Year (April to March)	Criminal Injuries to Persons Stg.£ (millions)	Criminal Damage to Property Stg.£ (millions)
1968/69	n.a.	0.01
1969/70	n.a.	2.0
1970/71	0.4	2.8
1971/72	0.7	4.0
1972/73	2.2	26.6
1973/74	3.9	28.0
1974/75	6.0	40.2
1975/76	7.9	45.8
1976/77	6.3	50.0
1977/78	7.5	37.2
1978/79	10.6	39.1
1979/80	8.7	39.5
1980/81	10.0	44.6
1981/82	6.3	36.6
1982/83	n.a.	31.1

7.3 In the South separate figures are not available for compensation for injury (including deaths) to persons arising out of the violence in the North. However, Table 9 shows the amounts paid since 1974 when the Criminal Injury Tribunal was established (effective for claims since 1972). An estimate by the Department of Justice suggests that of the IR£1.8 million paid in 1981, IR£325,000 could be attributed to violence. A further estimate calculates 18 per cent or IR£1.5 million of the awards given since 1974 might be attributed

to the violence in the North. This would amount to IR£2.2 million in 1982 prices.

Table 9: Payments made by Criminal Injury Tribunal (established 1974) with retrospective effect from October 1972

	IR £ (millions)	No. of awards
1974	0.1	n.a.
1975	0.5	170
1976	0.3	143
1977	0.5	148
1978	0.5	152
1979	0.8	244
1980	1.1	335
1981	1.8	443
1982	2.6	450
1983	3.5 (est.)	n.a.

7.4 It was decided by the Government in the South in 1974 that the cost to local authorities of damage to property that could be attributed to the violence in the North could be recouped from the Exchequer. In addition, where malicious damage claims put a burden on the rates of more than 20p in the £ the Exchequer would pay the excess. If one includes the amounts paid by the local authorities up to 1974 and the Exchequer payments under the heading of Northern violence from 1975 the total amount comes to over IR£10 million or about IR£28 million in 1982 prices. Table 10 gives an annual breakdown since 1967.

Table 10: Compensation paid by the South for damage to property

	Exchequer payments attributed to disturbances in the North	Exchequer payments not attributed to disturbances in the North	Local authority payments including those attributed to disturbances in the North
	IR£ (million)	IR£ (million)	IR£ (million)
1967/68			0.2
1968/69			0.1
1969/70			0.1
1970/71			0.3
1971/72			0.6
1972/73			0.6
1973/74			0.7
1974 (9 months)			1.3
1975	1.3	0.3	
1976	1.2	1.2	
1977	1.0	0.1	
1978	0.6	0.1	
1979	0.3	0.5	
1980	0.6	2.6	
1981	0.4	4.1	
1982	0.7	4.9	

7.5 An additional security cost in the North not included in Table 7 is the official premium given to hotels and other commercial undertakings towards the cost of maintaining security staff. These costs are given below in Table 11. (This premium has since 1982 been added to the NIO vote).

Table 11: The Security Staff Premium Scheme in the North

	Stg.£m	IR£m
1975/76	3.15	3.15
1976/77	3.97	3.97
1977/78	4.63	4.63
1978/79	5.40	5.40
1979/80	5.36	5.55
1980/81	6.83	7.7
1981/82	2.63	3.29

The total comes to IR£34 million or in 1982 prices IR£53 million.

8. The Growing Costs of Prisons, North and South

8.1 The violence in the North has resulted in a much greater number of people, especially young males, serving prison sentences than would be the case in normal conditions. The prison population in the North has risen from 686 in 1967 to about 2,500 today — 500 less than at its peak. This represents the highest prison population, per 100,000 population, in Western Europe. Graph I sets out the comparison with other countries on the basis of the latest figures available showing the North with 164 prisoners per 100,000 of the population and the South with 35.

Graph 1: Prisoners per 100,000 of total population.



8.2 In the North there are no separate figures for prisoners who in the South would be classified as 'subversive prisoners' but a large proportion of the 75 per cent of prisoners classified as 'high risk' were convicted of crimes connected with terrorism. In 1981, 567 or 24 per cent of 2,387 persons committed under sentence had been convicted of offences connected with terrorism, including murder and other crimes of violence against the person, explosives and firearms offences and robbery. There are 423 prisoners serving life sentences, including 66 who were under age, when sentenced, and are held at the Secretary of State's pleasure. Of this total the Maze H-Blocks contain 230, the Maze compounds 160, Crumlin Road 30 and Armagh 3. Table 12 gives the numbers in prison from 1970 to 1981. Given that over 25,000 persons have been committed under sentence between 1970 and 1981 and, applying the 1981 estimate that 24 per cent of all those convicted were connected with terrorism offences, there could have been over 6,000 persons imprisoned in the North as a result of the violence. If one also includes those persons who were interned and those given mandatory sentences for rioting (who would not be included in the percentage for terrorism) this figure could be as high as 10,000.

Table 12: Numbers in Prison, Borstal, and Young Offenders' Centres on 31 December in each year


	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total
In Prison:													
Men	766	806	1092	1593	2005	2501	2374	2656	2593	2295	2168	2187	
Women	18	13	25	56	82	87	67	84	78	66	55	50	
In Borstal:													
Boys	124	112	91	89	89	116	140	138	140	148	—	—	
Girls	2	5	4	1	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	
In YOCs:													
Males	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	135	210	207	
Females	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	1	—	
Total	910	936	1212	1739	2178	2706	2581	2878	2811	2654	2434	2444	25483

8.3 In the Maze prison Catholics outnumber Protestants in the H-Block by 530 to 300. 730 of these prisoners are serving sentences of four years or more. In Magilligan prison out of a total of 380 prisoners, 210 are Catholic and 170 Protestant. In Crumlin Road there are 230 convicted and 370 prisoners on remand, including 220 Catholics and 150 Protestants. In Armagh there are 50 women prisoners and in the Young Offenders Centre, Hydebank, there are 271 prisoners, 259 of them convicted and 12 on remand.

8.4 Graph 2 illustrates the fluctuation in the average daily population in prisons in the North from 1971 to 1981. This Graph does not include those persons interned from 1971 to 1975.

8.5 The current cost in 1983 of running the prisons in the North comes to IR£69.8 million (Stg.£55.8 million). With an average prison population of some 2,500 that works out at approximately IR£27,500 (Stg.£22,000) per

Graph 2: Average Daily Prison Population 1971-81



head which is higher than the cost per head in Britain. This expenditure covers running costs but not the investment in capital costs for new prisons such as Magheraberry. This jail, on which work began in 1978, will have 447 cells for male and 56 cells for female prisoners. It will cost an estimated IR£37 million (Stg.£30 million) in 1982 prices. (These capital and running costs are already included in the total cost of law and order in Table 7).

8.6 The total number of persons employed in the prison staff in the North as of June 1983 was 2,983. The bulk of this total, 2,009, are male and female staff at basic grade.

8.7 In the South it is difficult to cost exactly the extra expenditure that has been necessary in the prison service because of terrorist-related crime but the extra costs in terms of capital expenditure and staffing set out below give an overall indication of the increased expenditure. (These figures are included in the total cost of security in Table 6). In May 1972 there was a serious riot in Mountjoy prison involving subversive prisoners and the cost of reconstruction came to IR£650,000 in 1982 prices. In 1973 most subversive prisoners were transferred to Portlaoise prison and, therefore, most of the cost of operating Portlaoise since 1973 and Limerick prison since 1981 (when it was converted into a prison for male subversive prisoners) is attributable to terrorist-related crime. Table 13 shows the capital expenditure on these two prisons during these periods. The total cost to date in 1982 prices comes to IR£1.3 million which is included in the figures for total security expenditure given in Table 6.

Table 13: Capital Expenditure at Portlaoise Prison from 1972 to 1982 and also at Limerick Prison in 1982

Year	Approximate Expenditure
	IR£
1972/73	15,000
1973/74	25,000
1974 (9 months)	55,000
1975	42,000
1976	54,000
1977	43,000
1978	13,000
1979	53,000
1980	116,000
1981	17,000
1982	331,000

Note: The Table covers all the capital expenditure related to prison security needs e.g. accommodation for army and garda contingents, special lighting, defensive barriers, etc.

It does not include such items as the upgrading of ablutionary or catering facilities or reconstruction work that would arise in normal course.

8.8 The number of prison officers in the South has increased very much in recent years, from 774 in 1977 to 1,576 in 1983. If there had been no subversive crime it is felt that the number would not have increased so much or so rapidly. Table 14 shows the number of prison officers concerned with subversive prisoners and their approximate staff costs since 1974. The extra staffing cost comes to IR£34 million in 1982 prices.

Table 14: This table gives the number of prison officers in Portlaoise prison and their annual cost from the time the subversive prisoners were moved to Portlaoise at the end of 1973 up to 1981. For 1982 the number of officers in Limerick Prison and their cost is added to the Portlaoise figures.

Year	Number of Officers	Approximate Cost (current prices) IR£ (million)
1974	149	0.5
1975	166	0.7
1976	172	0.9
1977	217	1.1
1978	267	1.5
1979	269	2.2
1980	366	4.6
1981	356	5.0
1982	519	7.5

Note: It is not possible to give the cost of prison officers dealing with subversive prisoners prior to 1974 as up to that the same prison officers were dealing with subversive and ordinary prisoners.

Table 15: The approximate annual cost (current prices) of maintaining a subversive prisoner in Portlaoise from 1974 on and in Portlaoise and Limerick Prison for 1982. Staff and prisoner maintenance costs are included. Capital costs are not included.

Year	Approximate annual cost IR£
1974	5,370
1975	9,280
1976	9,385
1977	10,950
1978	12,775
1979	18,355
1980	35,975
1981	42,805
1982	48,700

8.9 The approximate annual costs of maintaining a subversive prisoner in Portlaoise prison from 1974 and in Portlaoise and Limerick prisons for 1982 are included in Table 15. Staff and prisoner maintenance costs are included but capital costs are not. If the additional cost of Garda security is included in 1982 the per capita cost of an inmate in that year comes to IR£61,400.

8.10 Tables 16, 17 and 18 give a breakdown of the age groups of subversive prisoners in 1982, of all prisoners since 1973 and of the length of sentences for subversive prisoners in 1982. The number of subversive prisoners in 1982 was 238 which means they represent nearly 20 per cent of the total of 1,200 prisoners in the South.

Table 16*: Breakdown of subversive prisoners into age groups in 1982

	Less than 18 years	18 years but less than 25 years	25 years but less than 30 years	30 years but less than 40 years	over 40 years
Portlaoise (199)	1	38	81	60	19
Limerick (31 Male) (2 Female)	—	4 males	14 males 1 female	12 males 1 female	1

Table 17*: Committals to all prisons by age since 1973

Age Groups	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
15 to 17 years	24	33	13	26	29	25	25	25	10	12
17 to 21 years	625	486	499	591	458	451	427	523	498	513
21 to 25 years	641	603	583	633	551	557	553	564	560	751
25 to 30 years	401	439	451	488	419	457	386	435	415	549
30 to 40 years	404	473	422	425	370	416	354	461	419	476
40 to 50 years	232	203	236	216	161	189	186	226	149	183
50 to 60 years	114	102	102	69	66	85	65	62	38	44
60 to 70 years	30	14	24	29	31	26	23	19	26	25
70 and over	1	4	—	—	3	1	6	5	5	4
Total	2472	2357	2330	2480	2088	2207	2025	2320	2120	2557

Table 18*: Percentage breakdown of subversive prisoners serving sentences of following lengths in 1982

	Less than 1 year	1 year but less than 5 years	5 years but less than 10 years	10 years but less than 20 years	over 20 years
Portlaoise	1%	14%	48%	28%	9%
Limerick	—	9%	43%	36%	12%

*The breakdown of committals for all prisoners is only readily available in the age groupings given in Table 17 as this is the way they are compiled for the annual report.

9. General Economic Impact of the Violence

Decline in Output

9.1 Although it is certain that violence has damaged the North's economic performance, it is difficult to quantify precisely the exact extent to which the violence, as distinct from other significant factors, affected the North's economy. The most important of these factors is the general reduction in the level of economic activity in the UK, largely as an effect of the international recession since the 1973 oil crisis although the high exchange value of sterling has also been a significant influence. In addition, the North has faced particularly severe structural adjustments, as the shipbuilding and textiles industries, on which it is particularly dependent, contracted in the face of competition from low cost countries and from other changes. Finally, the North has suffered a growing loss of competitiveness relative to Britain and to the South, as unit wage costs reflected the adverse effects on productivity of the decline in industrial output.

9.2 An examination of the variation in performance of the North's economy in relation to that of Britain and some of its regions helps to distinguish between the influence of violence and other negative factors on the decline in output. Since 1950 the general trend of economic performance in the North followed the trend in Britain closely. It might reasonably be expected that in the absence of violence this pattern would not have significantly altered, even in the recessionary conditions of the 1970s. In the 10 years prior to when the violence began in 1969 average annual GDP growth in the North was approximately 40 per cent above that in Britain. However, between 1969 and 1982, despite substantial growth in transfers from Britain, average annual GDP growth in the North was only 40 per cent that of Britain. This decline in growth cannot be simply explained by the poorer performance of peripheral regions in a recession because the North's performance was also worse than that of other regions of the United Kingdom. Comparing GDP in the different regions over the period 1971-81, as given in 'Regional Trends 1983' (UK CSO) and using the UK GDP deflator the North's GDP grew in real terms on average 0.5 per cent per year compared to 0.9 per cent for Wales and 1.2 per cent for Scotland. This relatively poorer performance by the North in the post-1970 period occurred in spite of increasing public expenditure in the North compared to the other UK regions. By contrast the South substantially improved its performance as measured by GDP growth relative to the UK.

9.3 If it assumed that but for the indigenous adverse factors, the North's GDP growth would have continued during 1970-82 in the same relationship to British GDP growth as in the 1960s, it is possible to derive an estimate of 1.4 per cent per annum as the approximate average loss of real GDP growth since the violence began, representing the difference between the actual annual average growth rate of 0.6 per cent and the 'expected' growth rate of 2 per cent if the previous relationship with British growth had been maintained. This would represent a net loss to the North's economy for it already reflects benefits to the North's GDP of increased British expenditure on extra security costs and on more extensive public services. Had such expenditure not occurred the gross loss of output would have been even

greater. While some of this loss in output can be attributed to factors other than violence, it is a reasonable conclusion that violence was the dominant factor in the deterioration in the North's performance relative to that of Britain generally, to other regions such as Scotland and Wales and to the South. Any quantitative expression of the amount of loss attributable to violence is necessarily arbitrary but if it is assumed that 75 per cent of the loss is so attributable, the cumulative cost of the violence over the 13 year period would amount to some IR£3,830 million (stg.£3,490m), in 1982 prices.

10. Lost Jobs and Investment

10.1 Violence has severely affected employment opportunities in the North; one widely quoted estimate puts the gross loss of jobs at 39,000 over the decade 1970-80. (R. Rowthorn in 'Cambridge Journal of Economics' No.5, 1981). Professor Norman Gibson of the New University of Ulster has suggested that the measure of this loss in 1982 alone might be approximately IR£431 million (stg.£350m). However, this cost and that for previous years can be taken as reflected in the cumulative cost of lost output above.

10.2 In 1982 the British Government estimated that the extra costs of security within the North (not including extra British army costs) were IR£308 million (stg.£250m). This figure reflects the growth since 1969 of over 12,000 new jobs directly attributed to the extra security costs. This job creation can hardly be seen as a benefit because it is a resource cost to the UK economy and even for the North itself it represents the diversion of resources from socially productive purposes to meeting exigencies that would not normally exist. In addition, one must also consider the long-term implications for the North's economy of distortions of costs and price structures and the resultant unfavourable economic climate for private sector investment due to the high level of resources devoted to an expanded security establishment.

10.3 Investment levels and job creation in the North have been at a very low level in recent years. It is clear that violence and its adverse impact on the North's image with potential investors are a principal cause of the decline as compared with earlier years. In March, 1983 the Northern Ireland Industrial Development Board revealed that 60 per cent of British, German and American businessmen questioned by market research consultants for the Board said that they considered the risks of investing in the North too great. The study, based on interviews with 460 leading businessmen, found that respondents put political stability, government attitudes on nationalisation and market size as the three most important factors in plant location decisions. The North was placed 19th on a list of 20 western European countries assessed as to their attractiveness as locations for industrial plants.

10.4 In the South, there has not been the same problem with potential investors. Queries about the violence sometimes arise at an early stage in discussions with company executives who are not familiar with the different levels of violence, North and South, but the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) has invariably been able to satisfy them that there is no ground for concern in this regard. This was reflected in the continuing

success of the IDA throughout the 1970s in attracting overseas investment to the South. For example, from 1960 to 1969 the figure for overseas investment by the IDA was IR£131 million (in current prices) and from 1970 to 1979 it was IR£1,823 million. Since 1979, however, both parts of Ireland as well as the UK have been hit sharply by international recessionary conditions but the impact has been much more severe in the North.

11. Damage to Tourist Industry

11.1 The world-wide adverse publicity arising from the continuing violence and loss of life in Northern Ireland since 1969 has proved extremely damaging to the tourist industry in both North and South. The scenes of violence on television screens in Britain, Continental Europe and North America and reports of the toll of deaths and injuries in the North suggested general unrest and danger to personal safety and, since Ireland was generally perceived by the rest of the world as a single holiday destination, the images of both North and South were damaged. Efforts to produce a more balanced image and to reassure potential holiday-makers about the geographical limits of the violence have had some success, especially in relation to the South. However, the continuing media coverage of violence and instability, especially the intensive coverage of singular atrocities and the simplistic generalisations that often accompany it have offset such efforts, to a greater or lesser degree at different times. Consequently, even though the level of violence has declined substantially, the residual effect is that the earlier impressions remain a significant deterrent to many of those who might consider holidaying in Ireland.

11.2 These perceptions have been particularly adverse in their effects on the tourist industry in the North. The effects are graphically summed up in a comment in the Annual Report of the Northern Ireland Tourist Board (N.I.T.B.) for 1977: 'In 1974 Northern Ireland holidays could not be sold through any tour operator or travel agent anywhere in the world'. The result was that ten years of continuous and fairly rapid growth up to 1968 were succeeded by a rapid decline. By 1972, compared with the record levels of 1968, tourism revenue in real terms in the North had decreased by 60 per cent and visitor numbers by 63 per cent. Holidaymakers with no family or other personal ties with the North accounted for more than a third of total number of visitors entering the area from or via Britain in 1967 but this declined to less than 10 per cent of a much smaller total number of visitors in 1972 and to less than 5 per cent by 1976. The years after 1972 saw some fluctuations in results but by 1979 tourist revenue in real terms was only 57 per cent of its 1968 level and the total number of visitors was no more than two thirds of the number of visitors in 1968.

11.3 In line with the decrease in visitor numbers the number of establishments offering accommodation to visitors was 39 per cent less in 1979 than in 1970; the total number of bedrooms available was down 34 per cent over the same period. The number of permanent staff employed in catering establishments registered with the N.I.T.B. decreased from 13,300 in 1970 to 8,300 in 1978.

11.4 More recently, the slight recovery which began in 1978 and 1979 appears to have resumed, as a result of a promotional campaign directed at activity holidays such as angling and cruising.

11.5 Nevertheless, the losses incurred over the intervening years have been considerable. For a number of reasons any attempt to quantify the cost of violence to the industry can only be approximate. There is firstly the difficulty in gauging how the industry would have fared in peaceful conditions. Secondly, there is the problem of isolating the impact of violence from other factors which emerged in the 1970s such as the consequences of the 1973 and 1979 oil crises and the subsequent world recessions, inflationary pressures and increased competition from relatively inexpensive package tours to countries such as Spain.

11.6 In regard to the first of these difficulties a Co-operation North Study 'Tourism in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland' (W. Clarke and B. Ó Cinnéide, 1981) and comments by Bord Fáilte Éireann suggest that the rapid growth in revenue in the 1960s could not have been maintained to the same extent into the 1970s. It has been pointed out that in Britain there was also a decline in domestic tourism over the period 1969-82 as holidays based on 'cold water resorts' lost their appeal against the competition of 'sunshine destinations', and that the North had a rather heavy dependence on resort-based holidays. On the other hand, it appears likely that in more favourable condition of peace, the North would have been more vigorous in developing and diversifying its tourist attractions.

11.7 Clark and Ó Cinnéide took the view that it was unlikely that substantial further increases in the level of traffic could have been achieved in subsequent years. They considered it reasonable, however, to surmise that if the subsequent period had been free of violence, it would have been possible to earn each year the same real level of revenue as achieved in 1968. On this basis, Clark and Ó Cinnéide estimated that the violence resulted in a shortfall of stg.£280 million at current prices up to 1979 — equivalent to stg.£630 million in 1982 money values. Allowing for losses in the last three years — and it is clear from the data that the hunger strike crisis had a considerable adverse effect — the total for the period 1970-82 calculated by this method would be stg.£900 million or IR£950 million in 1982 money values. It has been suggested by Bord Fáilte that a more satisfactory way to estimate the losses would be to assume that, in the absence of violence, tourism revenue in the North would have followed more closely the trend of spending by British people on long holidays in Britain itself. If it is assumed that in peaceful conditions, the performance in the North would have been the same as that of British domestic tourism, it is possible to derive an estimate of stg.£1,230 million or IR£1,350 million at 1982 values for the loss of revenue. It may be appropriate, therefore, to take an average of the two estimates as a reasonable measure of the loss of tourism revenue to the North as a result of violence: on this basis the loss would amount to IR£1,150 million in 1982 money values (stg.£1,065m).

11.8 In the South the continuous growth averaging 6.5 per cent per annum for export tourism revenue over the period 1960-80 was halted in 1969 and followed by a continued decline in real terms up to 1976. Indeed, if one focuses on visitors staying more than one day and excludes fares paid to Irish air and shipping companies, it was only in 1978 that receipts in real terms regained their 1969 value.

11.9 Clark and Ó Cinnéide concluded that for the period 1970-78, the image of violence was the main contributory factor to the losses experienced. They noted that the performance of the Irish industry was poor in this period, as compared with the growth experienced in Britain, the South's closest competitor, or even as compared with the less rapid growth in tourism receipts in the OECD European countries considered as a group. They suggested that deteriorating competitiveness was scarcely the dominant explanation in that period, as both general consumer price movements and increases in the cost of hotel accommodation in the South were closely in step with corresponding changes in the UK. They considered that other environmental factors, such as economic recession and international political uncertainties, would affect all European tourism destinations more or less equally during the period in question. The authors of the study therefore concluded that the violence in the North must have been a major contributory factor to tourism losses in the period 1970-78.

11.10 Clark and Ó Cinnéide made an initial estimate of the losses from 1970-78 by comparing actual receipts in real terms with the receipts that might have been earned on the basis of extrapolating through the 1970s the trends experienced in the period 1960-69. The loss calculated in this way amounted to IR£530 million in current prices equivalent to IR£1,480 million in 1982 money values. On the basis of a second approach taking as a yardstick the growth of real tourism revenue in OECD European countries from 1970-78 they calculated that their first estimate was, if anything, an understatement of the total loss. If one applies the methodology of Clark and Ó Cinnéide, the further losses in the period 1979-82 amounted to IR£850 million giving a total loss over the period 1970-82 of IR£2,330 million in 1982 prices.

11.11 Bord Fáilte consider that lack of cost competitiveness may have been a significant contributory factor to the decline that has occurred in the real value of tourism since 1979. Inflation in the South was considerably greater than that in Britain, North America and the major market countries on the Continent. While for some markets, the divergence was entirely or largely offset by the effects of exchange rate movements, in other markets, currency changes fell short of compensating for the South's higher inflation and Bord Fáilte surveys of Continental tourists have revealed a marked consumer resistance on price grounds. In addition, the prices of major items in the tourists' spending basket increased considerably more than the general rate of inflation in the South. Moreover, during this period, there were a number of major atrocities and other events that had very adverse consequences on tourism, especially from Britain and the North.

11.12 Table 19 provides alternative estimates made by Bord Fáilte Éireann of losses of potential tourist revenue throughout the period 1969-83 by market. The basis used by Bord Fáilte was as follows: they assumed that in the absence of adverse factors, revenue from the British market would have followed the trend of spending by British people holidaying in their own country. In the case of visitors to the South from the North the loss of tourism revenue was calculated by comparing actual revenue with revenue that would have been realised if the 1968 level of visits from the North had been maintained. For all other markets the actual revenue was compared with the revenue that would have resulted if the volume of tourist revenue had grown in line with the volume of foreign tourist earnings to Britain over the period 1968-83.

Table 19:

Market	Losses IR£million, 1982 prices
Britain	1,020
The North	194
North America	188
Continental Europe	93
Other Areas	15
Total	1,510

As indicated previously in relation to the North any attempt to segregate the proportion of tourism losses that is attributable to violence is fraught with difficulty. High travel costs to Ireland may be a significant factor and there was some loss of competitiveness even in tourist's own currencies for the particular basket of goods and services purchased by visitors especially since 1978. Nevertheless, weighing all the evidence, it appears reasonable to conclude that the greater part of the losses was caused by the violence in the North. The difference between the Bord Fáilte estimate and that (IR£2,330 million) based on the approach used by Clark and Ó Cinnéide is significant but arises from the different assumptions used about growth in tourism in peaceful conditions. Even if the lower estimate is taken and if it is assumed that 75 per cent of the loss of revenue was attributable to violence, the loss on this account would amount to IR£1,130 million (stg.£1,070 million). This figure does not include the losses in bomb damage to hotels which are dealt with under compensation payments. Nor is there any evidence from official figures that the decline in cross-border tourism in this period resulted in compensatory increases in 'home holidays' in either part of the country.

11.13 Combining this figure with that for the North gives an estimated total loss to tourism in the island of IR£2,280 million (stg.£2,135m) in 1982 money values.

12. Increases in Electricity Prices

12.1 Because of the small and isolated nature of both electricity systems in the North and South generating costs are substantially higher than in other European countries. It is accepted that the linking of both electricity systems should confer economic benefits in terms of:—

1. capital savings because co-ordinated planning could ensure that surplus reserve generating capacity needs would be lower;
2. saving in operating costs because of lower 'spinning reserve' requirements (power stations on standby);
3. economies resulting from energy trading to mutual advantage.

12.2 An inter-connector between both systems was commissioned in 1970. During the 13 years of its existence it has only been operational for 24 per cent of the time owing to bomb damage on six occasions and has not been in service at all since 1975. Intimidation of repair teams has frustrated efforts to restore the interconnector in South Armagh. Since 1975 it is estimated by the Electricity Supply Board that the benefits lost by not having the inter-connector available amounted to IR£24 million each in current money values for the North and South. These savings relate to operating costs and trading losses rather than to capital savings. Joint planning and capital programming by both electricity services began in the late 1960s in anticipation of inter-connection and continued up to the mid-1970s. With the loss of inter-connection from 1975 onwards both utilities had little choice but to plan on a separate systems basis. Had continued integrated planning been possible up to the present time it is estimated that capital savings of the order of IR£180 million for the North and IR£20 million for the South could have been achieved.

13 Conclusion

13.1 The violence in the North has created staggering costs in human and economic terms since 1969. Nearly every family in the North has been touched either by personal grief or injury. There are many thousands who have lost spouses, parents, children. Amongst the 24,000 injured are many thousands who continue to suffer pain resulting from loss of limbs or other permanent disability. Thousands more have to endure psychological stress and damage because of the fear and tension created by murder, bombing and intimidation. The lives of tens of thousands have been blighted. While the South and Britain have not suffered in any comparable way they have been affected by the spillover of violence, especially in terms of extra security and judicial measures.

13.2 In addition to the appalling human costs, the violence has contributed significantly to the loss of jobs and opportunities for the people of the North. The major expenditure on security measures totalled in Table 20 below represents a serious opportunity loss because it diverts scarce public funds away from productive enterprises. There are additional costs to the British exchequer which are not included because of the difficulty in quantifying them. These include the cost to the health services of caring for those who have been physically or mentally injured by the violence and the cost to the social services of providing for the dependents of those killed or maimed. There are also the costs of reduced revenue because of the decline in GDP growth and the extra cost in terms of unemployment benefits because of the negative impact of the violence on job-creating investment and employment generally.

Table 20: Summary of Costs of the Violence since 1969 in 1982 prices

	IR£ million	Stg.£ million
A. Exchequer Costs		
Exchequer Costs to Britain and the North		
1. Extra Security Costs	4,455	4,195
2. Compensation for deaths, injuries and damage to property	1,040	1,010
3. Premium scheme for security staff	55	50
Sub-total	IR£5,550	Stg.£5,255
Exchequer Costs to the South		
1. Extra Security Costs	1,050	990
2. Compensation for deaths, injuries and damage to property	30	29
Sub-total	IR£1,080	Stg.£1,019
TOTAL Exchequer costs	IR£6,630	Stg.£6,274
B. Economic Costs		
Estimated Costs to the North's Economy:		
1. Cumulative lost output over 13 years*	3,830	3,490
2. Damage to tourism (IR£1150m or stg£1065m) included in above figure		
3. Capital and trading costs due to destruction of electricity inter-connector	205	190
Sub-total	IR£4,035	Stg.£3,680
*See basis for calculation in par. 9.3		
Estimated Cost to the Economy in the South		
1. Damage to Tourism	1,130	1,070
2. Capital and Trading costs due to destruction of electricity inter-connector	45	40
Sub-total	IR£1,175	Stg.£1,110
TOTAL Economic costs	IR£5,210	Stg.£4,790

13.3 Table 20 provides a summary of the economic costs of violence. It includes the estimated direct costs to the Irish and British exchequers as well as estimated costs to the economies in the North and the South. Thus it legitimately combines estimates of output actually lost with estimates of resources that were available but which had to be diverted from socially useful purposes to meeting exigencies that would not have arisen in normal circumstances. The figure given for the cost of the cumulative loss in output in the North over the past 13 years is that estimated on the basis set out in paragraph 9.3 above. The total direct cost of the violence to the exchequers comes to IR£1,080 million in the South and IR£5,550 million in the North. In addition, it is estimated that the cost to the economies was IR£1,175 million in the South and IR£4,035 million in the North. **Combining the estimates for direct and indirect costs, North and South, gives an overall estimate for the cost of violence arising from the Northern Ireland crisis over the period from 1969 to 1982 of IR£11,840 million (stg.£11,064m) in 1982 money values.**

As indicated in earlier sections of the paper, elements of arbitrariness have been unavoidable in estimating some components of this aggregate figure. It should not, therefore, be regarded as a precise estimate: it is, however, a reasonable approximation to the order of magnitude of the total cost of the violence.

13.4 Estimates of the annual losses in 1982, using the same methods as were used to derive the estimates of cumulative costs, are IR£656 million (stg.£533m) to both exchequers and IR£971 million (stg.£789m) in loss of GDP and tourism revenue to the economies, North and South. Combining these figures gives **an estimate of IR£1,627 million (stg.£1,322m) for the total 1982 cost of violence to North and South.** Of this total, the cost to the North and Britain is estimated at IR£1,297 million (stg.£1,054m) and the cost to the South is estimated at IR£330 million (stg.£268m).

APPENDIX I

Table 1: (Additional detail for Table 1 in main text)
Annual classification of the loss of life arising from political violence in the North, 1969 to 30 June 1983

CLASSIFICATION	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83	Total
Civilian	13	17	95	238	127	145	171	215	48	30	25	34	33	31	12	1,233
Elected Representative/ Political Activist			1	2	1		3	3	1			3	4	1		20
Former member of security forces including prison service			2	2	4	3	3	3	6	1	6	5	5	7		44
Sub total	13	17	96	242	130	149	177	221	55	31	31	42	42	39	12	1,297
Security	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83	Total
British Army (including TA)			43	107	58	27	13	14	16	12	38	12	11	20	4	375
RUC and RUCR	1	2	11	17	12	16	11	23	13	8	12	9	20	12	9	176
UDR			5	25	9	8	7	15	14	8	10	8	13	8	2	132
Prison Officer							2	3	3	8	2					19
Sub total	1	2	59	149	79	51	31	54	46	31	68	31	44	41	15	702
Provisional IRA			5	15	57	28	14	9	14	5	5	5	3	11	7	178
Official IRA	1		2	8	4	3	7									26
INLA						1	1	1	2	1	2	1	5	2	1	13
UDA			8	6	2	7	4	4			1	3	2	2	1	38
UVF			2	2	2	11	1	2								23
Sub total	1	5	17	75	40	21	35	19	12	7	5	5	19	13	4	278
Unclassified			1	1	8	3	1	2	1	1	2		3	2	2	27
Total	15	25	173	474	252	221	244	296	114	70	106	78	108	95	33	2,304

**Table 2: (Additional detail for Table 4 in main text)
Agencies Responsible for Loss of Life 1 January 1969 to 30 June 1983**

Agency	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83	Total
Non specific Republican Group	4	12	35	43	17	15	45	62	26	19	37	11	20	3	7	356
Provisional IRA	6	58	207	110	80	80	52	79	44	32	49	36	38	40	13	844
INLA						3	1	1	1	2	2	2	8	29	3	49
Official IRA		3	5	1	3	2							1			15
Non specific Loyalist Group	2	2	21	99	65	86	90	104	19	6	13	10	7	10	4	538
UDA (including UFF)			3	14	5	8		1	1	1	4	3	3	1	1	47
UVF			1	1	3	17	2	2	2				1	1		28
British Army	2	5	40	68	29	15	7	13	7	10	1	7	11	4	1	220
Ulster Defence Regiment			1	2									1			6
RUC/RUCR/USC	7	1	5	1	2	2	3	2	2		2	6	7	2		38
Non-classified*		15	42	12	12	20	27	11	2	3	6	12	1			163
Total	15	25	173	474	252	221	244	296	114	70	106	78	108	95	33	2304

*The non classified total embraces three distinct groups:

- (1) Those incidents where it is not possible to attribute responsibility.
- (2) Those incidents where there is no direct line of responsibility e.g. certain affrays or riot situations.
- (3) The deaths of the ten hunger strikers. However, accidentally self-inflicted deaths (e.g. premature explosions) have been attributed to the agency initiating the action.

Table 3: Industrial and Commercial Sector Damage in selected towns, 1978-83

Belfast:	Year	No. of Awards	Stg.£m.	IR£m.
	1978-79	659	7.8	7.8
	1979-80	454	8.9	9.3
	1980-81	338	11.5	13.0
	1981-82	273	5.4	6.8
	1982-83	407	9.1	11.2
	Interim*	281	21.5	24.1
		<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
		2412	64.3	72.2
Derry:	1978-79	89	0.8	0.8
	1979-80	148	1.7	1.78
	1980-81	148	1.7	1.97
	1981-82	219	1.7	2.17
	1982-83	253	1.7	2.10
	Interim	99	3.5	3.87
		<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
		956	11.2	12.69
Newry:	1978-79	32	0.2	0.20
	1979-80	46	0.7	0.68
	1980-81	54	1.5	1.65
	1981-82	33	0.5	0.66
	1982-83	33	1.0	1.17
	Interim	33	1.4	1.51
		<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
		231	5.2	5.87
Strabane:	1978-79	11	0.1	0.10
	1979-80	14	0.1	0.13
	1980-81	5	0.1	0.11
	1981-82	14	0.5	0.60
	1982-83	78	0.2	0.26
	Interim	10	0.1	0.13
		<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
		137	1.1	1.33

*Payments made pending final adjudication of award.

Table 4: Pattern of killings in the North from 1980 to 1982

	1980		1981		1982	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
(1) Belfast and adjacent towns (Belfast alone)	40 (35)	56 (49)	56 (46)	53 (43)	39 (30)	41 (32)
(2) Rural Towns/Villages and Country Areas – non-border	6	8.5	12	11	17	18
(3) Border Towns	6	8.5	22	21	18	19
(4) Rural Border Areas – Open Country and Small villages	19	27	16	15	21	22

Notes:

- (1) The category 'Belfast and Adjacent Towns' includes the following: Lurgan, Lisburn, Portadown, Holywood, Carrickfergus, Craigavon.
- (2) The category 'Rural Towns and Villages and Country Areas – non-Border' includes all towns/villages and rural areas not included in Category (1) and which are as a good distance from the border. Specifically it includes: Dungannon, Cookstown, Ballymoney, Coalisland, Ballymena, Magherafelt, Lisnaskea etc.
- (3) The category 'Border Towns' includes Derry, Newry, Enniskillen, Strabane, Crossmaglen etc.
- (4) The category 'Rural Border Areas – open country and small villages' includes for example, Castleterg, Newtownbutler, Belleek, Middletown, Aughnacloy, Keady etc.

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