# Women, Civil Society and Peacebuilding

Paths to Peace Through the Empowerment of Women

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Abstract

Women have long been recognised as having played a major and visible role in peace movements. Debates relating to innate passivity in women, socialisation processes, differential impact of conflict and coincidental factors are explored. Notions of civil society are also investigated and how women are included (or not) in the theory. In particular, it is argued that the participation of women is a key identifier of both binding and bridging social capital. The interaction of civil society with the project of peacebuilding is also analysed, where the involvement of civil associations is a factor in building participative democracy and has a role in bypassing conflict elites which often hold societies along lines of division. Using the investment in women's training as part of Peace and Reconciliation funding in Northern Ireland as an example, it is concluded that the empowerment of women through building their capacity to participate is essential to building social capital and creating the conditions for a lasting, inclusive peace.

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Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION – THE CASE FOR A FEMINIST METHODOLOGY

Women have been long associated with peace and peacebuilding. Accordingly, the participation of women in peacebuilding efforts has been justified on the basis of justice and equality, the necessities of policy criteria, contributions to economic growth and the strengthening of societal cohesion. However, a direct causal relationship between women as peacemakers, women as essential components of civil society and civil society as a pre-requisite for peacebuilding has not been thoroughly explored. The exploration of this issue requires a methodology that sufficiently represents the viewpoint of women and their experiences of political and social influences. To this end, a methodology that is 'feminist' is to be used. The form and even existence of such a methodology is in dispute, so an exploration of the background to the use of such a methodology should first be explained.

Political feminism challenges societal structures regarding gender relations. Social research analyses various aspects of social interaction. Feminists would therefore clearly have a particular perspective when research is being carried out. However, before establishing whether there is a distinct feminist methodology, an understanding of what constitutes 'feminism' should be acquired. It is then necessary to ascertain how such a political ideology can form the basis for a methodology, before identifying what distinct characteristics a feminist methodology might have.

There are many political manifestations that have been labelled as 'feminism'. Describing the various aspects of this diverse concept has often resulted in attaching the 'feminism' label to another political ideology or philosophy that is closely related, examples being liberal feminism, Marxist feminism, radical feminism, socialist feminism, existentialist feminism, psychoanalytic feminism, black feminism and post-modern feminism, to name the better known branches (Tong, 1995). Indeed, Coole has bemoaned these divisions, complaining that feminism has become "disjointed and indistinct" and that noting that, although there has been much research and political agitation, there remains no common purpose (Coole, 2000:37). With such compartmentalisation, often with conflicting ideological notions, the idea of an agreed methodology to encompass all shades of feminism seems ambitious.

A range of thinkers have striven to emphasise that there is more to unite feminists than divide them. Marilyn French offers a broad definition of feminism as "any attempt to improve the lot of any group of women through female solidarity and a female perspective" (French, 1992:4). There is a sense of action to address a situation and a way of looking at society that is distinctive. Arneil's comprehensive attempt to unify feminism incorporates the same ideas of action and perspective, but adds normative and epistemic features:

> *The recognition that, virtually across time and place, men and women are unequal in the power they have, either in society or over their own lives, and the corollary belief that men and women should be equal; the belief that knowledge has been written about, for and by men and the corollary belief that all schools of knowledge must be re-examined and understood to reveal the extent to which they ignore or distort gender.* (Arneil, 1999:3-4).

Feminism, for Arneil, combines notions of equality with a critique of conventional epistemology, which suggests there is a place for a methodological approach that could be defined as distinctly feminist. Rosalind Delmer goes a stage further in her three-step definition of feminism, summarised as (1) women suffer discrimination because of their sex, (2) specific needs remain negated and unsatisfied and (3) the satisfaction of these needs requires radical change in the social, economic and

political order (Mitchell and Oakley, 1994: 8). Feminism is not just about redefining knowledge, but actively bringing about fundamental change.

If there is agreement that there are common themes within feminism that can be related to knowledge and justice issues, a feminist epistemology may be formed. Carole Pateman traces the formation of western political thought, identifying how women have been excluded and suggesting that the subjugation of women has been central to this process (Pateman, 1989: 1). The French feminist Luce Irigaray explains this is the adoption of the masculine as universal and the feminine as a copy. The masculine machinery needs to be suspended for long enough for the feminine to be seen and heard (Leng, 2003: 171-3). If political thought has a bias against women, then the study of politics and political research will retain this exclusion (Carroll and Zerilli, 1993: 55). The epistemic basis for feminism, therefore, identifies a fundamental exclusion of women from the realm of political thought and study, which demands an alternative approach to correct this imbalance.

The logical conclusion drawn by Jones and Jonasdottir is that the exclusion of women from political theory creates an absence of the feminine from the practice of political analysis (Jones and Jonasdottir, 1988: 1). As Oakley points out, this absence is maintained by a bias against women in the formation of research methodology, which is geared to the pursuit of knowledge that benefits men, while negating the needs of women (Oakley, 1993: 3). Lynch refers to this kind of research as 'colonising', extending the subjugation of women by imposing a male epistemology. The counter to this has therefore to be 'emancipatory knowledge' (Lynch, 2000: 296). These arguments urge the formation of a distinct methodology to overcome the prevailing male universalist assumptions in political science by emancipating women's thoughts and voices and allowing a more equitable system of knowledge acquisition.

Standpoint feminism challenges the dominant position of the masculine in knowledge and understanding, referring to 'situated knowledge', which assumes as universal one particular perspective (Sayer, 2000: 51). This borrows from Marxism, indicating that alternative views - those of the 'oppressed' - not only should be expressed, but have a better understanding of reality due their subjugated position than does the oppressor. Hartsock relates this principle to the position of women: "Women's lives make available a particular and privileged vantage point on male supremacy" (Hartsock, 1983: 284). In this view, the formation of knowledge from a woman's perspective is superior to the prevailing understanding of reality, a position summarised by Jaggar:

> *The special social or class position of women gives them a special epistemological standpoint which makes possible a view of the world that is more reliable and less distorted than that available.* (Jaggar, 1999: 49).

By this reasoning, the application of a research methodology that represents the standpoint of feminism is essential for a clearer view of social reality.

The epistemological argument for a feminist methodology may be clear, but the features of a methodology that is distinctly feminist still need to be identified. Ramazanoglu and Holland indicate what feminist methodology is not. It does not constitute merely women studying women, there are no distinctly feminist research techniques and there is no distinctly feminist ideology (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002: 3-4). However, it is indicated that feminist methodology is identified by research that is shaped by feminist theory and is grounded in women's experiences (ibid.). Spalter-Roth and Hartman claim that feminist methodology is identified by two

functions, that of the researcher excluding bias in research techniques (by 'experts') and the utilisation of a feminist perspective in research design and purpose (by 'advocates') (Spalter-Roth and Hartman, 1999: 344). This latter point of political purpose is echoed in Daly's definition of feminist methodology, requiring the link to ideology, the re-definition of social relationships and a focus on women (Daly, 2000: 62). Byrne and Lentin also identify political purpose as an essential feature, added to women's experience, the hearing of women's voices and a more equitable relationship between researcher and researched (Byrne and Lentin, 2000: 7-8).

Feminist methodology can be characterised in terms of a general approach, but some have advocated certain research techniques that can be utilised in the application of this methodology. Wylie defines the general approach as "critically reassessing the extant ideology and theory where this leaves out women altogether or significantly distorts or devalues their activities or lives" and proposes two models of practice: The 'collectivist' model, which investigates the experiences of women by asking not telling them what they are experiencing and why and actively involves the research subject in the research process; and the 'self-study' model, which is designed to "recover and re-value the experience of women" and should not be widened into a general theory, using women as a 'resource' (Wylie, 1994: 612-4). This is clearly an hermeneutic approach, focusing on experience and understanding, requiring a subjective perspective in information collection.

Harding acknowledges the subjective approach, but also advocates a 'feminist empiricism'. Being aware of male bias and applying strict scientific techniques can squeeze the prevailing societal attitudes out of the research process. In this way, objective methods are also beneficial to a feminist methodological approach (Harding, 1987: 182). But it is not the methods themselves that constitute feminist methodology, it is the awareness, purpose and understanding of the research process in the wider sphere of gender relations in society that mould the relevance of the methods.

The existence and application of feminist methodology is not unchallenged. Not all feminists would acknowledge the fundamental difference between the sexes that could define a universal viewpoint. Carol Gilligan insists that there can be no generalisations about gender, but there are contrasts and perspectives that can be construed as difference (Gilligan, 1991: 2). Finding a representative methodology would therefore be problematic. This ignoring of other societal factors and differences between women goes to the heart of debates within contemporary feminism. The subjectivity of a feminist methodology has also been criticised by positivists and other supporters of the natural sciences. It is not regarded as sufficiently scientific and objective to be viable (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002: 3-4). Harding's feminist empiricism may go some way to counter these criticisms, but if the feminist critique is accurate and all research carries a masculine bias, a subjective correcting of this imbalance is justified.

Hekman identifies certain problems with standpoint feminism. While reprising the criticism that differences between women are ignored, the suggestion is made that the apparent discrediting of Marxism calls into question the epistemological assumptions of succeeding theoretical concepts, including feminist standpoint theory. Indeed, post-modernist and post-structuralist viewpoints challenge the very basis of feminist analysis, rendering a feminist methodology unsupportable in the prevailing sociological climate (Hekman, 2000: 9). Sayer gives a further warning that the privileged position assigned to the subjugated perspective threatens to become the new dominant situated knowledge, ignoring other discourses that may be equally valid (Sayer, 2000: 52).

The application of a specific feminist methodology makes some general assumptions about the nature of knowledge and the notion of objective reality. The absence of women from the political and philosophical spheres is regarded as proof of the application of a universal male dominance designed to exclude women, rather than any other explanation or prevailing discourse. A general female position is assumed to exist in contrast to a general male one, regardless of historical period, culture, class or social structure. This is made more problematic by critiques from what have been variously called black feminists or 'women of colour' and so-called 'third world feminists', that accuse mainstream feminists of trying to replace a male, white, middle class, western universalism with a female, white, middle class, western one (for example, hooks, 1984: 18). It can also be contested that the standpoint feminist claim to redress an imbalance to establish a more accurate interpretation of reality is flawed. Two conflicting subjective positions, far from establishing a median objectivity, merely represent two discourses among many, and any trade-off agreement between the two to find an 'agreed' reality does so at the expense of other perspectives. However, criticisms of the nature of a methodology that claims to be feminist do not disprove the existence of such an approach.

The divided nature of political feminism threatens to deny the existence of a feminist methodology. However, generalised notions of feminism can encompass many aspects common to most feminists, such as the female perspective, female epistemology and a political purpose. This permits the existence of a methodology that is feminist, not defined by the specific methods and mechanisms employed by the researcher, but by the general approach that encompasses being beneficial to women, illuminates the experiences of women and raises political and sociological questions about the position of women in society. The nature of a feminist methodology may be challenged, but no more than any other methodological approach, and such challenges do not necessarily disprove the fact of a feminist methodology. Whether such a viewpoint holds a more privileged or accurate version of reality or not, there is a feminist methodology which, laying claim to fundamental justice issues relating to gender equality, challenges the foundational nature of prevailing academic inquiry.

A perspective and research methodology that is feminist can thus be utilised to examine the position of women in the area of peacebuilding. This will be examined using theoretical notions of women and peace, women and civil society and civil society and peace. Using this theoretical model, the particular context of how women's development and empowerment in community-based projects in the transition from conflict in Northern Ireland will be analysed and evaluated. The detailed investigation of generic themes relating the conceptual models to peacebuilding activities at community level will have applications for inter- and intra-societal conflict in wider contexts where ethnic conflict management or transition from conflict is being attempted.

CHAPTER 1: WOMEN AND PEACE

The involvement of women with peace is a well-documented and publicised phenomenon. This chapter aims to examine the relationship of women with peace, drawing on the prevailing theoretical assumptions that link them, and to subject the literature to a critical analysis from the perspective of challenging the often narrow parameters within which women are inserted to justify essentialist notions of gender.

Examples of women's organisations engaging in the process of urging, making or building peace are a global phenomenon, a random sample being the International Women's Peace Service (Palestine), Bat Shalom (Israel), Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (International), Journée de la Femme et Paix (France), Žene za Mir (Former Yugoslavia), Frauen für den Frieden (Switzerland), Le Tre Ghinee (Italy), Kvinna till Kvinna (Sweden), Österreichische Frauenföderation für Weltfrieden (Austria), Follow the Women (Basque Country) and Association des Femmes pour les Initiatives de Paix (Mali). Specific studies of peace movements have highlighted the centrality of women to the concept, such as the Derry Peace Women in Northern Ireland, the Women's Unarmed Uprising Against War in Sweden, the Women's Peace Union in the United States or the Greenham Peace Camp in the United Kingdom (Hammond, 2002; Andersson, 2003; Alonso, 1997; Harford, 1984). There are also specific studies of women in the context of a conflict area, such as Northern Ireland, or profiles of individual women taken from a variety of contexts (Morgan, 1995; Henderson, 1994).

In the international context, examples such as the International Alert programme of 'Gender and Peacebuilding' and the United Nations Development Fund for Women emphasise the essential role of women in projects of peace. Significantly, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 in 2000 to increase the participation of women in all UN field operations and ensure a gender element in all peacebuilding initiatives[1]. Clearly, the association of women with peace is considered strong and is internationally recognised. However, it is not clear whether Resolution 1325 is a product of an acknowledgement of the particular role of women in peacebuilding initiatives or simply an extension of a general policy of gender mainstreaming in UN activities. While it is accepted that international efforts to include women in official peacebuilding processes is addressing an absence, there appears a wider tendency to associate peace movements with women.

One explanation of the relationship between women and peace is that women are naturally more peaceful. Women, writes Johann Galtung, have innate qualities that make them more peace-loving. High in empathy, their characters are horizontal and centripetal, making them more prone to peaceful relationships, combined with the chemical programming of the cyclical and complex oestrogen and high levels of mono amino oxidase, the chemical responsible for controlling violence (Galtung, 1996: 40, 43). Young girls, writes Brock-Utne, tend to share and co-operate, whereas young boys compete (Brock-Utne, 1989:99). Alonso affirms this notion, insisting that "almost every group has portrayed women as more sensitive, more caring, more thoughtful and more committed to producing a more humanistic and compassionate world than men as a whole" (Alonso, 1993:11).

In contrast, men are portrayed as makers of war and perpetrators of violence. Galtung cites the low empathy, vertical, centrifugual, expansionist character of man, pointing out that 95% of direct violence is committed by men (Galtung, 1996: 40-1). Something in the nature of men makes them fight, as Skjelsback and Smith point out:

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[1] See Appendix 1.

Some of the violent acts perpetrated by men in armed conflicts are perpetrated precisely because the men have become convinced that that is the way to show their masculinity. (Skjelsback and Smith, 2001:3)

It is the male value system that creates war, and it is women who suffer, as Brock-Utne notes: "Women pay for the male priorities of this world" (Skjelsback, 2001:65; Brock-Utne, 1989: 15). Military thinking, adds Ruddick, is imbued with male values (Ruddick, 1990: 145). These views move from the innate qualities of 'warlike men' and 'peaceful women' to acknowledgements that a degree of social conditioning drives men to fight. Indeed, if war is masculine, then areas of conflict are masculinised, as Monica McWilliams has referred to Northern Ireland as an 'armed patriarchy' (Miller et al, 1996: 217).

But Moser and Clark are not satisfied with this explanation:

Stereotypical essentialising of women as 'victims' and men as 'perpetrators' of political violence and armed conflict assumes universal, simplified definitions of each phenomenon. (Moser and Clark, 2001:4).

Karam is equally critical, suggesting the literature of women and conflict "tends to view women as victims rather than as active actors, largely as a result of patriarchal structures" (Karam, 2001:22). Other voices of dissent accord with a view that women are not as peaceful as they are portrayed nor men as warlike, as Reardon explains, women "are not predisposed by their hormonal balance to pacifism any more than men are predisposed to warmongering" (Ruddick, 1990:151; Reardon, 1993:15). Women, by this view, are being squeezed into a pervasive model that portrays them as peaceful and men into one of violence through a process of socialisation that accords with prevailing gender roles. As Clonan explains, there are ample examples of women taking a full and active part in combat, from terrorist groups, such as Baader-Meinhoff, to military participation in national struggles, such as the case of 40% of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) being women (Clonan, 2002). Ehrenbach has addressed this issue with reference to Iraqi prisoners abused by the US Army in 2004, where her feminist illusions of women having a moral edge over men have been dashed by revelations that three of the seven soldiers charged with abuse are women, the commander of Abu Ghraib prison where the abuses took place and the officer in charge of intelligence for the area being women, and the senior government figure ignoring allegations of abuse, National Security Advisor Condaleeza Rice, also being female (Ehrenbach, 2004).

The literature of nationalism and nationalist conflict illustrates this gendering process. Nations and nationalism are discussed and formulated in the public sphere, from which women have been excluded, leading to the formation of national identity without women (Yuval-Davis, 1997:2). As a result, writes Roberts, 'issues of the flag' become those of "war, trade and imperial expansion" and women's participation is 'edited out' of nationalism (Roberts, 2000). Yet women are essential to the image of nationalism, becoming a sign or marker of cultural identity, having symbolic value as 'maidens and mothers' (Timmerman, 2000:15; Moghadam, 1994:2, Roberts, 2000). Women are assigned roles in the nationalist project. In effect, their bodies are appropriated and utilised for political goals (Beasley and Bacchi, 2000:338). Yuval-Davies and Anthias list the main roles attributed to women as reproducers of the community, reproducers of ethnic boundaries, transmitters of communal values, markers of ethnic distinctiveness and active participants in war (Wilford and Miller, 1998:15). Jacoby illustrates this in the Israeli context, where women are recruited to fight in war, yet are relegated to hearth and home when not in use, referred to as the

'mobilisation-marginalisation' phenomenon (Jacoby, 1999:398). Women are therefore appropriated to the furthering of a national project for which they are absent at the point of formulation.

As well as being utilised for nationalist goals, women's opportunities are limited by the experience. As Jacoby has noted of the Israeli context, "conflict and conflict management in Israel tend to glorify patriarchal authority while restricting women's domain to the symbolic sphere of hearth and home" (Jacoby, 1999:382). Racioppi and O'Sullivan See have identified a similar effect in their study of unionist nationalism in Northern Ireland, where national identity is gendered, with 'Ulster's loyal sons' as the prevailing image and the Stormont government as an 'ethno-gender regime' (Racioppi and O'Sullivan See, 2001:93-95). Morgan has also pointed out that the political priorities given to nationalism has led to difficulties in women co-operating across the divide, lest they be regarded as 'disloyal' to their own 'side' (Morgan, 1995). The extent to which women's horizons are deemed to be limited in these circumstances has led Kaplan to declare: "Feminism and nationalism are almost always incompatible in the European context" (Kaplan, 1997:3). Women, then, are marginalised, as restrictive national identity-related roles are imposed upon them, which intensify in times of conflict due to the need to emphasise cultural or national cohesion. If conflict generates a restrictive nation for women, there is little wonder that it is women who appear more aligned to peace.

The picture of women passively accepting a symbolic role for the benefit of the nation does not sit comfortably with other writers, however. Nor are projects of nationalism universally accepted as being detrimental to women's goals. The national liberation movement in Algeria involved the whole of society and women actively elevated themselves from their subservient position under colonialism, but they were eclipsed after the war was over (Cherifati-Merabtine, 1994:40; Bouata, 1994:35). Likewise, the short-lived Saur Revolution in Afghanistan brought about a range of reforms that benefited women (Mogahdam, 1994:96). As Timmerman explains, nationalism can create opportunities for women to "acquire a more positive and esteemed identity" (Timmerman, 2000:15). Contrary to the stereotype, writes Karam, women play an active role in combat and, while women suffer in the same way men do, they can also gain from conflict situations (Karam, 2001:22). The evidence is therefore ambiguous. Women are not universally passive and opposed to male-imposed nationalist doctrines, so the apparent dominance of women in peace movements cannot be explained by a blanket assumption about the passive nature of women.

A useful example of the complex relationship between women, conflict and notions of national liberation is provided by studies of the Palestinian Intifada. In the first Intifada, women were active in paramilitary organisations and cultural practices dividing men and women were subverted by their mutual engagement in political activity, forcing a discourse between women's groups and the more conservative notions of 'women in the family' perpetuated by organisations such as Fatah and Hamas (Berger, 1997:109-122). Women engaged in demonstrations and confrontations with Israeli security forces, formed Action Committees and this political activism established alternative hierarchies to male ones (Abdo, 1994:157-168). However, the absence of women from the process of establishing an autonomous Palestine led to authoritarian male-dominated leadership structures for the second Intifada, resulting in a lack of women's activism and eroding the mass-based organisations of the previous rising (Johnson and Kuttab, 2001:21-7). This illustrates the often variable roles played by women in conflict even in a single context, throwing doubt on universal assumptions regarding women and peace or war.

The association of women with peace, if not innate, may derive from women's experience. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated: "Existing inequalities between women and men, and patterns of discrimination against women and girls, tend to be exacerbated in armed conflict" (Annan, 2002). Alonso has also attested that in war, women "were the ones to suffer most, both in the perpetual violence against women during the occupation and through the deaths of sons, husbands, lovers, brothers and fathers" (Alonso, 1993:57). Moser and Clark add that women suffer severe forms of victimisation and men are overwhelmingly the perpetrators, but the relationship can be complex (Moser and Clark, 2001:8). The Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 acknowledged the particular suffering women experience from "murder, torture, systematic rape, forced pregnancy and forced abortion", for example, as Benderley records occurring in the Former Yugoslavia (Platform for Action, 1995:Paragraph 11; Benderley, 1997:66). In addition, women become sustainers of community in times of conflict, suffer disruption of social and economic life and, with children, make up over 80% of refugees (Potter, 2004:35; O'Connell, 1993:ii-iv). Yet women participate in conflict and men also suffer terribly. If women generally experience conflict disproportionately to men, an affinity with peace is unsurprising. While an aversion to conflict may explain some women's motivation in the pursuit of peace, this would not provide a universal understanding of the phenomenon.

Hammond writes that the Derry Peace Women were driven by civil rights aspirations as well as 'maternalist motivations' (Hammond, 2002). Indeed, Sara Ruddick argues that women's experience of being mothers makes them better suited to peacemaking. Daily, mothers think out strategies of protection and nurture towards their children, qualities that women extend to the community (Ruddick, 1990:23,80). Maternal thinking, adds Ruddick, is opposed to military thinking, which is not an innate maternal peacefulness, but the fact that "maternal practice is a 'natural resource' for peace politics" (ibid., pp.150-7). While some feminists, such as Shulaimith Firestone, Ann Oakley or Adrienne Rich, contend that mothering is not instinctive (Tong, 1995:73-87), but imposed upon and socialised into women, the fact that women are primarily responsible for childrearing in virtually every culture would indicate that a socialising into a mothering role may have an effect on women's attitudes to peace. While Ruddick's argument is convincing, it cannot explain how childless women are involved in peace movements, or those who have rejected the mothering role. Likewise, the fact of women's active involvement in conflict clashes with Ruddick's thesis on the mothering effect.

The association of women with peace leads to a logical assumption that a higher percentage of women in decision-making positions would lead to less hostile activities on the part of the state in question. 'Critical mass' theory defines a certain percentage of women in national legislatures to influence policy positively. This figure differs according to source, but Gierycz suggests 30-35% to make a difference (Gierycz, 2001:25). Dahlerup contends, however, that it is not critical mass that matters, but 'critical acts', which can be carried out by anyone (Dahlerup, 2001:113). This acknowledges that progress towards peace or equality as aims can also be pursued by men. Virginia Woolf has been quoted as stating that there can never be peace until women's values in private life are included in international decision-making, suggesting that women possess values of passivism that are impeded by their exclusion from public life (Oldfield, 1989:3). Brock-Utne is more direct, stating that more women rulers would lead to fewer wars (Brock-Utne, 1989:90).

If more women in legislatures lead to more peace, a survey of states with high female representation would show a lower rate of conflict, and those with lower representation, more wars. A glance at a list of states in order of female participation

in national legislatures reveals a more ambiguous picture, however[2]. While the majority of states with high representation are relatively conflict-free, those such as Spain (28.3%), Uganda (24.7%), Eritrea (22%) and Pakistan (21.6%) have ongoing circumstances of conflict, and some may be considered oppressive regimes, such as Cuba (36%), Vietnam (27.3%) and Turkmenistan (26%). At the other end of the spectrum, while many states are in conflict, states such as those in the Pacific with no female representation at all have had no recent history of warfare, for example, Tuvalu, Tonga, Nauru and Micronesia.

Clearly, there is a range of circumstances that determine a state's involvement in warfare, such as geography, bellicose neighbours, culture or political considerations. In addition, figures regarding female representation do not reveal how influential women are on policy and many states include gender representation as a measure in transition from conflict, such as in Rwanda (48.8%), Mozambique (30%), South Africa (29.8%), Namibia (26.4%) and East Timor (26.1%). (see, for example, Heinecken, 2002 for the South African Context, or The Belfast Agreement[3] and Patton Report[4] for Northern Ireland). It could also be argued that the 'critical mass' threshold has only been reached by a few states (nine over 35%), or that the threshold has been set too low. Direct comparisons are problematic. If the island of Ireland is taken as an example, it may be true to state that women are marginalised in Northern Ireland due to the extremes of politics there, but representation in the more peaceful south remains among the lowest in Europe (Miller et al, 1996:12; Galligan, 1998:33). However, research by Caprioli and Boyer has found that there is a direct relationship between the level of violence exhibited by states in international crises and levels of gender equality, concluding that "the severity of violence in crisis decreases as domestic gender equality increases" (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001: 503).

To take Brock-Utne more literally, it may be women rulers that are more significant regarding the level of violence used by states. Genovese's study of women leaders identifies leadership styles with 'male' and 'female' characteristics, comprising hierarchy, dominance and order for the former and co-operation, influence and empowerment for the latter (Genovese, 1993:214). Margaret Thatcher, for example, is classed as a 'male' type, indeed Banducci and Karp suggest that she lost the women's vote for this very reason (Banducci and Karp, 2000:822). Certainly a universal case for peaceful women leaders would be difficult to make. In Sri Lanka, for example, a state with a long track record for female leaders, President Kumaratunga was elected on a platform of making peace with the Tamil Tigers, but deposed her Prime Minister when a peace agreement was offered that she considered too lenient (The Times, 11-11-94; 05-11-03). Indeed, Caprioli and Boyer also find that no conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between female leaders and international crisis violence (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001:516).

While it can be said that there is some evidence to suggest that the presence of women in decision-making processes may influence more peaceful behaviours in states, the evidence is at best ambiguous and does not appear to correspond to all – even most – women with executive power in conforming to the stereotype. Consideration should therefore be given to environments and processes that enable

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[2] See Appendix 2.

[3] Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Paragraph 1: "Pending the devolution of powers to a new Northern Ireland Assembly, the British Government will pursue broad policies for sustained economic growth and stability in Northern Ireland and for promoting social inclusion, including in particular community development and the advancement of women in public life".

[4] Recommendations paragraph 15.11.

women to be more prominent in public life as having an influence, rather than gender-specific characteristics.

Research by Regan and Paskeviciute suggests that violent conflict has more of a relationship with birth rates than gender. By this thesis, younger populations tend to engage more in conflict and the apparent prevalence of women in public life in states with lower levels of violent conflict is more to do with the family planning measures that enable them to be there (Regan and Paskeviciute, 2003:287). There is wider evidence for the increased likelihood of conflict from younger people, for example the militancy of the Hitler Youth or the youth wing of the African National Congress (Shirer, 1969:314; Mandela, 1997:112). In the Irish context, Hart emphasises the extent to which the Irish Revolution gained momentum from the young and in Northern Ireland, the typical casualty of the conflict was a young male (Hart, 1990:10; Fay et al, 1997:40-2). Huntington makes a particularly convincing case that "young people are the protagonists of protest, instability, reform and revolution", in which he identifies 'youth bulges' in populations of ages 15-24 in incidences of militancy (Huntington, 2002:117-8). High birth rates, then, contribute to the incidence of violent conflict. Birth control not only limits the violence perpetrated by a state, but enables women to participate more fully in public life, creating the coincidence of peacefulness and women's representation.

If age profile were a major contributor to militancy in a country, statistics would give a clear indication of this correlation. A survey of states with youthful populations[5] shows that those with 30% or more under 15 years have, with some exceptions, experienced warfare in recent years. This is not universal, and states with older populations, under 20% aged below 15 for example, have experienced considerable conflict, such as the Balkan states, Russia and Georgia. Likewise, analysis of states with a low median age[6] produces a similar result. The majority of states with a median age under 20 have experienced conflict in recent years, with particular exceptions among the Slavic states, Bosnia-Hercegovina having the same median age as Australia, for example. Finally, fertility rates[7] show that there is some correlation between high instances of childbirth and conflict - again with the exception of some Slavic states – many states where women produce six or more children having experienced conflict in recent years (for example, Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Yemen).

While statistical evidence may be compelling, there are many other reasons why conflict takes place or not and simplistic equations cannot be fitted neatly into such a complex phenomenon. For example, it can equally be argued that a surfeit of young people in these states leads to militancy and conflict or that the cultural emphasis on women having to bear and rear larger numbers of children prevents their participation in public life and the consequent restraining influence on conflict. Alternatively, conflict may owe more to structural influences, which links both conflict and women's participation to development. Furthermore, states where women apparently enjoy more freedoms in society may be frequently engaged in violent conflict with others, such as the United States, which questions whether peace or war and gender are related at all.

While women appear to be over-represented in projects of peacemaking or peace building, explanations of this phenomenon are elusive. Notions of the innate

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[5] See Appendix 3, column 1.
[6] See Appendix 3, column 2.
[7] See Appendix 3, column 3.

peacefulness of women and bellicosity of men have been largely challenged. However, the socialising effect of the reinforcement of this assumption in the form of presumed gender roles is bound to have a significant impact on the behaviour of women and men. Many women may associate themselves with peace because they have been conditioned to do so, and men with war for the same reason.

Many women may be more inclined to peace due to their life experiences. Women have been regarded as suffering during and after conflict disproportionately to men and the ideological currents necessary for the sustaining of conflict, such as national group identity, have often appropriated and utilised women to their detriment. Women are also primarily responsible for domestic stability, which is disrupted by conflict, so warfare would appear contrary to the tasks women have been allocated in society. Yet women have also participated in conflict in pursuit of improvements to their circumstances, often being frustrated in post-conflict arrangements.

Critical mass theory assumes that women in sufficient numbers will influence more passive decisions in a state. However, the evidence is not conclusive that this is the case in the few examples of states where any such representation has been achieved and there is no clear proof that women in executive leadership roles in states are less belligerent than their male counterparts. While it can be argued that women in positions of political influence gain their status by taking on 'male' characteristics, the assumptions behind this notion accept gender stereotypes that do not appear to be supportable by empirical evidence.

A more convincing argument is that societal circumstances that benefit women also promote peaceful responses to potential situations of armed conflict. One example of this has been offered as the coincidence of a reduction in the youthfulness of a population through birth control, which has been considered as more militant and radical in circumstances of conflict, and the resulting participation of women in public life that has been thereby facilitated. The real relationship between women and peace may be far more complex, however. While women clearly participate in warfare and can benefit from goals achieved by conflict, learned experiences of maintaining social stability, coping mechanisms in times of adversity and gender-specific conditioning through socialisation equip many women with the skills and insights necessary for post-conflict peace building. A greater understanding of the role of women in societies that foster peace, outside the gendered assumptions of social norms, is required to clarify the true relationship between women and notions of peace.

CHAPTER 2 – WOMEN AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Notions of 'civil society' and 'social capital' have received much attention in connection with how a state and its constituent population interact. To understand how women fit into this concept, it is necessary to trace how the ideas of civil society and social capital have developed, how they are defined or measured and their relationship with ideas of democracy and civil participation. A critique of how these theories are formed in relation to gender can then be made and an analysis made of how this affects notions of how women are integrated – or not – into participative processes.

Aristotle defined the state as an 'association', where people interact for mutual benefit (Aristotle, 1991:53). Thomas Hobbes' notion of a state as a 'contract of fear' by which individuals surrender their liberty in exchange for protection has found favour is some modern writers, such as Robert Nozick, who sees that state as the 'dominant protective association' (Hobbes, 1909:107; Nozick, 1974:24). In contrast to Hobbes' 'Leviathan', where the state has supreme power for the common good of the people, John Locke's construction of the state sees the community as the supreme power, whereby the communal good is exercised by government on their behalf (Locke, 1988:367). The state, then, consists of institutions that operate on behalf of and for the benefit of those under its jurisdiction.

Trentmann writes that 'civil society' was born in Europe in the Eighteenth Century, but went into decline in the Twentieth Century due to the rise of totalitarianism (Trentmann, 2000:4-5). Other authors have offered alternative views, McIntosh, for example, tracing civil society through other timescales, such as England 1300-1640, and Khaviraj and Khilnani, who point out that this is not just a western phenomenon (Khaviraj and Khilnani, 2001:11-12). Such inconsistencies are reflected by the ambiguity of the definition of 'civil society'.

One approach is to define what civil society is not. Baker's analysis of African countries where the state has ceased to function has revealed that anarchy does not prevail, as in Hobbes' account of nature, but sub-state structures appear to endure (Baker, 1999:131). Civil society could therefore be defined as where the state is not. Indeed, Margaret Thatcher alluded to this concept when separating 'state' from 'society' in the following statement (which has often been interpreted as a call for individualism):

> *There is no such thing as society. There are only individual men and women and there are families, and no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then our neighbour.* (Thatcher, 1995:626).

For Kumi Naidoo, Chief Executive of the international civic society organisation CIVICUS, civil society a more of a relationship or state that "enables all citizens to contribute" (Naidoo, 2003). The concept is therefore quite nebulous. Oxhorn defines civil society as an 'extremely ambiguous' concept and implies there are two general streams of thought, the 'continental/corporate' definition and the 'market-oriented liberal' (Oxhorn, 1995:311). Such lack of consensus has led Trentmann to conclude:

> *Rather than crystallising into a single master definition...the modern history of civil society is an unfolding dialogue between different imaginaries of the social.* (Trentmann, 2000:7)

Given these difficulties in defining or measuring civil society, the idea of 'social capital' has been developed to describe the qualities of human interaction indicative of civil society or the 'basic raw material' of civil society (Onyx and Bullen, 2000:24). Putnam explains "the core idea of social capital theory is that social networks have value" (Putnam, 2000:19).

Rather than seeing social capital as a new phenomenon, it is an old idea newly defined. Putnam himself relates the concept to the fraternité of the French Revolution (Putnam, 2000:351). If civic cohesion and relationships are significant indicators of social capital, the roots can be traced in the thought of a range of political thinkers. Aristotle wrote: "The task of all citizens, however different they may be, is the stability of the association", indicating that all members of the collectivity that is the state have a responsibility to its maintenance (Aristotle, 1991:179). This being the case, the philosophical notion of 'civic virtue' is comparable to social capital, this being the virtù of Macchiavelli, a high degree of which is needed to constitute a republic, or the virtue of Rousseau or Montesquieu (Russell, 1979:496; Foster, 1958:297; Rousseau, 1979:128; Montesquieu, 1970:82). Social capital is therefore related to how people inter-relate and how they interact with the structures that administer them.

Robert Putnam has been an influential figure in defining social capital. He notes that "the touchstone of social capital is the generalised principle of reciprocity", that is, a society characterised by people who are willing to do things for others, not for immediate return, but with the confidence that others would do the same for them (Putnam, 2000:135). In addition to reciprocity, Putnam adds 'trust' and 'networks of civic engagement' as essential components of social capital, and highlights how societies with high levels of social capital are more efficient, more prosperous economically and carry general benefits to its members (Putnam, 1993:170,173, 157; Putnam, 2000:21). There are also dimensions to social capital that need to be emphasised, insists Putnam. One of these is the difference between 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital, the former being good for the community, but exclusive, and the latter reaching out to other parts of society (Putnam, 2000:23). The other is the idea of 'vertical' networks, which are hierarchical and "cannot sustain social trust and co-operation", and 'horizontal' networks, which are more beneficial (Putnam, 1993:173).

Other writers have challenged Putnam. Edward and Foley accuse him of using social capital as a label for the norms and values of 1950's moral theory (Edwards and Foley, 1998:124). Grootaert has suggested that Putnam's theory of social capital is of a 'narrow' kind, because it concentrates on networks. A broader category looks at a variety of relationships and includes negative notions of social capital. The broadest sense is a general social and political environment "that enables norms to develop and shapes social structures" (Grootaert, 1998:2-3). Paldam and Tringaard focus on a single attribute, that of 'density of trust' as defining social capital (Paldam and Tringaard, 2000:339).

Efforts to measure social capital have also resulted in differing opinions. Onyx and Bullen applied a general formula based in the degree of social interaction between individuals, organisations and the polity in New South Wales, using Putnam's three main factors of networks, reciprocity and trust, concentrating on 'lateral associations' that are 'voluntary and equal' (Onyx and Bullen, 2000:24). Grootaert, however, identified 52 indicators of social capital under the headings of 'horizontal associations', 'civil and political society', 'social integration' and 'legal and governance' (Grootaert, 1998:14). Unsurprisingly, efforts to measure such a phenomenon have failed to clarify a concept that is essentially disputed.

A further point to note regarding civil society and social capital is that there are negative sides to the concept, as alluded to by Putnam with reference to 'bonding' and 'bridging' types. Kharivaj and Khilnani describe civil society as a "multiplicity of non-negotiable entities and colliding self-righteous beliefs" (Khaviraj and Khilnani, 2001:12). Indeed, Naidoo points out that the Ku Klux Klan and National Rifle Association are examples of civil society and that the two largest civil society organisations in the USA are the pro- and anti-abortion lobbies (Naidoo, 2003). There are clearly, then, different forms of social capital that are of variable value from a normative perspective.

When the philosophy of civil society is taken into account, it is clear that the relationship with the state in the context of democracy is an important dimension. Finer defines democracy as "government which is derived from public opinion and is accountable to it" (Finer, 1970:63). Civil society is a mode of mobilising public opinion and making government accountable, amounting to participative democracy and consultation. Policy-making, for example, is to be responsive to socially derived evidence, such as Evidence-Based Policy-Making, as articulated by the UK Home Secretary David Blunkett: "Government policy ought to be informed by sound evidence. Social science research ought to be contributing a major part to that evidence base" (Clarence, 2002:2). Beyond social science research, in which civil society has input, are processes of consultation with citizens, as Harold Laski has written, "the first great need of the modern state is adequately to organise institutions of consultation" (Laski, 1973:80). This consultation comprises active participation in policy-making processes by civil society, which "humanises the bureaucracy and strengthens the capacities of individuals and communities to mobilise and help themselves" (Midgley, 1986:8).

The active engagement of civil society is not always a positive experience for society, however, as some of the variations highlighted above have indicated. This has cast some doubt on the benefits of civil society participation as popular democracy. Friedman raises doubts as to whether elements of civil society that help develop policy are democratic themselves (Friedman, 2003:3). Naidoo acknowledges this criticism and emphasises the need for democratic structures to be developed in civil society organisations, which he describes as 'oligarchies' (Naidoo, 2003). However, in the absence of other viable engagement with the state, both authors claim that civil society has a positive role to play, not to replace the state, but to assist in making state intervention realistic (Naidoo, 2003; Friedman, 2003:22). Indeed, developing social investment models suggest organisations in the community can provide services on behalf of the state (Review of Public Administration, 2003:15; Pathways for Change, 2003:23-9).

The disparate nature of civil society and differing definitions of social capital give these notions an uncertain form in current political and social thought. More uncertain is how these concepts include women. Considering the role of civil society in ideals of participative democracy, this is a crucial aspect of how citizens influence state decisions about them. The exclusion of women from public political processes suggests an alternative route of policy development may serve to bypass some of the barriers that are encountered. Regardless, if democratic principles are based on equality of access and opportunity, the experience of women in the context of civil society is of prime importance.

Historical notions of citizenship and the polity have excluded women from the outset (Pateman, 1989:1; Jones and Jonasdottir, 1988:1-2; Carroll and Zerilli, 1993:55). Observers of the philosophical construction of social capital have noted that

Macchiavelli's virtù equated to 'manliness', Rousseau regarded women as transgressors on a 'male domain' in the polity and the 'socialist fraternity' has been more about 'male bonding' (Pitkin, 1984:25; Vogel, 1995:215; Phillips, 1993:8). Hence, if theories of citizenship are integral to the construction of civil society, the exclusion of women is integral to its fabric.

Ainhorn and Sever indicate that politics are gendered 'male' and the home 'female', with civil society in the middle. But this middle ground is also gendered (Ainhorn and Sever, 2003:167). However, Rotberg has noted that the definitions of social capital in terms of neighbourliness and assistance linkages reflect the domains of women and it is in the interests of women to protect and develop social capital (Rotberg, 1999:347). Furthermore, it is in this middle space that women have been able to organise and influence the state, for example Clemens notes that women gained the vote without having the vote, which is an "object lesson in the political uses of social capital" (Clemens, 1999:614). In Keen's research, it has also been found that "the government's relationship with women's associations...came purely through collective action that sought legislation to protect women and children" (Keen, 1999:651). As in situations of conflict, women have used the opportunity spaces presented by the middle ground of civil society to create the instruments of their own emancipation.

To consider the arena of civil society as favourable to women would be an overstatement, however. Gender is often excluded in notions of social capital, for example, Onyx and Bullen's research claims that social capital does not correlate with demographic variables such as gender (Onyx and Bullen, 2000:36). In Putnam's vision of social capital, while not the primary reason for decline:

> *The long-term movement of women out of the category of 'affluent housewife'*
> *into other categories has tended to depress civic engagement.* (Putnam,
> 2000:202)

This claim is problematic in the assumption that the primary engagement of women in civil society is at the level of 'affluent housewife', not other identities or classes, and it suggests that the trend of women entering the labour market in their own right or into other lifestyles to 'housewife' has a negative impact on society. The first issue ignores the level of participation and interaction that takes place in communities in favour of the exclusive 'dinner party' culture of the US middle class that Putnam associates with civic engagement and the second issue creates difficulties in that labour force participation is seen as an important step towards the liberation of women, providing opportunities for economic independence (see, for example, Galligan, 1998:26). To suggest that the economic independence and occupational satisfaction or alternative choices of relationship of one gender is anathema to the development of social capital clearly presents a simplistic and gendered view of the concept.

The discussion highlights a wider issue of how women are integrated into the theory of civil society. Women predominate in voluntary and community organisations, for example, comprising 72% of the paid workforce of voluntary organisations in Northern Ireland (NICVA, 2002). These organisations constitute the 'horizontal' relationships that Putnam identifies as important for social capital, community-based networks that comprise both 'bonding' capital within communities and 'bridging' capital between communities on the basis of issues such as equality or domestic violence. Furthermore, the idea of utilising input from civil society to increase the quality of democratic participation should accord with the principle of equality, allowing women to have equal influence on policy-making structures. However,

women are underrepresented on the structures that form the intersection between society and the government, for example, making up around a third of the membership of public bodies in Northern Ireland and only 35% of directors of voluntary organisations (Ward, 2003; NICVA, 2002). Nevertheless, the qualities associated with the definitions of high levels of social capital accord with those predominantly practiced by women, whether in women's organisations (the 'women's sector') or in wider voluntary and community organisations of which they comprise the largest component.

While women appear to predominate in 'horizontal' civil social structures, they are not necessarily prominent in positions of influence either in executive roles in civil society structures, public bodies or the more formal political structures, such as political parties or government institutions ('vertical' networks). Therefore, the greater the influence of those involved in civic society organisations in policy making processes, the greater the participation of women. However, this could lead to an acceptance of gender-specific realms of policy influence, consigning women to the structures gendered 'female' and leaving men to dominate the traditional political structures that are the main legislative and executive instruments of the state. It should be acknowledged that it is primarily women who are involved in the relationships that have been identified as comprising high levels of social capital and also that the prevailing thought on participative democracy presents opportunities for women to become more involved in the formulation of policy via the civic engagement route. At the same time, this cannot be seen as an alternative to the equal representation of women in the formal structures of government, which retain executive power and the primacy of electoral mandate.

Anne Phillips has pointed out that feminists have generally avoided the concept of civil society, largely due to the fact that its formation was generally along masculine lines and many interpretations of the idea involve state and civil society competing for the public sphere, not the all-important private sphere (Phillips, 2002:72, 74). But civil society and feminism have much in common: both are pluralist, both have a looser, more informal structure, both appear natural allies in contest with the state and if the battle for equality is to be won, it has to happen in civil society, acknowledging the limitations of legislation alone (ibid, pp.76-9). Yet there are still the unattractive elements that civil society formation tends to adopt existing power structures, can be discriminatory due to the lack of regulation and can be used to challenge state benevolence in favour of a self-help ethos, resulting in Phillips' assertion that "celebrating civil society as the sphere of freedom and autonomy is not really an option for feminism, given the inequalities that so often mar the cosy associational world (ibid, pp.80-1, 87). However, this view may be overly pessimistic. There are opportunities for women to claim spheres of influence within civil society and use its growing importance to structure an equality agenda. Many areas of civil society are sympathetic to the empowerment of women and others form a powerful platform to have the ideals of equal participation aired in a public, sub-state space. The potential pitfalls need to be juxtaposed with the possible gains.

Notions of civil society have been envisaged in a variety of forms, generally taking the form of non-state activities and relationships between citizens. The concept of social capital has been used to define the strength of civic engagement and cohesion, but again there is little consensus on the measurement of this phenomenon. Historically, notions of citizenship have been formulated in the absence of women and more recent ideas relating to social capital appear to have ignored gender as a factor or to have accepted gendered norms in their understanding. Uncertain as these concepts remain, they are of critical importance in prevailing attitudes regarding participative democracy, where civil society is

expected to be consulted during the course of policy development. Such engagement offers opportunities to women to become more involved in policy-making processes, the majority of people involved in organisations associated with civil society being women. However, this cannot be seen as a substitute for effective representation on formal political decision-making structures and there would need to be a greater representation of women on the bodies that claim to speak on behalf of civil society to ensure that even this limited contribution to policy development does not exclude the views of half of the population.

CHAPTER 3 – CIVIL SOCIETY AND PEACEBUILDING

Having established the relationship between women and peacebuilding and identified the place of women in evolving theories of civil society, it remains to close the circle and relate the concept of civil society to notions of peacebuilding. An understanding of the developing theories of peacebuilding will assist in placing notions of civil society in the framework of efforts towards peace in areas of conflict, enabling an analysis of the key role played by civil society and the associated concept of social capital in the peacebuilding process.

Peacebuilding assumes a situation in which there is a lack of peace that requires to be 'built', that is, a situation of conflict. Azar writes that "conflict is an inescapable part of social interaction" and Doucet that it is a "multi-dimensional social phenomenon" (Azar, 1990:5; Doucet, 1996:3). Indeed, conflict in the social sphere does not have to be a negative process, but an essential part of social development (Coser, 1968:49). There are therefore 'positive' and 'negative' forms of conflict, 'constructive' and 'destructive' (Conway, 1972:4; Kriesberg, 1998:21). The process of peacebuilding, therefore, is not to eliminate conflict, but to transform conflicts that are destructive to a constructive form (Tidwell, 1998:72; Kriesberg, 1998:22). The social nature of conflict also indicates that this is a relationship between opposing parties or communities, so it is transformation in the social sphere that requires to be achieved. As Burton notes, it is for all parties to redefine that relationship (Burton, 1996:40). In order to move beyond conflict, therefore, relationships between all of those involved need to be re-aligned, not just between a select few.

Traditional methods of addressing conflict have revolved around negotiation, for example, Galtung and Jacobsen's methods of negotiating an outcome that transcends the conflict terms of reference, or Mitchell and Banks' collaborative problem-solving workshops (Galtung and Jacobsen, 2000:210; Mitchell and Banks, 1998:5). Mechanisms have been developed to bring representatives of conflicting parties together to engage in a process of finding ways to peaceful relations. Desmond Tutu has emphasised the necessity of parties to 'talk face to face' so that conflicting parties can engage on a personal level, for example in the South African context, where Michael Cassidy arranged informal meetings for leaders of adversarial groups (Tutu, 1995:193; Cassidy, 1995:67-69). This is 'Track Two' diplomacy, which takes leaders out of their public positions, leaving them freer to manoeuvre without being scrutinised by those they purport to represent (Azar, 1990:3). While this may seem a logical step, particularly during the extreme stages of conflict where contact is difficult, the methods affect only elites. However, Lederach notes that elite accommodation is "a more formal and more superficial process" (Lederach, 1999:55). If conflict is a social phenomenon, society needs to be involved, not just those in leadership roles, many of whom are not as representative as they may claim.

Arendt Lijphart has proposed consociation as a mechanism to bring conflicting parties together in the form of a coalition government. This involves a 'grand coalition' of leaders of all sides, mutual veto on decisions, proportionality in executive posts and autonomy of the various 'segments' or communities (Lijphart, 1977:25). This method grants elites a remarkable degree of power, based on their leadership status during conflict, that is, they are 'conflict elites'. Consociational structures in various scenarios have been criticised for this reason. In the context of the Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland, Taylor notes that consociation supports the "ethno-national group identity as the social base for political devolution", which emphasises the divisions of conflict (Taylor, 2001:46). Of the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Glenny points out that "the three local elites are comfortable with the arrangement as

it guarantees their hold on power within their own communities", predicting that war will resume when international forces withdraw (Glenny, 2000:652). Likewise, Manning's analysis of Mozambique concludes that the involvement of Renamo in government is dependent the presence of extra-constitutional concessions, their chances of remaining in office unlikely in electoral terms (Manning, 2002:83). Elite accommodation has its problems, therefore.

The support of conflict elites in positions of power maintains communities in positions of conflict. Voutat describes the effect of clientelism, which defines the relationship between political leaders and 'client' populations, who provide a support base in return for elites articulating (and emphasising) fears (Voutat, 2000:286). Briquet has noted this form of relationship in Corsica, where clans maintain power by holding communities in a conflict stance, while adapting to political environments outside the community context (Briquet, 1997:65). The state of conflict creates a phenomenon by which communities see events in terms of the conflict affecting them, distorting alternative visions beyond the conflict discourse, described by Hunter in the Northern Ireland context as 'mediated reality' and by Briquet in the Corsican context as 'insular reality' (Hunter, 1983:10; Briquet, 1997:5). In this way, elites control the flow of information to 'client' groups, even where there is a more general access to information sources, the effects of conflict creating a process of information selection, reinforced by elite rhetoric. Clearly, more of a role for other groupings within society would serve to bypass this phenomenon.

In addition to maintaining lines of conflict, such arrangements exclude alternative discourses, significantly that of women, as stated by Pauline Sallembien of the clan system in Corsica (reported in Loughlin and Daftary, 1999:39) and by writers such as Kate Fearon in Northern Ireland (Fearon, 1999:2). The possibilities for women's organisations and for individual women are curtailed by conflict discourses, leading to a shortfall in the development of empowerment and equality agendas. By silencing women, elite-led processes jeopardise the possibilities of an equitable and sustainable peace.

Love describes peacebuilding as the "practical implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development" (Love, 1995:44). Indeed, if conflicts are social interactions, so would remedies be. Bloomfield describes this as a 'cultural' approach, which requires community development in a two-stage process: building the capacity of communities themselves and engagement between communities (Bloomfield, 1997:50, 55). Indeed, Montague confirms that the development of communities is an important first step (Montague, 2001:24). Fitzduff affirms this as a strategic goal, coupled with economic development, indeed, economic development has been a key area of peacebuilding activity in Northern Ireland, although there have been mixed responses regarding its effectiveness (Fitzduff, 1999:31; Byrne and Irwin, 2001:426). The World Bank claims that social capital is critical for human and economic development, so if economics have a role to play in peacebuilding, social capital is central to that strategy (www.worldbank.org). In addition, peace has been increasingly associated with democracy (see, for example, Moskowitz, 1959:157). As discussed above, the inclusion of civil society in decision-making processes has been increasingly linked with the development of effective democracy. All these processes associated with peacebuilding, therefore, have a link to civil society and the development of social capital.

If the task of peacebuilding is associated with the processes of community development, economic development and democratic structures, it is unsurprising that civil society plays a central role in developing theories of peacebuilding.

Lederach has identified three levels of engagement in the peacebuilding process, the top level (elites), the middle range and the grassroots level. While all need to be engaged, the middle range is said to be the most important (Lederach, 1999:39). This is the realm of the active areas of social groups that make up civil society. Kumar agrees, seeing the creation and involvement of civil society as an important part of the rehabilitation of war-torn societies (Kumar, 1997:2). Not only is civil society to be involved in post-conflict reconstruction, however, but in every stage of the process involving the transformation of conflict. Rasmussen notes that "the presence of unofficial actors is increasingly visible and valuable" and, as observed with the relationship between civil society and governance, non-state actors do not displace official representatives, but share the stage with them (Rasmussen, 1997:42).

The inclusion of civil society in every area of the transformation process requires the application of social capital. As Cordero explains,

> "Social capital plays a strategic role in building sustainable peace, both in local process management and in transforming the structural factors that hinder it". (Cordero, 2001:163)

However, the creation of social capital needs to account for local contexts, that is, an indigenous development, not imposed from outside. Belloni's analysis of efforts to build social capital in Bosnia-Hercegovina as part of the peacebuilding process has identified evidence that mechanisms that ignore local factors have hindered the growth of civil society, not helped it (Belloni, 2001:163). While the principle of building civil society is seen to be important in transforming conflict, the method and manner in which this achieved needs attention according to context. No over-arching generic models can be applied wholesale, but general concepts can be adapted to circumstances.

Civil society and the development of social capital are essential components in the development of community, economic growth and democratic structures that are required for peacebuilding. Women are likewise essential components of civil society. As Reardon exclaims, "the possibilities for peace rest in large measure on the possibilities for women, for their full emancipation and for the realisation of their visions of peace and security (Reardon, 1993:4). Samuel's analysis of Sri Lanka's peace process bears this out. Civil society has boosted official efforts to seek peace and women have been involved in the de-escalation of conflict a local level. Indeed, women are heavily involved in civil society, in non-governmental organisations (NGOs), collectives and local groups. Their influence is only hindered by their lack of political power to complement this (Samuel, 2001:199-202).

While the theoretical correlation between women, peace and civil society can be established, the relationship is not necessarily simple or unproblematic. Not all women are peacemakers, so assuring women's participation in peacebuilding activities is not to avail of their innate passivity, but as the half of the population that has been primarily engaged in the maintenance of family and community during conflict, the skills and experiences of women are essential to the process, not to mention the democratic right to be involved. While the involvement of women appears more conducive to the development of social capital, not all structures in civil society benefit women, indeed positions of executive leadership in civil society remain unrepresentative regarding gender. Not all of civil society is beneficial to the process of a stable, peaceful outcome, nor are civil society organisations necessarily

by definition democratic, but the inclusion of actors outside the traditional elites bypasses the narrow form of engagement that can prolong conflict. While theoretical models point to the need for the women-peace-civil society relationship to be utilised and developed, some evaluation of how this occurs as a process is required in order to demonstrate how this affects peacebuilding in practice.

CHAPTER 4 - PEACEBUILDING THROUGH WOMEN'S TRAINING IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The existence of a theoretical link between women's empowerment and peace requires qualification. The gender mainstreaming policies of the European Union have been carried forward into the application of structural funds to the Programme for Peace and Reconciliation being implemented in Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Irish Republic. However, the proof of a more specific relationship between the empowerment of women and peacebuilding requires a closer examination of how projects in the community put the policies into practice and how this process is evaluated.

The Treaty of Rome 1957 establishing the European Economic Community specifies the principle of equality between men and women regarding pay and the workplace (Article 119; Protocol on Social Policy, Article 2). These were reiterated and expanded in the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 (Articles 2, 3, 13, 136, 137, 141, 251) and is an objective of the European Union according to the draft Constitution 2003 (Article 2):

> It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between men and women, solidarity between generations and protection of children's rights. (European Communities, 2003:p.10)

In addition to statements in treaties, the EU has enshrined gender equality in policy and practice, including the Gender Mainstreaming strategy of 1996, which incorporates gender mainstreaming into every EU policy (COM(96) 67) and the Gender Equality Framework Strategy in 2000, to promote gender equality in every area of EU practice (COM(2000) 335).

Unsurprisingly, the establishment of a programme to encourage peace on the island of Ireland retains the principles of gender equality. The initial Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation included the role of women in Sub-programme 4: Social Inclusion, Measure 1: Developing Grass Roots Capacities and Promoting the Inclusion of Women, recognising:

> "the key role of women in community development, both as a source of new leadership in communities and more widely, in shaping social and economic regeneration". (EC, 1996:145)

The priorities of what was to become known as 'Peace I' (1996-1999) were mainly economic, however (p.36). There was an assumption that empowerment through employment and economic development would deliver peace.

In Peace II (2000-2006), the empowerment of women was 'promoted' to Priority 1 (of 5) Measure 5, intended to "support activities which improve women's access to and participation in the labour market" (SEUPB, 2000:89). Indeed, Priority 1 accounts for almost a third of the committed funds and Measure 1.5 a quarter of the funds allocated to the Priority, totalling 7% of the total programme (ibid, pp.53, 90). Again, women's empowerment has been seen as an economic contribution to the project of peacebuilding, as well as according to the general principles of gender mainstreaming, a sentiment echoed in the plans for the Structural Funds proposed by the Northern Ireland Executive (NI Executive, 2000:6). However, in addition to the specific measure for women, equality, including that between women and men, is laid

down as a 'horizontal principle' with which all operations must comply (SEUPB, 2000:64).

Measuring the impact of a particular programme is managed through the evaluation process. In the case of European Structural Funds, this is defined in Council Regulation 1260/1999, which requires evaluation to be carried out in respect of assistance to gauge its effectiveness and "to appraise its impact with respect to the objectives set out in Article 1 [of this Regulation] and to analyse its effects on specific structural problems" (Article 40). This process is to consist of 'ex-ante' evaluation, to set out plans, mid-term evaluation, to establish initial results, and 'ex-post' to judge whether the success has been successful through the analysis of results (Articles 41 to 43).

The language set out in the regulations pertaining to assistance refers to 'structural problems', indeed the role of the structural funds is to address regional disparities in economic and social terms that threaten 'harmonious development', as stated in the Treaty of Rome, or 'economic and social cohesion', according to current terminology (Wallace and Wallace, 1996:210). Therefore the finance of a peacebuilding programme has its origins in seeing the conflict in terms of creating regional disparity and disrupting regional cohesion, that is, addressing the economic and social consequences of conflict rather than the causes. Even so, the emphasis is on the economic rather than the social. Research by Byrne and Irwin found that economic aid to Northern Ireland has brought business leaders together and built human and material resources that foster self-esteem, assuming empowerment and vocational occupation diverts individuals from conflict, but it has not built cross-community ties (Byrne and Irwin, 2001:426). As Duncan Morrow, Chief Executive of the Community Relations Council, has recently stated: "No amount of money invested here will help unless it helps us to have a different relationship to antagonism" (Morrow, 2004).

Peace I funding has been focussed on economic development and building community capacity, but this has not been easy to measure or equate directly to peace. The themes for Peace II have been 'Employability' and 'Building Peace', which, while recognising the importance of 'soft outcomes', retains in practice a preference for measurable outcomes, such as courses completed by individuals and qualifications gained (CFNI, 2003:27-8). Peace I was broad-based and lacked a peace and reconciliation focus, but Peace II requires all projects to prove 'distinctiveness' criteria, how they contribute to the process of peacebuilding and reconciliation (Harvey, 2003:27,93). As Harvey notes, "reconciliation is not left to chance, or merely hoped for, but built into the structure of the programme and its projects" (ibid:104).

Training for Women Network (TWN) has acted as Intermediary Funding Body (IFB) under Measure 4.1 for Peace I and Measure 1.5 for Peace II. 114 projects were funded under Peace I training women in the areas of information technology, management, non-traditional skills, vocational qualifications, personal development, return to learn, research and other areas. 63% of those trained were women returning after family caring responsibilities and 74% of projects had a cross-community element (TWN, 2001b:3-4). The mid-term evaluation of TWN's funding activities focussed on measurable outcomes, for example, 70% of course participants progressing to further education or training and 14% to employment, but there was not direct correlation stated between the improvement of women's circumstances through these outcomes and the project of building peace (TWN, 1998:6). However, a link was made in TWN's strategy for Peace II, which stated that "the initiation and growth of women's education, training and employment programmes has been a catalyst for change and socio-economic regeneration in Northern Ireland" and that

"capacity-building within communities makes a contribution to the revival of the economy and the creation of an equitable and just society" (TWN, 2001a). Again, women have been linked to socio-economic growth, which in turn is deemed to create the conditions for peacebuilding. Indeed, the logical structure of the Peace II programme is geared to the understanding that economic renewal and social, economic and political transition lead to a "more peaceful, prosperous and stable society" (NI Executive, 2000:41). Consequently, TWN targeted specific areas, sectors and activities and communities and groups that have been most affected by the conflict, a total of 34 projects being funded under Peace II (TWN, 2002:9; TWN, 2003:6)[8].

The provision of training in post-conflict situations is not confined to employment and business activities. The International Labour Organisation acknowledges that "life skills training is vital in a post-conflict situation, as it addresses skill gaps which impede the economic (re)integration of those affected by the conflict" (ILO, 1998: paragraph 137). In this way, individuals are empowered to cope with the difficult task of transition and new ways of working with those who had been considered enemies. Therefore, the ability to engage in economic regeneration is coupled with personal development and empowerment processes for participation in the peacebuilding project and the society beyond. As women have been marginalised in activities in both the economic and political spheres, training in personal development and confidence-building is crucial to constructing peace for an equitable society.

The inclusion of women in peacebuilding programmes has been justified from the perspective that the inclusion of women in the economy brings benefits for business, contributing to growth, the improvement of the position of women in society contributes to the creation of a just and equitable society and women's equality is a general goal of all policies concerning the European Union. Indeed, the advancement of women is included in both the Belfast Agreement and Northern Ireland Act 1998 (see for example Belfast Agreement 1998, Human Rights Para 1, Economic, Social and Cultural Issues Para 1; Northern Ireland Act 1998, Section 75). However, a case for a direct causal link between women as peacebuilders, women as defining factors of a vibrant civil society and the essential participation of civil society in peacebuilding has not been effectively made in this context. A detailed evaluation of the activities of some community-based projects training women with European funding will shed some light on this process.

The primary source for specific evaluation is on the project application form on which the project would have originally been accepted. This details the aims of the project and measurable outcomes. The 'distinctiveness' criteria have to be outlined, describing how the project addresses the legacy of the conflict, takes opportunities resulting from peace, effects reconciliation and incorporates cross-community aspects. The range of criteria can be defined in the context of what is expected to be achieved and monitored according to the meeting of stated targets. Progress reports define how far targets have been met, progress towards objectives, benefits to women and the contribution to peace and reconciliation. While the meeting of targets can be measured, other impacts can only be approximated. In addition to progress reports, therefore, projects define what 'soft outcomes' have been achieved, that is, benefits to women that, while difficult to measure, have a cumulative positive effect on the empowerment of women and their participation in key areas of society.

Projects are required to identify the legacy of the conflict in their area, supported by research where possible, and show how this is to be addressed through their

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[8] See Appendix 4: map of project locations.

activities, taking advantage of the peace process. Effects of the conflict have included weak business infrastructure, low investment, unemployment, social and economic deprivation, population displacement, segregation or polarisation of communities, isolation and general loss of confidence. This situation impacts on women by closing down their networks, frustrating the addressing of important issues common to women through the primacy of constitutional politics and limiting opportunities for self-development through financial independence. In effect, the dynamics of conflict have appropriated women's lives and confined them to narrow spheres of opportunity.

Opportunities brought by peace identified by projects in their own areas comprise a negating of many of the confining influences of conflict, with increased possibilities for inter-communal contact, refocusing of communities from conflict identities, greater investment, economic regeneration, more mobility, a greater sense of security, communities being more open to outside help and the re-surfacing of important issues that have been subordinated by the conflict, such as homelessness and domestic violence. While these represent possible routes for women to exert more control over their lives, the years of restrictions have left them with a low skills base, fewer qualifications, reduced confidence and an inhibited capacity to re-define themselves. Consequently, the varied contexts and backgrounds of projects in the community have similar themes. These include skills and knowledge required to perform in the labour market, such as information technology, business development, entrepreneurship, vocational training and specific skills acquisition, but at the same time being given the capacity for personal development, confidence-building, basic skills and inter-relational development. These personal development processes are coupled with mandatory elements of reconciliation and mutual understanding within training programmes and experiences of cross-community working and interaction. These equip women in areas most affected by conflict with all the theoretical elements of economic, social and cultural development that are credited with moving a society beyond conflict.

Theoretical progress in peacebuilding aside, projects are monitored and evaluated according to realistic and practical impacts towards the aims and objectives of the projects themselves, their funding bodies, the national programme for peace and reconciliation and the aspiration of the European Union as whole. Projects state what can be achieved through their activities and define outcomes that can be measured by tracking the progress of participants. These measurable outcomes include attendance, qualifications, registration for further training or education, progression in or commencement of employment and business ownership. But what can be easily quantified is only part of the process. For example, of the 5180 women the 34 projects together state will be beneficiaries over a two-year period, cost and outcome correlation is highly differential, depending upon the starting level of the women, the context they are in, the structure of courses, the level of attainment intended and capacity of the project itself. Intended beneficiaries for individual projects, therefore, vary from 1152 to 10 individuals and from no accredited qualifications to degree awards, yet each project has an equally important role to play in the process of empowering women and the project of peacebuilding.

A developing discipline that is less easy to define in quantitative terms is that of assessing 'soft outcomes'. These are personal skills and capacities acquired by women through training itself, but mainly through the process of attending training. Recorded soft outcomes include community relations awareness, inclusion, mutual understanding, particular life and vocational skills, capacity building, attendance or participation, self-management, judgement, assertiveness, self-esteem or sense of worth, confidence, teamwork and personal growth. These are the very skills and

experiences that have been disrupted b the mechanisms of conflict and are required to be restored to enable women to gain or regain control over their lives and enable greater participation in their communities, civil society and public life. While developing these skills, projects attempt to negate the systemic barriers to women's participation, such as through the provision of childcare, transport and flexible working methods to account for women's individual situations.

The provision of opportunities for women to enter public life in positions of political, economic or administrative influence and power is necessary to the project of peacebuilding. In addition, key influencers in civil society are increasingly called upon to become involved in the transition process from conflict. By equipping women who have been most affected by the conflict with the skills, qualifications and capacity to participate more fully in their communities, civil society, economic life and political structures, the chances of a sustainable peace become magnified. While the understanding of how informal processes of learning and capacity building is still under development, examples drawn from women's training projects in the community in Northern Ireland as part of the investment in peace in the region demonstrate a clear connection with the theoretical notions that link the empowerment of women with the process of building peace in a society divided by conflict.

CONCLUSION

Women have been visibly at the forefront of efforts to bring about peace in the international context and in divided societies. While debates around innate pacifism, socialised protection mechanisms and experience-related interest in peace continue, the fact of contributions to peace being weighted towards the female gender is difficult to refute. Furthermore, whether a consideration of gender-specific assumptions about qualities of peacemaking, grounds of equality or an acknowledgement that a wealth of untapped resources is being neglected, international notions of peacebuilding include specific reference to a gender element and the participation of women. Women are therefore essential to the formal processes of building peace in areas of conflict.

Developing notions of civil society are subject to disagreement and debate. However, the qualities and definitions of a vibrant civil society accord to the imperative of the participation of women. Like society in general, civil society is gendered, but there are sufficient opportunity spaces for women to organise and influence in ways that are difficult in formal political processes. While there is some tension between what constitutes civil society and the ideals embodied in contemporary feminism, there is scope for women to claim substantial sections of civil society for their advantage. Indeed, the strength and cohesion of civil society depends largely on how women are integrated into its structures and processes. As with formal political and economic structures, the positions of influence and power within civil society remain largely in male hands, but women have a marginal advantage in this field in comparison with the often hostile environment of political institutions.

Theoretical and practical applications of peacebuilding processes in areas of conflict increasingly indicate the meaningful participation of civil society to a greater or lesser extent. This not only recognises the role of civil society in the concept of participative democracy, but also the understanding that, as conflict involves and affects whole societies, the transition from conflict must also do so. In addition, the predominance of conflict elites requires alternative mechanisms to bypass their influence in maintaining lines of division, requiring the multiple channels of communication and participation that exist in civil society to be involved in the peacebuilding process. As women are a defining factor in the understanding of civil society, the participation of women in the project of peacebuilding is a sign that civil society is being meaningfully engaged.

The contextual example of some women's training projects in Northern Ireland funded as part of the European Programme for Peace and Reconciliation demonstrates how women's participation and empowerment is being developed. As a group, women are differentially disadvantaged by the processes of conflict in society, women's needs and aspirations being subordinated to the imperatives of competing national identities. This creates a deficit in the capacity for women to participate in society. Structured training and group experiences, tailored to the specific contexts women find themselves in, create the formal qualifications and opportunities for self-improvement and progression needed to facilitate a greater participation in society, the economy and political life, whether formally or through the consultation processes of civil society. In addition, informal processes of empowerment and self-development are crucial to the process of moving beyond a conflict identity. While economic development has been the primary focus of peacebuilding activities, this can only partially contribute to the development of a more peaceful society. Individuals require the confidence and capacity to engage

with different communities and to take on leading roles in structures of leadership in communities and civil society that are not oriented towards a conflict stance.

The empowerment of women in a post-conflict society is a long and difficult process. Women need to travel from a marginalised position during conflict to one of leadership during peacebuilding. This has to take place in the form of equal political representation in institutions, influence in leadership structures in civil society and a recognition of the extensive impact of women's involvement in maintaining communities throughout conflict and its transition, as well as healing processes during and after conflict. The training of women in the community, particularly in areas most affected by conflict, contributes to the essential framework of promoting peace and creating the conditions for women to become more empowered and assertive in transition from conflict and the formation of a post-conflict society. The greater investment in these activities creates multiple contributions to the task of building peace. Firstly, the extension of women's participation in employment and entrepreneurship strengthens the economy required for societal stability. Secondly, the economic independence of women contributes to their options for emancipation, which is a pre-requisite for a just and egalitarian society. Thirdly, such training builds women's confidence and capacity to challenge traditional power structures and exert pressure on decision-making processes, leading to a fully role in the reconstruction of society. Finally, the empowerment of women in the community provides greater recognition of the resources available and potential for leadership in civil society in its role in peacebuilding.

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Appendix 1: Summary of the Articles of Resolution 1325 (2000) adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting on 31 October 2000 (S/RES/1325(2000))

1. Urges member states to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels.
2. Encourages the Secretary General to implement a strategic plan of action to increase the participation of women.
3. Urges the Secretary General to appoint more women as special representative and envoys.
4. Urges the Secretary General to seek to expand the role of women in UN field operations.
5. Expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations.
6. Requests the Secretary General to provide to member states training guidelines and materials on the specific needs of women.
7. Urges member states to increase their support for gender-sensitive training efforts.
8. Calls on all actors involved when negotiating and implementing peace initiatives to adopt a gender perspective.
9. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect international law regarding the rights of women and girls.
10. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to prevent gender-based violence.
11. Emphasises the responsibility of all states to end impunity for crimes against humanity, including gender-based crimes.
12. Call upon all parties to armed conflict to respect civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps.
13. Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, etc, to take into account the different needs of male and female ex-combatants.
14. Reaffirms its readiness to give consideration to gender impacts when acting under Article 41.
15. Expresses its willingness to ensure Security Council missions take account of gender perspectives.
16. Invites the Secretary General to carry out a study of the impact of conflict on women and girls.
17. Requests the Secretary General to include progress on gender mainstreaming in his report to the Security Council.

Appendix 2: Percentages of Women in National Legislatures[9]

Rank	Country	Lower or single House				Upper House or Senate			
		Elections	Seats*	Women	%W	Elections	Seats*	Women	%W
1	Rwanda	09 2003	80	39	48.8	09 2003	20	6	30.0
2	Sweden	09 2002	349	158	45.3	---	---	---	---
3	Denmark	11 2001	179	68	38.0	---	---	---	---
4	Finland	03 2003	200	75	37.5	---	---	---	---
5	Netherlands	01 2003	150	55	36.7	06 2003	75	24	32.0
6	Norway	09 2001	165	60	36.4	---	---	---	---
7	Cuba	01 2003	609	219	36.0	---	---	---	---
8	Belgium	05 2003	150	53	35.3	05 2003	71	22	31.0
9	Costa Rica	02 2002	57	20	35.1	---	---	---	---
10	Austria	11 2002	183	62	33.9	N.A.	62	13	21.0
11	Germany	09 2002	603	194	32.2	N.A.	69	17	24.6
12	Argentina	10 2001	257	79	30.7	10 2001	72	24	33.3
13	Iceland	05 2003	63	19	30.2	---	---	---	---
14	Mozambique	12 1999	250	75	30.0	---	---	---	---
15	South Africa	06 1999	399	119	29.8	06 1999	89	17	31.5
16	Seychelles	12 2002	34	10	29.4	---	---	---	---
17	New Zealand	07 2002	120	34	28.3	---	---	---	---
"	Spain	03 2000	350	99	28.3	03 2000	259	63	24.3
18	Viet Nam	05 2002	498	136	27.3	---	---	---	---
19	Grenada	11 2003	15	4	26.7	11 2003	13	4	30.8
20	Namibia	11 1999	72	19	26.4	11 1998	26	2	7.7
21	Bulgaria	06 2001	240	63	26.2	---	---	---	---
22	Timor-Leste	08 2001	88	23	26.1	---	---	---	---
23	Turkmenistan	12 1999	50	13	26.0	---	---	---	---
24	Australia	11 2001	150	38	25.3	10 2001	76	22	28.9
25	Switzerland	10 2003	200	50	25.0	10 2003	46	11	23.9
26	Uganda	06 2001	304	75	24.7	---	---	---	---
27	Lao People's Democratic Rep.	02 2002	109	25	22.9	---	---	---	---
28	Saint Vincent & the Grenadines	03 2001	22	5	22.7	---	---	---	---
29	Mexico	07 2003	500	113	22.6	07 2000	128	20	15.6
30	Eritrea	02 1994	150	33	22.0	---	---	---	---
31	Pakistan	10 2002	342	74	21.6	03 2003	100	18	18.0
32	United Rep. of Tanzania	10 2000	295	63	21.4	---	---	---	---
33	Latvia	10 2002	100	21	21.0	---	---	---	---
34	Monaco	02 2003	24	5	20.8	---	---	---	---

[9] Figures up to 29 February 2004 from the Inter-Parliamentary Website (www.ipu.org).

35	Nicaragua	11 2001	92	19	20.7	---	---	---	---
36	Canada	11 2000	301	62	20.6	N.A.	105	34	32.4
37	China	03 2003	2985	604	20.2	---	---	---	---
"	Poland	09 2001	460	93	20.2	09 2001	100	23	23.0
38	Bahamas	05 2002	40	8	20.0	05 2002	16	7	43.8
"	Guyana	03 2001	65	13	20.0	---	---	---	---
39	Trinidad and Tobago	10 2002	36	7	19.4	12 2001	31	10	32.3
40	Guinea	06 2002	114	22	19.3	---	---	---	---
"	Slovakia	09 2002	150	29	19.3	---	---	---	---
41	Senegal	04 2001	120	23	19.2	---	---	---	---
42	Portugal	03 2002	230	44	19.1	---	---	---	---
43	Dominica	01 2000	32	6	18.8	---	---	---	---
"	Estonia	03 2003	101	19	18.8	---	---	---	---
44	Bolivia	06 2002	130	24	18.5	06 2002	27	4	14.8
45	Burundi	06 1993	179	33	18.4	01 2002	53	10	18.9
46	Peru	04 2001	120	22	17.5	---	---	---	---
"	The f.Y.R. of Macedonia	09 2002	120	22	18.3	---	---	---	---
47	United Kingdom	06 2001	659	118	17.9	N.A.	677	113	16.7
48	Croatia	11 2003	152	27	17.8	---	---	---	---
"	Philippines	05 2001	214	38	17.8	05 2001	24	3	12.5
49	Suriname	05 2000	51	9	17.6	---	---	---	---
50	Dominican Republic	05 2002	150	26	17.3	05 2002	32	2	6.3
51	Botswana	10 1999	47	8	17.0	---	---	---	---
"	Czech Republic	06 2002	200	34	17.0	10 2002	81	10	12.3
52	Bosnia and Herzegovina	10 2002	42	7	16.7	11 2002	15	0	0.0
"	Luxembourg	06 1999	60	10	16.7	---	---	---	---
"	San Marino	06 2001	60	10	16.7	---	---	---	---
53	Ecuador	10 2002	100	16	16.0	---	---	---	---
"	Singapore	11 2001	94	15	16.0	---	---	---	---
54	Angola	09 1992	220	34	15.5	---	---	---	---
55	Israel	01 2003	120	18	15.0	---	---	---	---
56	Sierra Leone	05 2002	124	18	14.5	---	---	---	---
57	Andorra	03 2001	28	4	14.3	---	---	---	---
"	United States of America	11 2002	435	62	14.3	11 2002	100	13	13
58	Barbados	05 2003	30	4	13.3	05 2003	21	5	23.8
"	Ireland	05 2002	166	22	13.3	07 2002	60	10	16.7
"	Saint Kitts and Nevis	03 2000	15	2	13.3	---	---	---	---
59	Gambia	01 2002	53	7	13.2	---	---	---	---
60	Republic of	02 2001	101	13	12.9	---	---	---	---

	Moldova							
61	Tajikistan	02 2000	63	8	12.7	03 2000	34	4	11.8
62	Chile	12 2001	120	15	12.5	12 2001	49	2	4.1
63	France	06 2002	574	70	12.2	09 2001	321	35	10.9
"	Slovenia	10 2000	90	11	12.2	---	---	---	---
64	Uruguay	10 1999	99	12	12.1	10 1999	31	3	9.7
65	Colombia	03 2002	166	20	12.0	03 2002	102	9	8.8
"	Liechtenstein	02 2001	25	3	12.0	---	---	---	---
"	Syrian Arab Republic	03 2003	250	30	12.0	---	---	---	---
"	Zambia	12 2001	158	19	12.0	---	---	---	---
66	Burkina Faso	05 2002	111	13	11.7	---	---	---	---
"	Jamaica	10 2002	60	7	11.7	10 2002	21	4	19.0
"	Lesotho	05 2002	120	14	11.7	N.A.	33	12	36.4
67	Italy	05 2001	618	71	11.5	05 2001	321	26	8.1
"	Tunisia	10 1999	182	21	11.5	---	---	---	---
68	Cape Verde	01 2001	72	8	11.1	---	---	---	---
"	Saint Lucia	12 2001	18	2	11.1	12 2001	11	4	36.4
69	Djibouti	01 2003	65	7	10.8	---	---	---	---
"	Morocco	09 2002	325	35	10.8	10 2003	270	?	?
"	Swaziland	10 2003	65	7	10.8	10 2003	30	9	30.0
70	Cyprus	05 2001	56	6	10.7	---	---	---	---
"	El Salvador	03 2003	84	9	10.7	---	---	---	---
"	Romania	11 2000	345	37	10.7	11 2000	140	8	5.7
71	Lithuania	10 2000	141	15	10.6	---	---	---	---
72	Azerbaijan	11 2000	124	13	10.5	---	---	---	---
"	Malaysia	11 1999	191	20	10.5	2003	54	20	37.0
"	Mongolia	07 2000	76	8	10.5	---	---	---	---
73	Kazakhstan	10 1999	77	8	10.4	10 2002	39	2	5.1
74	Belarus	10 2000	97	10	10.3	12 2000	61	19	31.1
75	Mali	07 2002	147	15	10.2	---	---	---	---
76	Kyrgyzstan	02 2000	60	6	10.0	02 2000	45	1	2.2
"	Paraguay	04 2003	80	8	10.0	04 2003	45	4	8.9
"	Zimbabwe	06 2000	150	15	10.0	---	---	---	---
77	Panama	05 1999	71	7	9.9	---	---	---	---
78	Cambodia	07 2003	123	12	9.8	03 1999	61	8	13.1
"	Hungary	04 2002	386	38	9.8	---	---	---	---
"	Russian Federation	12 2003	450	44	9.8	N.A.	178	6	3.4
79	Sudan	12 2000	360	35	9.7	---	---	---	---
"	Venezuela	07 2000	165	16	9.7	---	---	---	---
80	Bhutan	N.A.	150	14	9.3	---	---	---	---
"	Malawi	06 1999	193	18	9.3	---	---	---	---
81	Gabon	12 2001	119	11	9.2	02 2003	91	12	13.2

"	Malta	04 2003	65	6	9.2	---	---	---	---
"	Thailand	01 2001	500	46	9.2	03 2000	200	21	10.5
82	Sao Tome and Principe	03 2002	55	5	9.1	---	---	---	---
83	Ghana	12 2000	200	18	9.0	---	---	---	---
84	Cameroon	06 2002	180	16	8.9	---	---	---	---
85	India	09 1999	543	48	8.8	11 2002	242	25	10.3
86	Greece	04 2000	300	26	8.7	---	---	---	---
87	Brazil	10 2002	513	44	8.6	10 2002	81	10	12.3
88	Congo	05 2002	129	11	8.5	07 2002	60	9	15.0
"	Cote d'Ivoire	12 2000	223	19	8.5	---	---	---	---
89	Guatemala	11 2003	158	13	8.2	---	---	---	---
90	Indonesia	06 1999	500	40	8.0	---	---	---	---
91	Serbia and Montenegro	09 2003	126	10	7.9	---	---	---	---
92	Ethiopia	05 2000	547	42	7.7	05 2000	120	10	8.3
93	Togo	10 2002	81	6	7.4	---	---	---	---
94	Benin	03 2003	83	6	7.2	---	---	---	---
"	Georgia	10 1999	235	17	7.2	---	---	---	---
"	Uzbekistan	12 1999	250	18	7.2	---	---	---	---
95	Japan	11 2003	480	34	7.1	07 2001	247	38	15.4
"	Kenya	12 2002	224	16	7.1	---	---	---	---
96	Nigeria	04 2003	360	24	6.7	04 2003	109	3	2.8
97	Algeria	05 2002	389	24	6.2	12 2003	144	?	?
98	Samoa	03 2001	49	3	6.1	---	---	---	---
99	Maldives	11 1999	50	3	6.0	---	---	---	---
100	Nepal	05 1999	205	12	5.9	06 2001	60	5	8.3
101	Chad	04 2002	155	9	5.8	---	---	---	---
102	Albania	06 2001	140	8	5.7	---	---	---	---
"	Fiji	08 2001	70	4	5.7	08 2001	32	2	6.3
"	Mauritius	09 2000	70	4	5.7	---	---	---	---
103	Honduras	11 2001	128	7	5.5	---	---	---	---
"	Jordan	06 2003	110	6	5.5	11 2003	55	7	12.7
"	Republic of Korea	04 2000	271	15	5.5	---	---	---	---
104	Antigua and Barbuda	03 1999	19	1	5.3	03 1999	17	2	11.8
"	Ukraine	03 2002	450	24	5.3	---	---	---	---
105	Equatorial Guinea	03 1999	80	4	5.0	---	---	---	---
106	Kiribati	05 2003	42	2	4.8	---	---	---	---
107	Armenia	05 2003	131	6	4.6	---	---	---	---
108	Sri Lanka	12 2001	225	10	4.4	---	---	---	---
"	Turkey	11 2002	550	24	4.4	---	---	---	---
109	Madagascar	12 2002	160	6	3.8	03 2001	90	10	11.1
110	Mauritania	10 2001	81	3	3.7	04 2002	56	3	5.4

111	Haiti	05 2000	83	3	3.6	05 2000	27	7	25.9
112	Belize	03 2003	30	1	3.3	03 2003	13	3	23.1
113	Marshall Islands	11 2003	33	1	3.0	---	---	---	---
114	Egypt	11 2000	454	11	2.4	05 2001	264	15	5.7
115	Lebanon	08 2000	128	3	2.3	---	---	---	---
116	Bangladesh	10 2001	300	6	2.0	---	---	---	---
117	Vanuatu	05 2002	52	1	1.9	---	---	---	---
118	Niger	11 1999	83	1	1.2	---	---	---	---
119	Papua New Guinea	06 2002	109	1	0.9	---	---	---	---
120	Yemen	04 2003	301	1	0.3	---	---	---	---
121	Bahrain	10 2002	40	0	0.0	11 2002	40	6	15.0
"	Kuwait	07 2003	65	0	0.0	---	---	---	---
"	Micronesia (Fed. States of)	03 2003	14	0	0.0	---	---	---	---
"	Nauru	05 2003	18	0	0.0	---	---	---	---
"	Palau	11 2000	16	0	0.0	11 2000	9	0	0.0
"	Saudi Arabia	05 2001	120	0	0.0	---	---	---	---
"	Solomon Islands	12 2001	50	0.0	0.0	---	---	---	---
"	Tonga	03 2002	30	0	0.0	---	---	---	---
"	Tuvalu	07 2002	15	0	0.0	---	---	---	---
"	United Arab Emirates	12 1997	40	0	0	---	---	---	---
?	Dem. People's Rep. of Korea	08 2003	687	?	?	---	---	---	---
?	Dem. Republic of the Congo	08 2000	500	?	?	08 2003	120	?	?
?	Iran (Islamic Rep. of)	02 2004	290	?	?	---	---	---	---
?	Liberia	10 2003	?	?	?	---	---	---	---
?	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	03 1997	760	?	?	---	---	---	---

Appendix 3: Population Indicators

Country	% under 15	Median Age	Fertility (children per woman)
Afghanistan	43	18.1	6.8
Albania	28	26.7	2.43
Algeria	33	21.7	3.15
American Samoa	41		
Andorra	16		
Angola	48	16.3	7.2
Antigua and Barbuda	28		
Argentina	27	27.9	2.62
Armenia	20	30.7	1.42
Aruba	23		
Australia	20	35.2	1.77
Austria	16	38.3	1.36
Azerbaijan	29	25.6	2.3
Bahamas	29	26.1	2.4
Bahrain	29	26.9	2.98
Bangladesh	38	20	3.95
Barbados	19	32.6	1.5
Belarus	16	36.5	1.27
Belgium	17	39.1	1.6
Belize	38	19.8	3.6
Benin	45	16.6	6.1
Bermuda	20		
Bhutan	41	18.3	5.5
Bolivia	39	20.1	4.32
Bosnia and Herzegovina	17	35.1	1.35
Botswana	40	19.1	4
Brazil	28	25.4	2.34
Brunei Darussalam	30	25	2.7
Bulgaria	14	39.1	1.14
Burkina Faso	49	15.5	6.89
Burundi	46	15.8	6.8
Cambodia	41	17.5	5.25
Cameroon	42	18.1	5.1
Canada	18	36.9	1.56
Cape Verde	39	18.5	3.8
Central African Rep.	43	18.3	5.3
Chad	47	16.7	6.65
Chile	27	28.3	2.44
China	23	30	1.8
China, Hong Kong SAR	15	36.1	1.1
China, Macao SAR	19	33.5	1.15
Colombia	32	24	2.8
Comoros	42	18	5.4
Congo	47	16.7	6.29
Cook Islands	36		
Costa Rica	30	24.5	2.58
Cote d'Ivoire	41	18.1	5.3
Croatia	17	38.9	1.6
Cuba	20	33	1.55

Cyprus	22	33.4	1.96
Czech Republic	15	37.6	1.18
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	47	16.5	6.7
Denmark	19	38.7	1.75
Djibouti	43	18.3	6.1
Dominica	33		
Dominican Republic	32	23.1	2.88
Ecuador	33	22.7	3.1
Egypt	35	21.3	3.51
El Salvador	35	21.8	3.17
Equatorial Guinea	44	18.2	5.89
Eritrea	45	16.9	5.93
Estonia	16	37.9	1.28
Ethiopia	46	16.9	6.5
Fiji	32	23.1	3.2
Finland	18	39.4	1.74
France	19	37.6	1.76
French Guiana	35	23.7	3.83
French Polynesia	29	25.1	2.6
Gabon	41	18.9	4.5
Gambia	41	19.4	5.2
Georgia	19	34.8	1.58
Germany	15	39.9	1.34
Ghana	40	18.8	4.6
Greece	15	39.1	1.3
Guadeloupe	25	31.8	2.1
Guam	31	27.4	3.2
Guatemala	43	17.8	4.93
Guinea	44	17.6	6.27
Guinea-Bissau	47	16.6	7.1
Guyana	30	24.1	2.45
Haiti	38	18.9	4.38
Honduras	40	18.7	4.3
Hungary	16	38.1	1.38
Iceland	23	32.9	2.06
India	33	23.4	3.45
Indonesia	30	24.6	2.6
Iran (Islamic Republic)	32	20.6	2.53
Iraq	41	18.7	5.25
Ireland	21	31.9	1.9
Israel	28	27.9	2.94
Italy	14	40.2	1.21
Jamaica	30	24.1	2.5
Japan	14	41.3	1.39
Jordan	38	20.1	4.11
Kazakhstan	25	27.9	2.1
Kenya	41	17.7	4.6
Kiribati	...		
Korea, Dem. People's Rep.	26	29.4	2.05
Korea, Republic of	20	31.8	1.51
Kuwait	26	28.6	2.89
Kyrgyzstan	32	23.2	2.89

|			
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	42	18.5	5.3
Latvia	16	37.8	1.17
Lebanon	29	25.2	2.29
Lesotho	40	18.8	4.34
Liberia	47	16.6	6.8
Libyan Arab Jamahariya	31	21.8	3.43
Lithuania	19	36	1.38
Luxembourg	19	37	1.73
Madagascar	45	17.5	6.1
Malawi	46	17.1	6.46
Malaysia	33	23.6	3.26
Maldives	42	17.7	5.8
Mali	49	15.4	7
Malta	19	36.5	1.86
Marshall Islands	49		
Martinique	23	33.8	1.9
Mauritania	43	18.2	6
Mauritius	25	28.9	2.05
Mexico	32	22.9	2.75
Micronesia, Fed. States of	39	19	4.3
Monaco	13		
Mongolia	32	21.8	2.7
Morocco	31	23	3
Mozambique	44	17.8	5.9
Myanmar	32	23.4	3.3
Namibia	43	18.4	5.15
Nepal	40	19.5	4.65
Netherlands	18	37.6	1.6
Netherlands Antilles	24	32	2.1
New Caledonia	29	26.9	2.6
New Zealand	22	34.5	1.97
Nicaragua	42	18.1	4.32
Niger	50	15.1	8
Nigeria	44	17.3	5.92
Norway	20	37.2	1.85
Occ. Palestinian Territory	46	16.8	5.99
Oman	37	21.2	5.44
Pakistan	41	18.8	5.48
Palau	...		
Panama	31	24.8	2.79
Papua New Guinea	41	19.1	4.6
Paraguay	38	19.7	4.17
Peru	33	22.7	3.2
Philippines	36	20.9	3.64
Poland	17	35.2	1.48
Portugal	17	37	1.46
Puerto Rico	23	31.8	1.99
Qatar	26	31	3.7
Republic of Moldova	20	31.7	1.56
Reunion	27	28.3	2.3
Romania	17	34.7	1.32

Russian Federation	16	36.8	1.25
Rwanda	45	17	6.2
Saint Kitts and Nevis	31		
Saint Lucia	30	23.8	2.4
Saint Vincent/Grenadines	30	22.7	2.4
Samoa	40	19.1	4.51
San Marino	15		
Sao Tome and Principe	41	18.4	4.5
Saudi Arabia	39	20.6	5.09
Senegal	43	17.6	5.4
Serbia and Montenegro	19	35.4	1.77
Seychelles	28		
Sierra Leone	44	17.9	6.5
Singapore	21	34.5	1.57
Slovakia	18	34	1.4
Slovenia	15	38.1	1.25
Solomon Islands	42	18	4.99
Somalia	48	16	7.25
South Africa	33	22.6	2.9
Spain	14	37.4	1.19
Sri Lanka	25	28.1	2.1
Sudan	39	19.7	4.9
Suriname	31	23.5	2.62
Swaziland	43	17.4	5.1
Sweden	18	39.6	1.56
Switzerland	16	40.2	1.47
Syrian Arab Republic	37	19	3.82
Tajikistan	36	19.9	3.72
Thailand	25	27.5	1.95
The FYR of Macedonia	22	32.3	1.92
Timor-Leste	36	17.4	4.35
Togo	44	17.7	5.8
Tonga	37	20.3	4.2
Trinidad and Tobago	22	27.6	1.65
Tunisia	28	24.4	2.32
Turkey	30	24.2	2.7
Turkmenistan	34	21.6	3.03
Tuvalu	41		
Uganda	50	15.1	7.1
Ukraine	16	37.7	1.25
United Arab Emirates	25	29.6	3.17
United Kingdom	18	37.7	1.7
United Rep. of Tanzania	45	16.8	5.7
United States of America	21	35.2	2.05
U.S. Virgin Islands	25	33.4	2.25
Uruguay	24	31.4	2.4
Uzbekistan	34	21.5	2.88
Vanuatu	41	18.6	4.59
Venezuela	33	23.1	2.98

Viet Nam	31	23.1	2.5
Western Sahara	35	22.1	4.4
Yemen	49	15.4	7.3
Zambia	47	16.7	6.05
Zimbabwe	43	17.5	4.5

Taken from the Indicators on Youth and Elderly Populations Table, United Nations Statistics Division, 2003; Table 8: Median Age of Population 2000, United Nations Population Division; and Table 3: Total Fertility, United Nations Population Division.

Appendix 4 – Projects Funded by Training for Women Network 2004

Belfast
- Taughmonagh Community Forum.
- Nexus Institute.
- Newtownards Road Women's Group (Carew II).
- Belfast Women's Aid.
- Short Strand Partnership.
- Falls Road Women's Centre.
- Simon Community.
- E Belfast Community Education Centre.
- Intercomm.
- Women's Tec.
- Ballynafeigh Community development Association.
- ItxP.
- Oasis Family Centre.
- Shankill Open Learning Centre.
- Advanced Learning Centre (Making IT).
- Employment Route 1.

L/Derry
- NW Centre for Learning & Development.

Loughgiel
- Loughgiel Community

Dungiven
- Glenshane Community

Magherafelt
- ALS (Moyola Open Learning

Strabane
- NW

Omagh
- GG Enterprises.
- Enterprise

Cookstown
- Cookstown and District Women's Group (Positive Steps).

Lisburn
- FACT.

Lurgan
- HURT

Enniskillen
- Devenish Partnership Forum.
- Women in Agriculture.

Newry
- Clanrye Employment & Training Services.

Dungannon
- DDA Worktrack.
- S Tyrone Empowerment Programme (STEP).

Armagh
- Armagh Campus, QUB

Keady
- Keady & District Community Initiatives

Ballymacnab
- Ballymacnab Community Development

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