

The First Five Hundred

*Two Essays
on Aspects of the
Northern Ireland Problem*

by

MICHAEL McKEOWN

Three Irelands or One?

20p

THE FIRST FIVE HUNDRED

August 8th, 1972 saw the end of a year of internment in N. Ireland. By ironic coincidence it was marked by the announcement of the 500th fatality to occur since the death of Francis McCloskey in July, 1969 heralded in the current phase of violence in N. Ireland. Those five hundred deaths are not the only index of the violence in our community. That violence is manifest in the destruction of property at a cost which must eventually come near to £100m. That destruction has embraced large commercial undertakings like the Belfast Co-op and the small terraced housing of Bombay Street. The violence is reflected in the expulsion of innocent citizens from their homes and places of employment. It can be seen in the bitterness and hatred which people display towards those whom they regard as their enemies. Most clearly however the violence is charted in the circumstances surrounding the deaths of those five hundred people who have died tragically in the course of the past three years.

I have attempted in the following essay to analyse the circumstances in which these people died. I have done so primarily in the belief that by identifying objective circumstances surrounding these deaths it might be possible to draw some valid conclusions about the nature of the violence. Such conclusions might suggest the steps necessary to secure a termination of the violence, and a guarantee that it would never recur. A secondary reason is the fact that having been an eye witness of some of the situations in which people have died and having been well acquainted with at least a dozen of the victims, I have been conscious of how easily the total picture of the violence becomes distorted by the propagandist efforts of the involved parties.

Before attempting any specific analysis, some general points about the role of violence in N. Ireland should be noted. Since the beginning of this century the theme of violence has always been closely linked to the practice of politics in Irish society. The major political decisions affecting the destiny of Ireland in the 20th century have been taken in response to a policy of force majeure. As Prof. T. W. Moody has pointed out "Both Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State owe their origins not to the force of argument on which the national movement from O'Connell to Redmond had relied but to the argument of force, and their history bears the marks of that tragic but inescapable fact." How interwoven is our present with our past, is illustrated by the fatality figures in N. Ireland for the period June 21st, 1920 to June 18th, 1922 which were 428. In 1922 alone, 232 people were killed in N. Ireland. Although 1922 was to prove the peak of violence which would not be exceeded until 1972, nevertheless each succeeding decade was marked by a litany of fatalities occasioned either by sectarian rioting or guerilla campaigns.

A degree of violence seems to be endemic to all societies and all state structures claim the right to exercise a measure of coercive

violence against disruptive elements in their midst. This is implicit in the existence of a police force whose function in the last resort is to restrain by force those who would ignore the laws of the community. The degree of coercive violence which any society tolerates in its structures and institutions obviously varies from community to community and probably reflects the degree of social harmonization within the community. Citizens give their assent to the instruments of coercive violence in their society because they see them as operating within a rule of law and because they see the existence of such instruments as a necessary sanction for the law. One of the difficulties in any discussion about the morality of the use of violence in N. Ireland derives from the failure of some people to acknowledge the function of violence within the legitimate activities of the state and the failure of others to acknowledge any difference in moral quality between violent acts legitimately sanctioned and violent acts which are illegal and actionable at law. This failure was evidenced in a Christmas Covenant published in December, 1971 and signed by such people as Garret Fitzgerald, T.D., Dr. Simms, Primate of All Ireland and the Rev. Eric Gallagher who is probably the best known figure within the Methodist community in Ireland. The signatories pledged that they would "not use, threaten or countenance the use of violence to achieve political ends or to coerce any section of the community into conformity with beliefs which they do not share". What in fact the signatories may have been wishing to condemn were the practices of the I.R.A. and the U.V.F. but what in fact they were doing was withdrawing their support from many of the activities undertaken by the British Army, the Irish Army, the R.U.C. and the Garda Siochana acting as agents of their respective governments enforcing compliance with the requirements of those governments.

To acknowledge the coercive violence which can be invoked by our law enforcement agencies is to acknowledge that violence as an instrument of politics may be implicit as well as explicit. To secure one's goal by the threat of violence is to act within the same coercive ambit as those who actually resort to violence. If the use of violence is not acceptable as a legitimate political weapon, neither is the threat of violence. No more legitimate is the pursuit of goals which in themselves will precipitate violence even though they might be achieved by non-violent means. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association in a newsletter of June 29th, 1972, claimed "Until the British Government eliminates repression and sectarianism, there will be no lasting truce and the British Government must bear responsibility for the recurring violence."

Whatever the merits of the particular argument, any attempt to "eliminate repression and sectarianism" must produce a violent response. For a body such as N.I.C.R.A. which eschews the use of violence to seek that particular goal is to be inconsistent.

It is no mere sophistry to emphasise these inconsistencies because they demonstrate one of the difficulties confronting anyone trying to examine the function of, and attitudes to, violence in the political

context of N. Ireland. Attitudes to violence tend to be coloured by who is engaging in the violence, and who is suffering it, and the purpose to which the violence is being directed. Public reaction to any news of an explosion, shooting incident, or riot situation, is to re-echo Lenin's question "Who, whom?"

It is primarily this very question which I have attempted to explore in relation to the five hundred fatalities. I do so in the full knowledge that though the victims can be differentiated in a range of categories, they are indivisible in the common grief their deaths have brought to their families and in their commonalty as a symbol of community strife.

To attempt to identify accurately the circumstances in which these people have died is very difficult. Each power group has a vested interest in presenting a distorted picture of the situation and truth as usual has been the first casualty in the current conflict. The circumstances surrounding some of the deaths have been the subject of judicial enquiries and have been explored in the Scarman and Widgery Reports. In the cases of Martin McShane, Seamus Cusack and Desmond Beattie, local interests have organised unofficial enquiries. Inquests have been held on many of the fatalities but especially in the Belfast area, inquests are sometimes delayed for some months and consequently many of the deaths referred to have not been the subjects of inquests as yet. Apart from such sources the only other evidence to support the classifications I have drawn up, is derived from the often conflicting eye witness accounts, Death and In Memoriam notices, and the official press releases of the Security forces and both wings of the I.R.A. Within the limitation of such sources I would claim that the classifications are correct to an acceptable margin of error.

In classifying the fatalities, six categories automatically suggested themselves. There are those whose deaths were casual or accidental and there are those whose deaths were the result of a deliberate intention to inflict death. The casual deaths can be further differentiated into those fatalities occasioned by the Security forces operating under the sanction of law, and those occasioned by subversive elements acting outside the law. This gives us two divisions and applying the same considerations to those whose deaths could not be described as casual give us a further two divisions. A category must also be included to cover those victims who have been deliberately killed in circumstances where it is impossible to identify the perpetrators of these killings. Finally a category must be reserved for victims killed in riot situations where it would be impossible to state whether they were casual victims of the violence or from what source the violence emanated. In so far as the members of the Security forces appear to be primary targets for subversive attacks I have not treated deaths in this category as casual, and similarly I have not treated the deaths of members of para-military organizations or of people engaging in subversive activities as casual.

On the foregoing principles I have distributed the five hundred fatalities among the following categories:

- (1) Security forces killed.
- (2) Members of para-military organizations killed; civilians killed while engaging in subversive activities.
- (3) Civilians killed as casual victims of terrorist activity.
- (4) Civilians killed as casual victims of security forces operations.
- (5) Civilian victims of killing operations carried out by unidentified agents.
- (6) Civilian victims killed in riot situations involving sectarian clashes or clashes with the security forces.

CATEGORY ONE

Category 1 covers the largest single grouping of fatalities. The total breaks down as follows:

British Army Personnel	109
Ulster Defence Regiment Personnel	18
Royal Ulster Constabulary Personnel	23
R.U.C. Reserve Personnel	2

Total 152

With the exception of Constable Arbuckle (d.11/11/69) and possibly U.D.R. Private Harry Russell, (d.13/7/72) it can be presumed that all other fatalities died from operations carried out by Republican militant groups. Constable Arbuckle died in a riot on the Shankill Road and Private Russell may have been killed because he was a Catholic rather than because he was a member of the U.D.R.

The Provisional I.R.A. have claimed responsibility for most of these deaths although the Official I.R.A. have also acknowledged responsibility for some. The high number of fatalities suffered by the security forces is probably attributable to two reasons. Their presence in large numbers in all areas means that no matter how security conscious they might be, they are constantly being exposed to risk. Their inability to disguise their identity means that the risk is always constant even within military posts. While the U.D.R. and the R.U.C. enjoy an advantage over the Army personnel in being able occasionally to discard their uniforms, their dual role as security personnel and private citizens exposes them to greater risk in their own homes and neighbourhoods.

Although I.R.A. bulletins have claimed that certain killings have been carried out as reprisals for specific Security operations, it must be assumed that inflicting the maximum fatalities upon the Security forces is an integral part of the Provisional I.R.A. military strategy. This view is supported by the fact that U.D.R. men and R.U.C. men have been killed at their homes while British Army personnel such as Pte. Thomas McCann (d.13/2/72) have been killed while on leave in

the Republic. Although what appear to be I.R.A. briefing notes captured in Derry include prohibitions on the killing of U.D.R. men in their own homes, it is likely that this was dictated more by political than by military considerations. It is undoubtedly true that the killing of R.U.C. and U.D.R. personnel has more impact upon the people of N. Ireland than the killing of British Army personnel. The anonymity of a British soldier in the tightly knit community of N. Ireland gives his death much less political significance than the death of an R.U.C. or U.D.R. man who is well known in the local community. It was significant that despite the high number of British Army fatalities in the city of Derry, no significant volume of criticism was expressed about such fatalities until Ranger William Best, (d. 21/5/72) a native of Derry, was killed by personnel of the Official I.R.A. To date only one successful prosecution has been brought directly in connection with the killing of a member of the security forces although there are several still at hearing. Accessories to the killing of Const. Raymond Carroll in Ardoyne on 28/1/72 have been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.

CATEGORY TWO

Category 2 consists of sixty-nine people who have been killed who were either members of para-military organizations or who were engaging in subversive activities at the time of death. I have not been able to identify the affiliations of all these victims. The affiliations of sixty are listed:

Provisional I.R.A.	52
Official I.R.A.	7
Ulster Defence Association	1

Of the remaining nine, two of the victims were Protestant and seven Catholic. Of the total group, at least thirty-six have died accidentally rather than in engagements with the security forces. The big majority of these accidental deaths have been caused by premature explosions like those at Newforge Lane, Castlereagh, Crumlin, Clonard Street and Whitehouse. In all the cases mentioned it is to be presumed that the people concerned were engaged in preparing the explosives or transporting them. There is some doubt about the case of the four Provisionals killed in the Anderson Street explosion on 28/5/72 but I shall be referring to this in another context. A minority of accidental deaths such as those of Anthony Nolan (d. 8/12/71) or Denis Quinn, (d. 3/7/72), would appear to be the result of accidental discharge of weapons. In the absence of forensic evidence it would be idle to speculate whether the fatal wounds in such cases were self-inflicted. Such a high percentage of accidental deaths is perhaps inevitable in the context in which this campaign is being waged, but it does point to a high degree of recklessness on the part of the members of the Provisional I.R.A. and a military viewpoint in which a higher degree of expendability is tolerated than would be acceptable in a conventional military unit. In the circumstances in which these people died: i.e., either handling illegal substances or illegal arms, they were quite clearly at the time of death engaged in acts which were per se subversive. This is not immediately apparent in all cases of I.R.A. members killed by the security forces. In the cases of Joseph

McCann, (d. 15/4/72) and Gerald McDade (d. 21/12/71) they appear to have been unarmed and killed while evading arrest. In the case of Dorothy Maguire, (d. 23/10/71) it would appear she was killed for acting in a suspicious manner and there is a volume of eye-witness evidence to suggest that Seamus Cassidy, (d. 28/7/72) was unarmed and not acting illegally at the time he was shot. There are also grounds for believing that Albert Kavanagh, (d. 4/3/72) and Martin Forsythe, (d. 24/10/71) were killed while attempting to surrender to the security forces. Allowing for the fact that there are massive propaganda machines at work on both sides, the inference must be drawn that at least in a few cases, the security forces have exercised summary rights of execution upon those suspected of being members of the I.R.A.

CATEGORY THREE

In this category I have counted those civilians whose deaths can be directly attributed to the activities of subversive groups. They total in all 87 people and include those who died as a consequence of explosions, those who died in cross-fire emanating from subversive sources and those deliberately shot in pursuance of terrorist activity. The breakdown is as follows:

Explosions	70
Cross-fire	12
Deliberately Shot	5

The victims in this last category include Daniel McCormick, (d. 10/12/71), Senator Barnhill, (d. 12/12/71), Marcus McCausland, (d. 4/3/72), Harold Grey, (d. 19/7/72) and Leslie Laggett, (d. 20/7/72).

The I.R.A. have accepted responsibility for some of the explosions which have killed civilians, have denied responsibility for others and have remained silent on some others. Of the major explosions involving loss of civilian life, the I.R.A. have acknowledged the following as their responsibility:

E.B.N.I.	— 25/8/71 —	1 dead
Dublin Road	— 6/12/71 —	1 dead
Donegall Street	— 20/3/72 —	7 dead
Courtaulds	— 1/5/72 —	1 dead
Strabane	— 19/7/72 —	1 dead
Oxford St. and Cavehill Rd.	— 21/7/72 —	9 dead

They have denied responsibility for the following:

Four Step Inn	— 29/9/71 —	2 dead
McGurk's Bar	— 4/12/71 —	15 dead
Abercorn	— 4/3/72 —	2 dead
Anderson St.	— 28/5/72 —	8 dead
* Claudy	— 31/7/72 —	9 dead

*The eighth and ninth victims of this explosion, Joseph Connolly and Arthur Hone (d. 12/8/72) are not included in the 500 total.

Although the Provisional I.R.A. does not accept responsibility for many of the deaths, it does appear that they are responsible for the big majority of deaths caused by explosions. While there is room for doubt about the Abercorn explosion and the Anderson St. explosion, all the evidence suggests that the Claudy explosions were caused by a Provisional I.R.A. unit. On the other hand the evidence offered by the forensic experts at the inquest on the victims of the explosion in McGurk's Bar was consistent with the limited evidence offered by eye-witnesses which supported the view that the bomb had been deliberately placed and was not accidentally exploded in transit. The only other inference to be drawn from the inquest evidence was that there was a deliberate conspiracy by the witnesses, some of whom were victims of the explosion, to exculpate the I.R.A., and that the conspiracy was so well rehearsed that it stood up to the scrutiny of an inquest.

That there have been explosions originating from some Protestant subversive group cannot be gainsaid. The fatal explosion in Bann St., 14/9/71 allied to the unheralded attacks on Catholic property like the explosion at Murtagh's Bar on 18/12/71 which killed James McCallum or the explosion at Kelly's Bar on 13/5/72 all point to the existence of such a group or groups which may have been responsible for a significant number of deaths. However even on their own admissions and making reasonable conjectures about the nature of the fatal explosions, there is little doubt that the I.R.A. bear major responsibility for this heavy toll of fatalities.

The heavy civilian toll does not seem to be an integral part of the I.R.A. campaign. A high civilian fatality rate is politically counterproductive and militarily sterile, and the I.R.A. realization of this is reflected in their policy of issuing warnings prior to a bombing attack, and in their efforts to disclaim responsibility when the warnings do not have the effect of preventing fatalities. The policy of issuing warnings has however often been executed with the same ineptitude and lack of foresight which has resulted in so many self-inflicted I.R.A. casualties. It is a mistaken view to see in their indifference to human life a deliberate policy of killing civilians. This is said, not to attribute to them a moral sensitivity, but to emphasise the fact that the political considerations entwined in the military strategy require a degree of popular support which could not be long sustained in the face of a fatality rate rising more steeply than the fatality rates in other categories.

CATEGORY FOUR

If a policy of terrorism carries with it the risk of a high civilian fatality rate, and a consequent alienation of support, conversely the tactics of countering terrorism by military techniques carries with it a similar risk of inflicting a high number of civilian fatalities and thus creating support for the subversives. Out of the total number of 105 deaths known to have been caused by the Security forces, at least 70 have been killed in circumstances which suggest a high degree of carelessness on the part of the Security forces. The total figure obviously includes those we have already looked at who have been

killed while engaging in terrorist activities and those who were caught up in situations of confusion and turmoil. This latter group covers those killed in situations where mistakes although unfortunate, were by the nature of the situation nearly inevitable, and those where the mistakes were the consequence of gross carelessness and an indifference to the safety of the citizen. The 70 deaths already specified fall within this latter category. Although some of them occurred in riot situations they all point to a recklessness in the use of firearms on the part of the security forces. Of these 70 I have only been able to identify three cases where the Security forces later admitted the possibility of a tragic mistake. These three cases are those of Mrs. Worthington, (d.9/8/71), Mr. N. Watson, (d.9/8/71), and Mr. William Ferris, (d.10/8/71). In all other circumstances they have persisted in their original claims that the victims were engaged in aggressive activities at the time of death or else disclaimed responsibility for the incidents despite convincing eye-witness evidence to the contrary. It is doubtful if even the introduction of internment did as much to alienate minority opinion in the North from support for the Security forces as the cavalier indifference of the Security forces to the demands for adequate enquiries into the circumstances of many of these deaths. Only twenty of these deaths occasioned by Security forces operations have been the subject of special enquiries. Seven were the subject of the Scarman Inquiry and thirteen were the subject of the Widgery Inquiry.

Although both of these Inquiries were characterised by a capricious attitude to the laws of probability they did nevertheless serve a function in establishing a corpus of fact. Unfortunately in the other fifty cases the circumstances have tended to be blurred by the televised interviews which seemed to follow each incident. The need to maintain the morale of the security forces by protecting them from either criminal or civil actions arising out of these fatal incidents precluded the possibility that adequate investigations of these incidents might be carried out. The legal position of members of the security forces has been deliberately obscured and the famous "Yellow Card" instructions issued to soldiers seemed to have little relevance to the actions of the soldiers. Between 1970 and 1972 a pattern emerged where people such as Harry Thornton, (d.7/8/71), William McGreaney, (d.14/9/71), and Martin McShane, (d.14/12/71) who were killed by the Security forces had to be identified as subversives in order to acquit the individual soldiers involved from criminal responsibility. The distress afforded to relatives of the deceased by such policies was most poignantly conveyed in a statement issued by the widow of Francis McKeown, (d.16/7/72) after a British Army statement that her husband had been shot while attempting to attack soldiers. "My children and I have suffered the terrible loss of a husband and father. We feel it wrong that he, whose life was so casually taken should now lose also his character and reputation in equally callous fashion."

CATEGORY FIVE

So far we have been dealing mainly with the results of a conflict between identifiable or putative subversive elements and the authorised forces of the State in which personnel on both sides have been killed,

as well as a large number of non-participant civilians who have been innocent victims of the conflict. Within this range it has been possible to distinguish the casual deaths from the deliberate deaths and to attribute responsibility for most of these deaths. There have however been at least 77 deaths where it is difficult to define with any certainty either motive or the agency responsible for the death. These are what are popularly called the assassinations, a general term implying only that they are deliberately executed and in some way associated with the general political conflict. Some insight may be offered by classifying the victims under sectarian headings. Forty-eight of the victims have been Catholic. Twenty-five have been Protestants and four could hardly be included in either category since they did not belong to the N. Ireland community where such terms have a particular tribal significance. Although the circumstantial evidence supports the view that most of these killings have a politico-sectarian significance, it would be wrong to assume that all the Catholics were killed by Protestant groups and vice-versa. Some of the killings suggest action by the I.R.A. against suspected informers. The death of James O'Hanlon (d.16/3/72), was claimed by the Provisional I.R.A. to be due to the accidental shooting of one of their own members. Police inquiries however revealed that he had been beaten before his death and his name does not appear in the periodic roll of honour issued by the Provisionals. The Official I.R.A. have claimed that the deaths of Bernard Norney (d.27/6/72), and Mrs. Jean Smith, (d.8/6/72) were caused by the carelessness of Provisional vigilantes manning road-blocks. The death of Desmond Macklin appears to have been caused by members of the Provisional I.R.A. in a faction fight with the Officials.

The locations of the bodies of Samuel Nelson, (d.16/9/71) and Frederick Maguire, (d.24/7/72), both Protestants, suggest that they are more likely to have been killed by a Protestant group than by a Catholic group. The only reasonable inference to be drawn is that there are murder groups operating within both sections of the N. Ireland community visiting revenge upon those whom they see as their enemies. The particularly sadistic character of some of these murders has aroused much apprehension but there are two other aspects which should be a matter of concern. In the case of Bernard Rice, (d.8/2/72) and in the case of Gerard McCusker, (d.13/5/72), the R.U.C. deliberately supplied the media with information suggesting that they had been murdered by Republican groups. The information was so irrelevant and indeed inaccurate that one can only infer that the police wanted to obscure the picture by contributing to groundless speculation. There is also a possibility that some of these murders might have been carried out by members of the British Army acting as agent provocateurs. Two well attested incidents, one in the Shankill Road and the other on the Glen Road involved Army personnel in civilian dress opening fire from a car on passing civilians. In neither case was a satisfactory explanation forthcoming from the Security forces. Since quite a few of the victims of these assassinations have been killed by shooting from prowling cars the two incidents referred to suggest the possibility of British Army involvement. What the motive for such operations could be is a matter of speculation. It is possible that these

were the only two incidents of their kind but it is hard to believe that there were not more which in the ensuing confusion were attributed to sectarian murder gangs.

CATEGORY SIX

In the final category I have included 45 victims who could be said to have been killed in riot situations of such confusion that it is impossible to include them in any category. At least nine of these victims have been killed by the British Army in circumstances where it would be difficult to judge the legitimacy of their actions. These include the deaths of Bernard Watt, (d.7/2/71), William Halligan, (d.5/3/71), Herbert Hawe, (d.11/11/69) and George Dickie, (d.11/11/69). I have also included in this category the victims of the sectarian gun battles in the Falls, Ardoyne and Ballymacarret in 1969 and 1970. I have included also the shootings of such people as Sean Madden, (d.11/6/72), Harold Morris, (d.18/5/72) and Joan Scott, (d.30/5/72), who were killed in isolated bursts of shooting across the peace lines. The interesting aspect of this category is that it includes those fatalities occasioned by communal sectarian strife which first brought the military presence on the streets in N. Ireland but which now constitute the lowest proportion of the fatality figures.

CONCLUSION

Some general conclusions might be drawn from the profile of violence afforded by the foregoing classifications. There are three sources of violence operating within the N. Ireland context.

The first is the combined force available for the maintenance of law and order which operates within an ambit of legality but displays an indifference to the legal provisions which protect the private citizen from the arbitrary exercise of their powers by the Security forces.

There are the Republican militant groups operating illegally who reserve to themselves the right to kill members of what they regard as the occupying forces and who are indifferent to the legal right to life of the ordinary citizen caught in the middle.

There are Protestant militant groups operating illegally whose purpose seems to be exact revenge and practise intimidation upon members of the Catholic community.

The three groups seem to operate like three spokes in a wheel each chasing the other in an endless revolution of violence.

That violence is a product of the chaos which overwhelmed N. Ireland in 1969 and 1970 and left a moral vacuum where no institution can sustain its claim to be exercising moral authority. The only authority which many people now acknowledge is the private authority of conscience or the external authority of force. The public moral consensus which can hold a society together with a minimum of coercive violence has disappeared in N. Ireland. It cannot be restored on this occasion by an even more rigorous invocation of force. Those

who see the argument in terms of force are those who describe January 30th the day of the 13 deaths in Derry as "Good Sunday" or those who sing "When you shoot a British soldier clap your hands". Similarly there are those who see the solution in terms of more lead bullets or the use of flame throwers. In the same category at a slightly more sophisticated level are those who by inflating the achievement of the Security forces encourage the notion that all that is required to secure the end of violence is one more push. Geoffrey Johnston-Smith in answer to a Parliamentary question at Westminster on 16/6/72 claimed that the Security forces had killed 89 suspected terrorists between 1/1/71 and 13/6/72, a figure which bore no relation to any official figures which have been published, unless one includes the Martin McShanes and the Eamon McDevitts. More sensationally the Belfast Newsletter on 9/8/72 claimed that unspecified official sources put the I.R.A. fatality rate at 260. While this may be gratifying to those who derive a satisfaction from the deaths of I.R.A. members it serves little purpose other than to encourage the belief that by pressing on with a policy of force a solution can be achieved. Those who would advocate from whatever position the pursuance of a policy of force should remember that of the five hundred killed to August 8th over two hundred were innocent passers-by who just happened to be "the wrong people in the wrong place at the wrong time."

.....

I have included as appendix B a table showing the main locations of deaths within the listed categories. Since I have not listed areas where there have been only a few deaths and since I did not attempt to classify those deaths where there was evidence that the killing had taken place in a different area from where the body was found the total in this list does not include all five hundred deaths. It does however throw some light upon the interaction of these different classifications upon each other and on how the pattern of violence differs from area to area.

Since categories 2, 3, 4, and 5 cover the situations where there is most dispute over the facts, the names in these categories are published in Appendix C to enable readers to test the validity of these classifications.

APPENDIX A

Category No.	Description	Numbers Killed
1	Security Forces killed.	152
2	Members of Para-military organizations killed and civilians killed while engaging in subversive activities.	69
3	Civilian victims of subversive operations.	87
4	Casual victims of security operations.	70
5	Civilian victims of assassination operations.	77
6	Civilians killed in riot situations.	45
		500

APPENDIX B

MAIN AREAS OF KILLINGS BELFAST

Area	Category						Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Lr. Falls/Grosvenor Rd. ...	13	9	4	12	7	1	46
Ardoyne ...	16	6	1	7	3	7	40
Ballymurphy/Whiterock ...	8	5		11	4	5	33
New Lodge/Unity Flats/Antrim Rd. ...	5	2	15	4	5		31
Springfield Rd./Clonard ...	4	1	4	2	9	2	22
Oldpark/Lr. Crumlin Rd. ...	3	1	2	1	12	3	22
Andersonstown ...	11	2	3	2	4	1	23
Shankill ...	1	1	7		7	3	19
Ballymacarrett ...	2	5	4	1	1	4	17

PROVINCIAL AREAS

	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Derry City ...	21	8		20		1	50
Tyrone ...	7	2	11	2			22
South Down/South Armagh ...	13	5	2	3			23
Co. Derry ...	3	3	10	1			17
Co. Armagh ...	9		1	2	5	1	18
Co. Fermanagh ...	10						10

POSTSCRIPT — 28/8/72

Since the foregoing classification was prepared a further 36 people have been killed. Ten were civilian victims of subversive activity. Eight were members of the Provisional I.R.A. killed while handling explosives. Eleven were members of the security forces and seven were civilians murdered by unidentified agents.

CATEGORY 2

Bateson, John 18/12/71
 Bell, Gerard 21/2/72
 Black, John 28/6/72
 Bradley, James 31/7/72
 Brady, Edward 14/7/72
 Campbell, Patrick 25/3/72
 Casey, Patrick 9/2/72
 Cassidy, James 28/7/72
 Crossan, Gerard 9/3/72
 Cunningham, Jos. 10/2/72
 Curry, Rose 23/9/71
 Deery, Manus 19/3/72
 Doherty, Gerald 25/2/72
 Dorrian, Robert 21/2/72
 Dougal, John Jos. 9/7/72
 Engleton, Martin 28/5/72
 Finlay, James 21/9/71
 Fitzsimmons, Jack 28/5/72
 Forsythe, Martin 24/10/71
 Gamble, Eamon 8/3/72
 Gibson, Gerard 11/7/72
 Grant, Phelim 5/2/72
 Hamill, Brian 4/9/71
 Henry, Eamon 4/9/71
 Hughes, Charles 8/3/71
 Hughes, Samuel 7/4/72
 Johnson, John 9/3/72
 Kane, Michael 5/9/70
 Kavanagh, Albert 4/3/72
 Keenan, Colm 14/3/72
 Lafferty, Eamon 19/8/71
 Lee, Martin 18/12/71
 Lewis, Tony 9/3/72
 McAdurey, Patrick 9/8/71
 McAuley, David 19/2/72
 McCaffrey, David 9/7/72
 McCann, Charles 5/2/72
 McCann, Joseph 15/4/72
 McCann, Thomas 9/3/72
 McCrudden, Robert 3/8/72
 McCrystal, Charles 7/4/72
 McDade, Gerald 21/2/71
 McDermott, Terry 2/10/71
 McDonald, Edward 28/5/72
 McElholm, Jack 28/5/72
 McErlaan, John 7/4/72
 McGillion, Eugene 14/3/72
 McNulty, Peter 26/1/72
 Maguire, Dorothy 23/10/71
 Magee, Joseph 4/2/72
 Magee, Michael 13/5/72

Mooney, John 15/7/72
 Mulloy, Tobias 16/7/72
 Nolan, Anthony 8/12/71
 O'Hagan, James 19/8/71
 O'Hare, Gerard 23/9/71
 O'Neill, Daniel 8/1/72
 O'Riordan, Sean 23/3/72
 Quinn, Dennis 3/7/72
 Reid, James 14/7/72
 Reid, William 15/5/71
 Saunders, James 7/2/71
 Scullion, Lewis 14/7/72
 Sheridan, James 18/12/71
 Simpson, Seamus 19/8/71
 Sloan, Michael 11/3/72
 Starrs, John 13/5/72
 Steele, Gerard 21/2/72
 Thompson, John 14/9/71

CATEGORY 3

Aiken, John 11/2/71
 Andrews, Alex 29/9/71
 Barnhill, James 12/12/71
 Bates, Ernest 29/9/71
 Beggs, Harold 25/8/71
 Bell, Sydney 20/8/72
 Beren, Janet 4/2/72
 Black, George 11/2/71
 Bracey, Francis 4/12/71
 Bruce, Hugh 11/12/71
 Carr, Bridgid 23/11/71
 Clark, Mary 28/2/72
 Cochrane, John 2/11/71
 Colton, John 4/12/71
 Cromie, James 4/12/71
 Crawford, Martha 30/3/72
 Crothers, William 21/7/72
 Currie, David 1/5/72
 Daly, Patrick 8/10/71
 Donegan, Ernest 20/3/72
 English, Elizabeth 17/2/72
 Eagan, Harry 11/2/71
 Eakin, Catherine 31/7/72
 Fiordo, Angelo 9/7/72
 Forsyth, Joseph 28/3/72
 Gallagher, Angela 3/9/71
 Garry, Philip 4/12/71
 Gavin, Rosalee 29/4/72
 Gemmill, Molly 2/11/71
 Gibney, Vivian 1/12/71
 Gibson, Jack 21/7/72

Grey, Harold 19/7/72
 Hankin, Ian 27/11/71
 Henderson, David 11/2/71
 Hughes, William 22/5/72
 Hyndman, B'dette 12/3/72
 Irvine, Kathleen 4/12/71
 Irvine, William 21/7/72
 Jack, Alan 19/7/72
 Jordan, William 4/11/71
 Kane, Edward 4/12/71
 Kane, Thomas 4/12/71
 Keenan, Edward 4/12/71
 Keenan, Sarah 4/12/71
 Killops, Thomas 4/11/72
 King, Harold 11/12/71
 Knox, Carmel 16/3/72
 Lavery, Jack 21/12/71
 Legget, Leslie 20/7/72
 McAuley, Mrs. 13/4/72
 McCalum, James 18/12/71
 McCauley, Marcus 4/3/71
 McClelland, James 31/7/72
 McCloskey, M. J. 31/7/72
 McCormick, Dan 10/12/71
 McCorry, Margt. 21/12/71
 McElhinney, Mrs. 31/7/72
 McFadden, Paul 7/2/72
 McGurk, Maria 4/12/71
 McIntyre, Pomena 4/12/71
 McKeague, Isabella 9/5/71
 McLaughlin, Rose 3/8/72
 Macklin, James 20/3/72
 McLaughlin, Tom 4/12/71
 McMahon, G'dine 28/5/72
 McMichael, Robert 28/3/72
 Maxwell, Winifred 9/10/71
 Millar, Frank 20/3/71
 Miller, David 31/7/72
 Milligan, David 4/12/71
 Munn, Tracey 11/12/71
 Murray, Brigitta 21/7/72
 Nicholl, Colin 11/12/71
 Nugent, John 28/2/72
 O'Hare, Margaret 21/7/72
 O'Neill, James 27/11/71
 O'Neill, Louis 2/2/72
 Owens, Anne 4/3/72
 Parker, Stephen 4/7/72
 Smyth, James 4/12/71
 Spotswood, Robert 4/12/71
 Temple, W. 31/7/72
 Thomas, William 11/2/71

Thompson, Isabel 6/12/71
 Trainor, Samuel 20/3/72
 Young, Martha 26/5/72

CATEGORY 4

Anderson, Robert 23/10/71
 Beattie, Desmond 7/7/71
 Beattie, John 9/8/71
 Bonner, James 25/6/72
 Burns, Thomas 18/7/72
 Burns, William 3/7/70
 Butler, Pat 9/7/72
 Casey, James 24/7/72
 Connolly, Joan 9/8/71
 Connors, Michael 1/3/72
 Copeland, John 30/10/71
 Corry, Patrick 2/8/69
 Cusack, Seamus 8/7/71
 Doherty, Edward 9/8/72
 Doherty, Pat Jos. 30/1/72
 Donaghy, Gerald 30/1/72
 Donaghey, Patrick 17/4/72
 Duddy, John 30/1/72
 Elliman, Patrick 3/7/70
 Fitzpatrick, N. Rev. 9/7/72
 Ferris, William 10/8/71
 Gallagher, John 14/8/69
 Gilmore, Hugh 30/1/72
 Gargan, Margaret 9/7/72
 Hegarty, Daniel 31/7/72
 Herron, Hugh 19/8/71
 Kelly, Michael 30/1/72
 Lavery, John 9/8/71
 McCabe, Hugh 14/9/69
 McCloskey, Francis 14/7/69
 McDaid, Michael 30/1/72
 McDevitt, Eamon 18/8/71
 McElhinney, Kevin 30/1/72
 McEgan, Anne 6/9/71
 McGreaney, Wm. 14/9/71
 McGuigan, Bernard 30/1/72
 McIlroy, Thomas 2/2/72
 McKavanagh, Wm. 11/9/71
 McKeown, Francis 16/7/72
 McKerr, John 19/9/71
 McKinney, Gerald 30/1/72
 McKinney, William 30/1/72
 McLarnon, Michael 29/10/71
 McLarnon, Samuel 14/9/69
 McLaughlin, Jas. 23/10/71
 McShane, Martin 14/12/71

Magee, Patrick 17/4/72
 Maginnis, Frank 9/8/71
 Maughan, John 1/3/72
 Meehan, Maura 23/10/71
 Mullan, Hugh Rev. 9/8/71
 Nash, William 30/1/72
 O'Hagan, Daniel 31/7/70
 O'Neill, Charles 3/7/70
 Parker, Joseph 11/12/71
 Phillips, Noel 9/8/71
 Quinn, Christopher 3/11/71
 Rooney, Patrick 14/9/69
 Rowntree, Francis 23/4/72
 Ruddy, Sean 23/10/71
 Young, John 30/1/72
 Taggart, Daniel 9/8/71
 Thompson, David 17/10/71
 Thompson, Kathleen 6/11/71
 Thornton, Harry 7/8/71
 Toolan, Terry 14/7/72
 Watson, Norman 9/8/71
 Wglik, Zghigniew 3/7/70
 Worthington, Sarah 9/8/71
 Wray, James 30/1/72

CATEGORY 5

Andrews, David 9/7/72
 Agnew, Sydney 18/1/72
 Andrews, Victor 4/5/72
 Barton, Adrian 21/5/72
 Beattie, Paul 12/7/72
 Beckett, Ingram 25/3/72
 Bell, Albert 7/2/71
 Bennett, John 10/10/71
 Brennan, Andrew 24/5/72
 Campbell, John 25/6/72
 Campbell, Norman 8/6/72
 Cavanagh, John 27/1/71
 Clawson, Hugh 2/7/72
 Cochrane, William 12/7/72
 Connor, Charles 16/6/72
 Corr, Frank 26/7/72
 Davidson, Anthony 21/7/72
 Duddy, Gerald 21/4/72
 Dunne, Daniel 29/7/72
 Fisher, David 2/7/72
 Hayes, Daniel 1/7/72
 Heenskerk, Enrico 12/11/71
 Henneby, Terence 7/8/72

Howell, James 2/7/72
 Hughes, Felix 4/8/72
 Jardin, Andrew 30/12/70
 Joblings, Paul 1/7/72
 Kells, Thomas 31/10/71
 Kenna, Arthur 25/7/72
 McAfee, William 30/7/72
 McArthurs, Francis 22/7/72
 McAteer, Leonard 29/5/72
 McCabe, Jack 12/7/72
 McCarty, Rose 22/7/72
 McClernaghan, David 12/7/72
 McConville, Sean 15/4/72
 McCusker, Gerard 13/5/72
 McCrea, Gerard 2/7/72
 McCrooy, Patrick 12/2/71
 McCullough, Patrick 23/6/72
 McFarland, Robert 26/10/71
 McGerty, John 27/7/72
 McKenna, Arthur 16/9/70
 McKenna, Lawrence 8/7/72
 McMillan, Brian 9/7/72
 McStravick, Francis 27/7/72
 McVeigh, Joseph 12/5/72
 McKivicker, Alex. 16/9/70
 Macklin, Desmond 18/6/72
 Maguire, Frederick 24/7/72
 Maguire, Philip 28/7/72
 Meehan, Alan 11/7/72
 Moane, Bernard 17/5/72
 Murray, Gerald 4/6/72
 Murray, David 30/9/70
 Nelson, Samuel 16/9/71
 Norney, Bernard 27/6/72
 O'Hanlon, James 16/3/72
 O'Hanlon, John 3/7/72
 O'Neill, Patrick 22/7/72
 Orr, Malcolm 5/7/72
 Orr, Peter, 5/7/72
 Owens, Martin 20/4/72
 Poots, Colin 12/7/72
 Rice, Bernard 8/2/72
 Robinson, Samuel 7/7/72
 Rosatto, Francis 22/7/72
 Seanman, David 6/2/72
 Smith, Jean 8/6/72
 Teer, James 28/5/72
 Todd, Jack 8/9/69
 Turkington, Gerald 9/7/72
 Wardlow, Thomas 29/5/72
 Watson, Charles 11/7/72
 Woods, Gerard 7/7/72
 Wright, Hugh 7/7/72

THREE IRELANDS OR ONE?

An important contributory factor to the violence now engulfing the people of N. Ireland has been the failure of the contending forces to find a common ground in the problems which divide them. One such problem has been the question of a united Ireland. The difficulties surrounding discussion of this problem have been recently highlighted through the publication by The New Ulster Movement of a pamphlet called "Two Irelands or One?". The pamphlet which is intended to explain to "southern opinion the objections which many northerners feel towards the concept of a united Ireland" displays so much of the conservative thinking and double standards which have inhibited constructive discussion upon this issue that it could be cited as a textbook illustration of the stagnation of Irish politics. Since however the authors write in good faith and genuinely believe themselves to have "an open minded approach to all issues", it is desirable that their case should be examined by someone who while not presuming to be "open minded" would welcome some sort of *modus vivendi* with his political opponents.

"Two Irelands or One?" fails as a constructive contribution to the Border issue on four counts. The pamphlet is directed towards the wrong audience. Much of what it says is a well worn rehash of Unionist polemic. More of it is tendentious in tone and unsubstantiated in content. The issue which is crucial to the Border question — the continued *raison d'être* of Northern Ireland — is ignored.

Before examining these four criticisms in detail, it is necessary to consider why it was improbable that such a pamphlet should have any fresh insights to offer on this problem. As has been said N.U.M. claims to have an "open minded approach to all issues" and the authors vindicate this claim by pointing to the fact that they "were among the first to demand the establishment of a Community Relations Commission and of a Central Housing Executive and the abolition of the Ulster Special Constabulary". — This is just not so, and indeed the claim is a measure of the disingenuous tone of the pamphlet. The demands they refer to featured prominently in most of the opposition programmes in the 1969 N.I. General Election. N.U.M. campaigned actively in that Election in favour of Terence O'Neill and the official Unionist programme which was opposed to such demands. The N.U.M. eventually came to support these measures as indeed did the Unionist government, but to claim as they do in this pamphlet, that in 1969/70 they "were among the main pressure groups working for reform in the province" is to make a claim that history will hardly endorse. In truth the N.U.M.'s position, was and is, that of a conservative but flexible grouping which could respond slowly to new developments but which lacks the will or the imagination to mould a long term strategy.

This conservative attitude is reflected in the N.U.M. decision to address Southern opinion on the difficult question of Irish unity.

While the majority of people in the South have a vague commitment to the concept of Irish unity, and while the Constitution of the Republic embodies the claim to territorial jurisdiction over the whole of the island, it is not immediately apparent that such aspirations are a major factor in the ongoing conflict of the past fifty years. A deletion of this particular article from the Constitution of the Republic while making it more consistent with the realities of international practice would make little practical difference to the political situation in the North since the particular article is merely a pious hope and has no judicial significance. This has been clearly shown by the inability of Northern nationalists to invoke it to secure either representation in the Dail, or legal protection within the scope of international tribunals. When the Southern government has claimed consultative rights with the British government about Northern issues it has been by virtue of contiguity rather than on legal entitlement. Regardless of any Southern attitude to the Border, the Republic of Ireland is likely to remain the sole state adjoining N. Ireland, and consequently will always be affected by internal disturbances in N. Ireland, whether through the care of refugees fleeing South or the harrassment or sheltering of gunmen fleeing South. Although the Southern aspiration to unity is an irritant to unionists it is peripheral to the real problem. As indeed the pamphlet acknowledges at one point the attitudes of the Southern administrations have in many respects been as partitionist as those of the Northern administration.

However the issue of Irish unity is a live one, and an explosive one, and a fatal one, and this is primarily because so many citizens of N. Ireland are committed to it. Supporters of the "link between N. Ireland and Gt. Britain" who believe that anti-partitionists should take heed of our view" should have addressed these views to the hard core of anti-partitionists who are their fellow citizens in the North of Ireland. The failure of the N.U.M. to speak to this section typifies a constant element of the partitionist syndrome which interprets anti-partition opinion as the result of Southern agitation, or Communist subversion, or the product of an equally alien force. It is the Northern anti-partitionist whom the N.U.M. ignore who have done so much over the past decade to demonstrate to Southern opinion the obstacles standing in the way of unity. The message has got across so clearly to Southern opinion that it is now quite obviously determining Southern government policy towards the Northern crisis.

The authors specify five main areas of difficulty confronting a united Ireland and all parties would agree with the first, second and fifth of these. These refer to the "economic difficulties," the "religious difficulties" and the "administrative difficulties". As far as the first two are concerned the authors are merely spelling out in detail the fears expressed in the Preamble to the Ulster Covenant published in 1912 and repeated annually at every Orange demonstration. They are nonetheless valid and their validity has been accepted by those who would be styled "anti-partitionists". Recognizing such difficulties as legitimate reasons for having reservations about a united Ireland does not however throw any significant light upon the implications of these

difficulties. The authors point this out when they say "Southern Irishmen must face the fact that other people too have loyalties which are stronger than financial self interest" It would be interesting to investigate the extent to which "financial self interest" was an essential component of the partitionist rationale. Given an equalization of living standards would the intensity of partitionist feeling be moderated, or would its degree of support be significantly curtailed? It would have been helpful if the N.U.M. pamphlet had offered some answers to these questions but unfortunately it does not. Similarly in dealing with the religious issues the authors conclude rather lamely that even if complete equality and protection for all religious groupings was guaranteed by law and endorsed by a Bill of Rights, there would still be Protestant reservations arising from the fact that "Protestants and Catholics have different views on the rightful sphere of ecclesiastical authority and Catholics will concede to their Church an influence which seems to Protestants unreasonable". This is exceedingly glib, and seems to be a re-echo of William Craig's notorious Ulster Hall speech when he suggested that democracy could not be achieved in a state with a Catholic majority.

Again there is no attempt to assess the strength of such feelings in the partitionist position nor for that matter is any proof adduced that Protestants and Catholics do have different views on the sphere of ecclesiastical authority. If it could be demonstrated that there were in fact no differences would this modify partitionist attitudes?

The tendentious character of these propositions becomes more marked in the section devoted to the clash of national sentiments. The pamphlet argues that a large majority of people in the North consider themselves as British and display this sense of identity in a wide range of forms. These forms especially in their symbolic aspects are irreconcilable with the symbolic aspects of Irish identity. Further the authors suggest that the sense of Britishness is shared by many Northern Catholics. That a feeling of national sentiment is obviously tremendously important in the framing of political institutions cannot be gainsaid. This pamphlet seems to suggest indeed that it goes to the heart of the problem. It does not however attempt to weigh such a sentiment against the other factors already mentioned. There is no attempt to investigate how far the concepts of nationality and citizenship are related or how far a sense of nationality can be divorced from a sense of nationalism.

Apart however from these limitations, the premise that the majority of the Northern people have a sense of Britishness is not sustained by any strong evidence. The authors refer to the "ubiquitous union jacks in the month of July" as the "more extravagant manifestations of this feeling". To advance such an argument after the displacement of the union jack in July 1971 suggests that the authors were not around in N. Ireland in that year. Similarly to find evidence that many in the Catholic community share this feeling of Britishness because they have "a tradition of serving the British crown, in the armed services, the police or civil employment" ignores the fact that

such traditions are equally strong among citizens of the Republic who would not by virtue of this regard themselves as British. Indeed such an argument displays an incredible naivety about the choice of employment open to people living in an economically depressed area. It also of course ignores the high percentage of British ex-servicemen involved in various Republican activities. It further ignores the evidence in Richard Roses's book "Governing Without Consensus" which suggests that only 29% of the people of N. Ireland regard themselves as British while 43% regard themselves as Irish. Among the Catholic community, 76% regard themselves as Irish according to the Rose analysis.

Quite clearly here the authors have chosen to ignore the dichotomy between those partitionists who see themselves primarily as British and those who see themselves as Ulster citizens. This problem has come into sharp focus since March of this year by the division between those Unionists who seek full integration with the U.K. and those who wish to assert an Ulster nationalism with its own claim to sovereignty. Nowhere in this section dealing with national sentiment do the authors refer to the potent political force of Ulster nationalism which Randolph Churchill so clearly identified in 1886. To present the Northern question simply in terms of the British/Irish antithesis is an example of the double think referred to earlier. It is the double standard which permits them to refer to what they see in the South as the "covert influencing of government policy by the Catholic hierarchy acting behind the scenes" while ignoring the covert influences in the North of spokesmen for the Protestant churches on such matters of public policy as education, Sunday opening and the licensing laws.

The double standard seems to permeate the theme of the N.U.M. essay. Having listed all the problems the authors fail to indicate whether if these could be satisfactorily resolved there could be any advance to a united Ireland. There is no attempt to scrutinize the arguments in favour of a united Ireland, nor indeed any attempt to justify the continuance of the Northern Ireland political administration. Since all the disruptive influences which the authors project into a united Ireland are already present in N. Ireland, is it to be inferred that the only argument to be advanced for maintaining the status quo is the force of political inertia.

The authors comment, that the best that could be hoped for from a united Ireland would be "that it will survive at a low level of legitimacy", is the most apt comment that could have been made about the N. Ireland system, if in fact it had survived. Finally the double standard is enshrined in the authors' final plea — "Provided a just re-structuring can be achieved in the North, would it not be better for all of us if you went your way and we went ours — two states acknowledging their different traditions but ready to co-operate in all matters of common concern." Having devoted fourteen pages to demonstrating how conflicting values can inhibit the emergence of a united community, how can the authors suggest the existence of a community of interest in the North implicit in their use of the term "we"? If it were legitimate to use the term "we" in any political sense about the North of

Ireland then we would have been spared the violence and bloodshed of the past years.

What "we" in the Northern context means now, what it could come to mean, and what it could never mean is crucial to any discussion of Irish unity. By blithely suggesting "if you went your way and we went ours", the authors are avoiding the crunch question. "What is ours?" The authors suggest vaguely a "just restructuring". They should have attempted to offer some answers to the following questions.

Can a just restructuring be achieved in the North? If a just restructuring could be achieved would the objections to a united Ireland be sustained?

To what extent is the partitionist case based as much on a desire to retain a monopoly of control as on the factors discussed in the N.U.M. pamphlet?

Do the advantages accruing to the people of N. Ireland because of the constitutional link outweigh the disadvantages accruing from the maintenance of partition?

What are the organic geo-political forces at work which might indicate the future development of the two areas of Ireland?

Consideration of these questions might start from the proposition that at the beginning of this century, the divisive tribal loyalties which were manifest in the major power blocs of Nationalism and Unionism were too irreconcilable and too exclusive to be contained within a common national framework. Partition was the only alternative to civil war. In the event the people of Ireland under pressure from Britain settled for partition.

The indications are that British politicians saw the partition solution as a temporary framework in which the two communities could move on to a new political entity. This has not happened. It may be that two reasons account for this failure. By institutionalizing the tribal characteristics of the two communities partition gave them a new dynamic. All the reinforcing structures of the modern state apparatus were at work to emphasise the difference between the two communities. As each of the two political administrations developed its own institutions, the divergence between the two ways of life gradually became more marked. What might have been a gradual process of assimilation and integration between the peoples of North and South was halted and indeed reversed. This in itself however might not have been a major source of friction. The irredentist claims of the small minorities within each administration who wished to pursue a policy of aggrandizement by expansion to embrace either a 32 county state or a nine county province could probably have been relegated to the periphery of politics. Apart however from inhibiting the emergence of trust between the two 19th century Irish communities, partition also created a new community which posed an entirely new political prob-

lem. This community was the Northern nationalist community which found itself thrust into a political administration whose values they did not share and whose motives they did not trust. It is the continued presence of this community within the overall pattern of stagnating political development which is at the root of the Irish problem today.

It was the fear that this group could eventually through the seizure of power bring to an end the Northern administration which led the partitionist community of the North to adopt policies designed to preclude them from power.

Reference is often made to the fact that there is little evidence to suggest widespread discrimination against the Protestant population of the 26 Counties. With a minority problem (in the sectarian sense) of only five per cent it was natural to display an attitude of tolerance. There was never any likelihood that that minority could grow large enough to constitute a threat to the nature of the regime. (A parallel may be found in the tolerance displayed by the Presbyterians of Belfast towards the small Catholic community of Belfast in the 1790's, in contrast to the fierce sectarian friction evident in Armagh, Cavan and Monaghan where the Protestant and Catholic communities were more evenly balanced). By embracing within the six county area a large dissident minority the partition settlement injected into the dynamic of community strife, a disposition towards discrimination on the part of the majority to ensure that the minority never became a majority. Two of the most essential reforms involved in any restructuring of N. Ireland derive from this situation. Discrimination as a device to restrain the minority from becoming the majority must be ended and the absolute right of any majority to impose its will upon any minority must be stringently qualified.

The possibility of the minority becoming the majority is of course inherent in a situation where normal political processes of dialogue are pursued. In a context where voting tends to follow tribal lines a minority is more likely to become a majority by virtue of a higher birth rate. The birth rate in the Catholic community has been higher than that of the Protestant community. That this higher birth rate has not seriously affected the population balance to date has in some measure been a consequence of the discriminating practices sanctioned by the Northern regime which induced a higher emigration rate among the Catholic community. Any measures which secured equitable housing and employment policies would probably be reflected in a gradual growth of the Catholic population as a percentage of the total. In effect a just restructuring could bring about a potentially more explosive situation by enhancing the minority threat to the continued existence of the Northern administration. Two objections can be urged to such a proposition. The first is that a variety of circumstances could operate to bring about a diminution of the fertility differential between the two communities, and the other is that by affording fairer treatment to the Catholic minority, they might be encouraged to identify themselves with the administration. Both of these objections have some substance. The fertility differential might well be reduced and the antagonistic attitudes of many Catholics could be modified. It would be unduly

sanguine however to assume that the growth in Catholic commitment to the administration would match the growth in the Catholic proportion of the community. This latter growth would in the meantime be arousing Protestant apprehensions and contributing to a new build up of sectarian tensions. It is this possibility which prompted the question whether a just and permanent restructuring in N. Ireland is possible without creating an even more explosive situation thirty years from now.

It would seem that such an eventuality could only be obviated by qualifying by some method the power of the majority, or by securing in the current phrase a system of "power sharing". While this might be irksome to the present Unionist majority it could afford them the assurance that in the event of their position becoming a minority position they would be protected from the arbitrary exercise of power by the new majority. (In passing it should be observed that the most serious argument against a referendum proposal is that it puts the whole partition issue in a majority/minority context and would create a most dangerous situation if the proportions ever begin to tilt). As far as power sharing is concerned, if it could be secured either on a political basis or a tribal basis, it might prove an effective instrument in reducing tribal conflict and stimulating the growth of a real community of interest. Such a model might then prove appropriate for a 32 county situation.

Before any worthwhile opinion could be expressed about the feasibility of such a development it would be important to determine to what degree the Unionist rationale was rooted in the desire to retain a Protestant monopoly of power. If it is a strong feature it would further be important to know how far that desire is for power as a gratifying goal in itself, or merely as the means of preventing another group — the Catholic community — from acquiring power and abusing it. Some sociologists have argued that minority problems in a community, derive not so much from the treatment afforded to minority groups, but rather from a sense of resentment on the part of the minority that they are in fact a minority. If there is any merit in such an idea then there is a limit to what could be done either in a restructured N. Ireland or in a united Ireland to reconcile the minority to the problems of being a minority. This of course is valid only so long as people identify themselves in tribal terms, and leads us to the question whether the partitionist position would be as strong if the partitionist monopoly of power was broken and a detribalized society began to emerge.

This monopoly of power has been one of the advantages accruing to unionist supporters because of the existence of partition. It has been as limited in its appeal as the sense of being in an ideological majority has been limited to those who see themselves as British. To secure these advantages for a section of the population the entire community has had to exist in a political context which has been perennially unstable.

That instability is unlikely to disappear within the foreseeable future for the reasons I have already suggested. Is it asking too much to ask those who have upheld the status quo to give serious consideration to the cost they are prepared to pay for advantages which increasingly may be more apparent than real? Is it unreasonable to suggest to the "open-minded" members of the N.U.M. that all the well founded objections to a united Ireland which they advance support the view that N. Ireland is unstable and is likely to remain so? Is not the logic of their conservative thinking, not that there should be two Irelands but three? one for the Southerners; one for the Northern Protestants and one for the Northern Catholics. Why should the people of the Gaeltacht not demand their own sovereign state? The only way out of such an impasse is to encourage positively the evolution of new political institutions in Ireland without putting artificial limits upon their development. Kevin St. Sinn Fein has suggested such a development based upon provincial assemblies. The weakness in such a proposal lies in the fact that while the provinces have an historic political significance and a contemporary significance in sporting and cultural administration, they do not reflect today the politico-economic realities of Irish life. One such reality is that the border is there, as is the border within the border. Both borders must be dismantled by parallel and simultaneous processes.

How sensitively this process must be undertaken can be spotlighted by recognizing that the instability of the Northern administrative area derives from the non-identification of the minority with the administration and the fear and resentment that this non-identification arouses in the minds of the majority. Given that there is not likely to be any radical shift of attitude within the next generation and the need to find a delicate compromise becomes evident.

Does that compromise not lie within a restructured N. Ireland which shares some political institutions with the 26 Counties. At the present time the political institutions which link the North with Great Britain reflect and reinforce the organic links between the two areas. These organic links embrace such characteristics as shared attitudes, social structures, trade links etc. They are real and they are vital. The organic links binding North and South are just as real and just as vital and political institutions would have long since emerged to accommodate these but for the partitionist fears of weakening the constitutional links with Great Britain. Is it not time that the nature of the constitutional link with Britain was modified to permit the emergence of appropriate political institutions for this island. Most anti-partition groupings recognize that there were serious obstacles to unity in 1920 and that these obstacles have achieved greater significance since then. They know that a united Ireland cannot simply be created by treaty. They accept that it must evolve and in its evolution develop forms appropriate to a pluralist society embracing not simply a majority-minority dichotomy but a range of minority groups differentiated by ethnic, religious and linguistic considerations. They believe that such evolution must take place while a N. Ireland political administration remains in existence and they also believe that such an administrative

area could well be a permanent feature of the new Ireland which would eventually emerge.

The common political institutions which would be appropriate at this time and which would provide a framework for future development would embrace both executive and judicial functions. The executive functions could be concerned with matters of trade, commerce, economic development, cultural exchange and internal security. The judicial function could be concerned with the application of a common Bill of Rights to the citizens of both political areas. Such provisions would alter the constitutional position of N. Ireland within the U.K. but it would do so without exposing the people of N. Ireland to any of the difficulties envisaged by the authors of the N.U.M. pamphlet. It would offer anti-partitionists a more credible guarantee of their rights, a focus for political identification and a sense that political progress was being made. It would leave the future relationship open-ended to be shaped by the rationale of history and the emerging consensus of the various Irish communities. It could above all rescue politics from the arsenals and restore them to the council chambers.

To the members of the New Ulster Movement then I say: Your position is too defensive and too dominated by the siege mentality.

Your arguments lack constructive analysis and offer no new contribution to a fifty year old communication gap.

While arguing the special case strongly for one minority you ignore the case of the other minority.

In criticizing the rationale of a united Ireland you subvert the rationale for the continued existence of N. Ireland.

You fail to take into account the variety of ways in which a compromise could be found.

You should question whether you can justifiably claim to be "an organ of moderate opinion" if your only solution to what is commonly acknowledged to be an agonizing problem is to make a plea that we go on in exactly the same way as we have been doing for fifty years with such tragic results.

The views and suggestions that I have outlined in this essay are basically the same as I presented in a pamphlet called "Unity — a New Approach to Old Problems" which I published eleven years ago just as the last I.R.A. campaign was drawing to a close. In making those suggestions I warned that if they were ignored by those who stood four square upon the constitutional position a new campaign would flare within ten years. The unionist position was maintained unswervingly and violence did flare up. It will continue to flare as each new generation emerges until those who seek peace find a method of accommodating the desires of both Northern communities and any such

accommodation must involve some new form of relationship with the South. The authors of the N.U.M. pamphlet suggested to whoever in the South might be interested that peace could be achieved "if you went your way and we went ours". The forces of history, geography, economics and politics restrict the ways we can go and we will find ourselves locked in a collision course unless we can find some way of travelling harmoniously together upon what must be a common path. The N.U.M. should help chart it.