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Extracts from 'Northern Ireland's Troubles: The Human Costs' by Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth



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Text: Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth ... Page Compiled: Fionnuala McKenna

The following extracts has been contributed by the authors Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth, with the permission of the publisher, Pluto Press. The views expressed in this chapter do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the CAIN Project. The CAIN Project would welcome other material which meets our guidelines for contributions.
These extracts are taken from the book:

front cover of book Northern Ireland's Troubles
The Human Costs
by Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth (1999)
ISBN 0-7453-1374-4 (Paperback) 229pp £12.99

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This publication is copyright Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth 1999 and is included on the CAIN site by permission of Pluto Press and the authors. You may not edit, adapt, or redistribute changed versions of this for other than your personal use without express written permission. Redistribution for commercial purposes is not permitted.


Contents

List of Tables
List of Figures
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Map of Northern Ireland

 

CONTEXT

Outlines of Protagonists

A Chronology of Key Events

1

Northern Ireland, a State in Conflict

2

Understanding Political Violence in Northern Ireland

3

Economic and Social Aspects of the Troubles

 

THE HUMAN COST OF THE TROUBLES

4

Profiling Those who Died in Northern Ireland’s Troubles

5

Patterns of Violence
(extracts pp133-146)

6

Victims and Perpetrators

7

Half the Battle: The Impact of the Troubles on Children

8

Conclusions and Next Steps

 

Notes
References
Index


List of Tables

1.1

Average Unemployment, 1922—29

1.2

Unemployment Rates, Great Britain and N. Ireland, 1931—39

1.3

Rates of Unemployment (Selected Regions) 1946—54

3.1

Religious Difference among Males in the Experience of Unemployment

3.2

Different Unemployment Rates between Religions, 1971—91

3.3

The Proportion of Households on Low Weekly incomes, Selected Regions

3.4

Average Weekly Household Income by Religion

3.5

Employment in Externally Owned Manufacturing Plants in Northern Ireland

3.6

Average Weekly Household Incomes (£s), Selected Regions

3.7

Industrial Output, the UK and NI, 1983—89 (1985 100)

3.8

Percentage Changes in Employees in Employment Northern Ireland and the UK, 1979—88

3.9

Employment Trends in Northern Ireland, 1981—91

3.10

Duration of Unemployment in Northern Ireland, 1981 and 1990

5.1

Distribution of Deaths (1969—98)

5.2

Distribution of Deaths by Month (1969—98)

5.3

Numbers and Death Rates with Northern Ireland District Council Areas

5.4

Deaths by Location in Postal Districts

5.5

The Number of Fatal Incidents and Resident Deaths in each Belfast Ward

5.6

A Comparison of Violence (1969—98) and Deprivation (1994) in Selected Districts

5.7

The Distribution of Resident Deaths in Five Localities

5.8

A Comparison of Resident Deaths and Fatal Incidents in Selected Areas, 1969—98

5.9

Monthly Cycle of Resident Deaths, 1969—98

5.10

BT14 Residents Deaths by Perpetrator and Religion

5.11

Fatal Incidents in BT14 by Perpetrator and Religion

6.1

Deaths by Status, 1969—94

6.2

Injuries by Status, 197 1—96

6.3

Gender of Victims

6.4

The Age Distribution of Those Who Died

6.5

A Different Age Distribution

6.6

The Distribution of Deaths by Religion

6.7

Deaths Rates per 1000 between the Main Religions

6.8

Occupational Status of Victims

6.9

Affiliation of Victims

6.10

Alternative Affiliation of Victims

6.11

Organisations Responsible for Deaths

6.12

Deaths by Religion by Organisation Responsible

6.13

Political Status of Victims by Organisations Responsible for Deaths

6.14

Selected Age Groups by Organisations Responsible

6.15

Deaths by Gender in Selected Areas

6.16

Deaths by Religion in Selected Areas

6.17

Deaths by Political Status

6.18

Those Responsible for the Deaths in Selected Areas

6.19

Organisations Responsible for Deaths by the Political Status of Resident Victims

7.1

Deaths from 1969 to 1.3.1998 in the Northern Ireland Troubles by Age Grouping

7.2

Children and Young People Killed in the Troubles1969 to 1.3.1998 by Age Grouping, Total Population in Age Group and Death Rate for Age Group

7.3

Death Rates at Each Age, 0—24, 1969 to 1.3.1998

7.4

Troubles-Related Deaths of Children and Young People under the ages of 25 and 18 by Postal Area in Northern Ireland and by other Locations: 1969—1.3. 1998

7.5

Who Killed Those Under 25 and Under 18? (1969—1.3. 1998)

7.6

Religious Affiliation of Those Under 25 and Those Under 18 Killed 1969—1.3.1998

7.7

Political Affiliation of Those Under 25 and Under18 Killed 1969—1.3.1998

7.8

Cause of Death 1969—1.3.1998

7.9

Deaths from Plastic Bullets by Age of Victim at13.11. 1991

7.10

Casualties Under 20 as a Result of ParamilitaryPunishments

7.11

All Casualties of Paramilitary Attacks

7.12

Age Breakdown of Punishment Shootings and Assaults 199 1—97

List of Figures

5.1

Comparative Yearly Death Rates in the Troubles

6.1

Deaths Rates for Age Groups per 1000 Population


Acknowledgements

We wish to acknowledge the help of the following people:

Dr John Yamell, Department of Public Health, Queen’s University and the Health Promotion Agency; Dr Debbie Donnelly, NISRA; Wendy Hamilton, General Registry Office; Alison Hamilton, Central Services Agency; Ronnie McMillen, John Park, Social Services Inspectorate; Yvonne Murray, Linenhall Library; Andy White; Conor Barnes; Jonathan Blease; Alan Breen; Survivors of Trauma, Ardoyne; Greencastle Women’s Group; Damien Gorman, An Crann/The Tree; Tony McQuillan, Northern Ireland Housing Executive; Staff in the Central Library, Belfast, Queen’s University Library; David McKittrick; Professor John Darby; Dr Andrew Finlay, Trinity College Dublin; Dr Maggie Martin, Eastern Connecticut State University; Brandon Hamber, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Cape Town; Patrick Ball of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington, DC for providing some of the international data; The Community Information Technology Unit, Belfast; The Centre for Childcare Research at the Queen’s University of Belfast; Dr R. Scullion of the Central Statistics Unit; Arlene Healey from the Young People’s Centre; John Park from the Social Services Inspectorate of the Department of Health and Social Services; Dr Brian Tipping, Research Services Ireland; young people from various communities in North and West Belfast, Derry and elsewhere contributed enormously to our understanding of their position; over sixty adult interviewees participated in our enquiries, and many gave us much by way of understanding of parental roles, and their experience. Dr Roger McGinty at INC ORE provided feedback on a draft of the book. Our colleagues, Gwen Ford, Sarah Oakes and Mark Mulligan at The Cost of the Troubles Study, and fellow directors of The Cost of the Troubles Study, particularly David Clements, Brendan Bradley, John Millar, Hazel McCready, Sam Malcolmson, Linda Roddy, Mary Donaghy and Shelley Prue have provided assistance, guidance and feedback. Tracy Wong of the Urban Institute assisted with the statistical analysis. Others who offered feedback were Paul Morrissey, Mary Enright, Bel McGuinness, Marguerite Egin, and Dr Yallowly from the Department of Public Health at the Queen’s University of Belfast, who also provided useful suggestions about other research. We thank those who funded the research on which this book is based: the Central Community Relations Unit of the Central Secretariat; Making Belfast Work, North and West teams; the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation through the Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust; the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust; a private donation; Barnardo’s Northern Ireland, Save the Children Fund; the Cultural Diversity Group of the Community Relations Council, the Belfast European Partnership Board and the Community Relations Council. Finally, we thank Roger van Zwanenberg and everyone at Pluto Press.

Publication Contents


5 Patterns of Violence

Like many other phenomena, political violence in Northern Ireland has been distributed unevenly across space and time. Certain periods saw extreme concentrations of violence relating to particular events like the introduction of internment, Bloody Sunday or, more recently, the annual crisis associated with the determination of the Portadown Orange Lodges to march through the Catholic area of the Garvaghy Road following the church service at which they commemorate the battle of the Somme. Equally, over three decades of violence have been concentrated in particular places according to the different phases of the Troubles and the different types of conflict.

Indeed, the conflict itself has taken several forms:

  • The war between Republican paramilitaries and the security forces has not merely exhibited different intensities over the years but has taken different manifestations in particular places. For example, the bombing campaign against 'economic targets' was primarily undertaken in cities and towns as was anti-security force rioting and, in the early period, attempts to establish 'no-go' areas. Such activities were associated a high rate of civilian casualties, particularly as the result of urban car bombs and the 'collateral' damage of the riot. In contrast, the 'rural' war was fought more directly between the protagonists themselves with ambushes carried out by both sides. This was a war whose success depended crucially on the intelligence each side possessed and the capacity for surgical strikes at precise targets. In this case, the profile of victims was remarkably different from that generated by urban confrontation.
  • Moreover, different time cycles saw different strategies and tactics as each side developed the skills of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Crucially paramilitary actions depended on supplies of weaponry, the capacity ,to develop organisational structures that were difficult to penetrate and the ability to mobilise popular support. The overall strategic approach of the paramilitaries was to create the conditions under which their own capacity for military action was maximised while those of the security forces were politically inhibited by international pressure and legal constraints. Conversely, the security forces sought to create a terrain of maximum manoeuvrability within these restraints. Hence, Northern Ireland has seen different legal strategies (e.g. Diplock Courts) and different security tactics ('supergrasses' or the endless debate over the existence of 'shoot-to-kill' policies). All these developments provided the framework within which the war was fought, influenced how it was conducted and determined the character and location of its victims.
  • A wholly different category of violence was associated with inter-communal conflict, although this has also taken different forms. The territorial segregation of the two main religions in Northern Ireland has steadily increased over the period of the conflict. In certain cases, the degree of physical separation has been substantial—the River Foyle largely divides the Catholic and Protestant populations of Derry Londonderry — in Belfast, east of the River Lagan has only 12 per cent of the population Catholic, whereas west of the river has 55 per cent. In other instances, only a few streets, frequently intersected by 'peace walls', separate the different religions. North Belfast is the primary example, containing 14 out of Belfast's 17 peace walls. This proximity factor has often been associated with extreme inter-communal violence — segregation does not convey safety. Moreover, the necessity to move outside an area for work or leisure can carry high risk. Indeed, demographic change, particularly the increasing proportion of the Northern Ireland population who are Catholics, has had spatial implications — Catholics are now the majority in places where, previously, they were a tiny minority. Some such places have been associated with 'traditional' Loyalist marching routes and thus become contested spaces, flashpoints of confrontation and violence during the 'marching' season. Dunng penods of tension, minority populations, predominantly Catholics, were frequently intimidated from where they lived or worked. Thus, patterns of contiguous territories give rise to particular forms of violence and specific categories of victims.
  • Equally, the complex geography of religious segregation has also determined the terrain for sectarian assassination. Republicans legitimate their actions as anti-imperialist' struggle. The legitimate targets of this struggle are those involved in, or associated with, the British state. The definition of legitimate targets has been almost infinitely elastic —construction workers rebuilding police stations, those providing catering for the British Army or those long-time retired from the RUC reserve. The specific history of Northern Ireland has meant that those associated in some way with the state have been overwhelmingly Protestant. Accordingly, Protestants perceive Republican intentions as being directed primarily at them in an attempt to intimidate or evict from Northern Ireland altogether. Conversely, Loyalist paramilitaries had no 'obvious target' for their activities — the IRA, by definition, was a covert organisation. Nevertheless, they employed classic counterinsurgency tactics by terrorising the Catholic population which 'hid' the Republican guerrillas. Thus, particularly in the 1970s, all Catholics were regarded as 'legitimate' targets for Loyalist paramilitaries. The motivation was either revenge for the 'Republican terror campaign' or an effort to pressurise the IRA to desist or, in some cases, it was simply hate-crime. Belfast, and particularly North Belfast, was the cockpit for sectarian assassination. The fact that the two communities lived in such proximity facilitated the search for victims and ensured that escape from the scene could be quickly accomplished.
  • Finally, there were internal struggles going on within both communities either as feuds amongst rival paramilitary groups or 'punishment' type activities. The former have tended to emerge out of ideological split within paramilitary organisations such as the early secession of key dissidents from the Official IRA to set up the Provisional IRA or the later conflict between Official Republicans and the Irish Republican Socialist Party. Paramilitary punishments have been viewed either as a necessary evil, a form of policing in areas where the writ of the RUC does not run and where petty criminals are 'turned' as informers or as a systematic strategy to maintain control and intimidate opposition to paramilitary power. A surprisingly high proportion of the deaths in each community has been perpetrated by organisations that claim to defend that community. Unlike the random violence associated with deprivation and urban crisis, the violence in Northern Ireland has tended for the most part to conform to certain rules, given that the protagonists keep a weather eye on the media and public opinion. Attempts are made to demonise people after they have been assassinated or attacked, in order to justify the violence, the warning codes surrounding bomb planting and the relatively few no-warning bombs that have been deployed are examples of how the violence has tended to been used according to certain codes.
This matrix of cycles, phases, types and locations of violence has created a complex pattern of violence not easily reducible to simple trends. The purpose of this chapter is to look at the patterns in terms of when and where. As indicated, the core analysis is derived from a comprehensive database of political deaths between 1969 and 1998. While this depicts the most extreme consequences of the conflict, it is also a good surrogate for violence in general. A comparison of the numbers of deaths each year and the number of injuries associated with political violence shows a correlation coefficient of .93. Injuries outnumber deaths by just over ten to one but have exactly the same cycle. The combination of deaths and injuries represents the primary human cost of the Troubles although these do not encompass the trauma of grief, imprisonment and intimidation. Nevertheless, the deaths have been taken as an appropriate reflection of the overall costs. Since Northern Ireland is made up of sets of different territories, some case studies — areas where violence was particularly significant — will also be highlighted. There has not been one uniform conflict in Northern Ireland, rather the Troubles are a mosaic of different types of conflict. Accordingly, the 'reality' of the Troubles is different for people in different locations and in different occupations. Thus, to grasp some of these different realities, comment is made on sub-populations living in specific areas. These have been chosen to illustrate either the intensity of the conflict or its particular character in certain locations.

WHEN DID THE DEATHS OCCUR?

The distribution of political deaths over time in Northern Ireland is described in Table 5.1.
 
Table 5.1 Distribution of Deaths (1969—98)
Year
Frequency of Deaths
% of Total*
1969
18
0.5
1970
26
0.7
1971
186
5.2
1972
497
13.8
1973
274
7.6
1974
307
8.5
1975
265
7.4
1976
314
8.7
1977
117
3.2
1978
83
2.3
1979
124
3.4
1980
86
2.4
1981
115
3.2
1982
112
3.1
1983
88
2.4
1984
74
2.1
1985
61
1.7
1986
64
1.8
1987
103
2.9
1988
105
2.9
1989
81
2.2
1990
84
2.3
1991
101
2.8
1992
93
2.6
1993
90
2.5
1994
68
1.9
1995
9
0.2
1996
21
0.6
1997
23
0.6
1998
12
0.3
Total
3601
100.0
Average no. of deaths per year
120
 

* to the nearest decimal point

Just over half of all deaths occurred in the period 197 1—76. If the frequency of deaths can be regarded as a good indicator of the intensity of the conflict, then these five years stand out over the entire two and a half decades. The pivotal event was the introduction of internment in 1971. Only 32 deaths took place before 9 August. Thus, 154 people died in the remaining five months of the year —equivalent to a yearly figure of 370. The number killed in 1972 was even greater, as resentment against security policies (typified by the Bloody Sunday deaths in Derry) increased. The proroguing of Stormont in 1972 fuelled Loyalist resentment and saw the growth of their paramilitary operations. A further high point was 1974, the year the Power Sharing Executive was dramatically brought down by the Ulster Workers' Council strike. After 1976, despite equally dramatic events such as the renewed Loyalist strike in 1977 and the hunger strike deaths of the early 1980s, the number killed in any one year never exceeded 125 and in only seven years was it greater than 100. Put another way, the average annual number of deaths for the whole period was 120, for 1969—70 it was 22, for 1971—76 it was 306 and for 1977—94 it was 91 — thus, the intensity of killing between 1971 and 1976 was more than twice that for the whole period and more than three times that for all of the subsequent years. This can be seen in Figure 5.1 which takes the average annual number of deaths (120) as 100 and scores each other year relative to that. As illustrated graphically, the first half of the 1970s stands out. Indeed, in 1972, the number of deaths was over three and a half times the yearly average for the entire period.

The data themselves cannot provide a comprehensive explanation for the trend. By cross-tabulating the years in which the deaths occurred by those organisations responsible, it is possible to say something about the roles of the various protagonists over time. Just over half of all those killed by the British Army (163 deaths or 51.6 per cent) died between 1971 and 1973 compared to 15.3 per cent of deaths (7 deaths) for which the RUC was responsible. It could be said that the most offensive security posture by the military occurred over the two and a half year period consisting of the last five months in 1971 and all of 1972—73. Although Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries killed very large numbers of people during these years (502 and 216), they constituted a lower share of their respective totals (25.4 per cent and 23 per cent). Thus, the overall distribution of deaths for which they were responsible is less concentrated in the short period characteristic of the British Army. Indeed, 40 per cent of deaths (452 deaths) perpetrated by Loyalist paramilitaries took place between 1974 and 1976.

Deaths Ratio (Yearly Av. = 100)

Figure 5.1 Comparative Yearly Death Rates in the Troubles


There would thus appear to be different cycles amongst the organisations principally responsible for the killings that produced the massive concentration of deaths in the early 1 970s. For the British Army, the most offensive period was 197 1—73, for Loyalist paramilitaries, it was 1974—7 6 and for Republican paramilitaries it was 1971—76 accounting for 47 per cent of all the deaths they have carried out in the entire period.

Explosions and shootings were the predominant causes of death. Almost 91 per cent of victims died from these causes. Deaths caused by explosions were more characteristic of the 1970s with shootings more evenly distributed across the period.

Given that violence has also been associated with regular annual events, for example, Loyalist marches or anniversaries of internment, it is also useful to examine the deaths in terms of a monthly cycle — i.e. the number of deaths occurring in particular months over the entire period. Table 5.2 gives the absolute number of deaths that occurred in each month and the percentage of the total. It also gives a ratio that is based on the fact that if the deaths had been evenly distributed across the months, then each would have contained 8.5 per cent of the total. The ratio column gives a figure for each month with its own score relative to 8.5 (treated as 100) so as to indicate clearly the months in which a disproportionate number of deaths occurred.
 
Table 5.2 Distribution of Deaths by Month (1969 98)
Month
Number of Deaths
% of Total
Ratio
Jan.
262
7.3
87
Feb.
308
8.6
103
Mar.
286
7.9
95
April
279
7.8
93
May
326
9.1
109
June
285
7.9
95
July
325
9.0
108
Aug.
345
9.6
115
Sept.
253
7.0
84
Oct.
342
9.5
114
Nov.
331
9.2
110
Dec.
256
7.1
85
Total
3598
100
 

There is some indication of a cycle corresponding to periods of particular tension. The first four months had average or low ratios and the deaths begin to rise in May, with July and August also having high ratios. Months with equally high scores, however, were October and November, both outside the calendar of tension-associated events. It may have been that the years when deaths were most frequent have affected the general monthly cycle. Nevertheless, on this basis the notion of a systematic monthly cycle is not proved.

In summary, Northern Ireland's armed conflict began as a political struggle in the late 1 960s that rapidly escalated into a violent struggle in the first half of the 1970s and which persisted at a lower intensity for the next 20 years. Interpretations vary about why an essentially political struggle about civil rights and modernisation so quickly moved into a violent phase:

  • A traditional Unionist analysis contends that the initial civil rights campaign had at its core a Nationalist (and Republican) agenda designed to destabilise the state. The campaign's demands were 'transitional', designed to provoke conflict and, even when granted, fresh demands were raised to generate more friction. The Republican elements involved had a tradition of violence and were seeking a means of legitimating a new campaign against the Northern Ireland state.
  • Nationalists argue that the absence of civil rights and indeed, the political centrality of organisations like the Orange Order within the state, were core elements of Northern Ireland. It had been established as structurally discriminatory and coercive. Thus, the state forces reacted violently to a programme of political protest because the state itself could not accommodate reform, thus catalysing three decades of ensuing conflict.
  • It is possible, however, to interpret the situation by incorporating elements of both these approaches. The basis of Partition in Ireland lay in the uneven development of the island's economy. Given the industrialisation of the North East and the fact that its products depended crucially on British and Empire markets, the inhabitants of that area could not accept a 'home rule' (never mind independence) proposal because of the threat it posed to its economic infrastructure — Sinn Féin had openly talked of tariff barriers to protect infant industries in the South Johnson, 1981). Had these been applied to Northern industries, with the probability that Britain would retaliate, the area would have deindustrialised even more rapidly than it did. The division of Ireland was not an 'imperialist conspiracy' (in any case, the industries were owned by local, rather than 'foreign' capital), but rather the result of the political and social implications of uneven economic development within the island. Nevertheless, the process of establishing the Northern Ireland state was sustained by an ideology of division and supremacy — sectarianism (O'Dowd et al., 1980). This outlived the economic conditions that determined Partition. Such economic variables almost guaranteed that the island would be politically divided, but sectarianism determined the form that Northern Ireland would take. While Protestants were faced with a Southern state which was predominantly Catholic in its institutions and culture, and while Catholic Nationalists persistently refused to accept the validity of Northern Ireland, the well-documented levels of social and economic exclusion experienced by Catholics were more than just a defensive reaction on the part of Protestants.1 Given the history and character of the state, it was impossible to separate out the necessity to modernise, and thus eliminate all forms of discrimination, and challenges to its very existence. Such confusion created potent conditions for a rapid transition to violence. O'Leary and McGarry (1993) suggest that Northern Ireland was:
the territorial line of the retreat of the British state in Ireland, and was testament to the failure to build a British identity which would have enabled the descendants of Catholic natives and Protestant settlers to transcend their differences. It was also proof of an Irish failure: Nationalists lacked the coercive and ideological resources to achieve a popularly supported revolution throughout the whole island between 1916 and 1925. (p. 107)
As the conflict moved into the 1980s, the numbers dying dramatically reduced. It took on the form of a 'low intensity' conflict with around 100 deaths each year. The security forces could not subdue their Republican opponents nor could the latter militarily impose their will on the British government. Many within the Loyalist paramilitaries recognised that random sectarian assassination of Catholics only bolstered support for the IRA and, indeed, there was some effort to specifically target Sinn Féin members as surrogates for the IRA. Violence had settled nothing.


WHERE DID THE DEATHS OCCUR?

Table 5.3 describes the deaths that have taken place in each district council area in Northern Ireland comparing these figures with district populations in 1991.

The table records deaths in two ways: the first gives the number of violent incidents in which someone died (fatal incidents) occurring within the district; the second records the number of district residents who have been killed (victims). Neither covers the total number who were killed. This is because a number of deaths occurred outside Northern Ireland, a large number of non-Northern Ireland residents were victims and, in some cases, there are difficulties in assigning incomplete addresses to particular districts. The number of deaths in each category has been divided by the 1991 figure for the resident population to produce a comparable death rate per 1000 population and these have been ranked. Clearly, the death rates are exaggerated by the fact that the accumulated number of deaths is being compared with the population for a single year. True yearly death rates for each district would be considerably lower.
 
Table 5.3 Numbers and Death Rates with Northern Ireland District Council Areas
District Council
Pop.1991
(000s)
Fatal Incidents
Rate
1000
Resident
Victims
Rate
1000
Ratio
In/HA
Belfast
294.3
1352
4.59
1216
4.13
0.90
Armagh
51.6
129
2.50
128
2.48
0.99
Dungannon
45
115
2.56
107
2.38
0.93
Cookstown
30.8
65
2.11
63
2.05
0.97
Strabane
35.4
58
1.64
67
1.89
1.16
Derry
97.5
244
2.50
170
1.74
0.70
Craigavon
75.1
110
1.46
121
1.61
1.10
Fermanagh
54.1
94
1.74
87
1.61
0.93
Newry and Mourne
82.7
325
3.93
131
1.58
0.40
Magherafelt
35.9
40
1.11
49
1.36
1.23
Castlereagh
61.6
32
0.52
65
1.06
2.03
Lisburn
101
77
0.76
106
1.05
1.38
Newtownabbey
75.9
39
0.51
75
0.99
1.92
Banbridge
33.4
8
0.24
27
0.81
3.38
Down
58.6
46
0.78
42
0.72
0.91
Limavady
29.6
27
0.91
21
0.71
0.78
Omagh
45.6
41
0.90
31
0.68
0.76
Ballymoney
24
13
0.54
14
0.58
1.08
Carrickfergus
33.2
8
0.24
17
0.51
2.13
Coleraine
52.9
22
0.42
24
0.45
1.09
North Down
72.5
12
0.17
32
0.44
2.67
Antrim
45.6
15
0.33
20
0.44
1.33
Ballymena
56.2
10
0.18
23
0.41
2.30
Lame
29.4
8
0.27
12
0.41
1.50
Ards
64.9
8
0.12
26
0.40
3.25
Moyle
14.6
4
0.27
4
0.27
1.00
Total  
2902
 
2678
   

In terms of absolute number of incidents, Belfast, Newry and Mourne, Derry, Armagh, Dungannon and Craigavon stand out. These constitute four areas worthy of greater attention, though the last three can be aggregated to constitute a 'Mid Ulster' (which is distinct from the electoral constituency of 'mid Ulster'). In both absolute and relative terms, Belfast has seen the greatest intensity of violent deaths. Indeed, the rates per 1000 population have been almost twice as high as the next district, Armagh. In some districts, the number of incidents and the number of resident deaths almost tally. As the last column of the table shows, the two lists were within plus or minus 10 per cent of each other in ten districts. In others, the number of incidents was substantially greater than the number of resident deaths, for example, Newry and Mourne. It may be hypothesised that this reflects the 'rural war' referred to earlier in which a high proportion of casualties were members of the security forces who did not live in the area. Equally, in still other areas, the number of residents who died was greater than the number of incidents, for example, Castlereagh and North Down. While such areas were relatively untouched by violence, their residents were less insulated reflecting either membership of the security forces or perhaps being victims of bombs in city centres.

A similar ranking of postal districts provides the next table (Table 5.4), which points to particular parts of Belfast, Derry, South Armagh and 'Mid Ulster' as locations for a high intensity of violence.
 
Table 5.4 Deaths by Location in Postal Districts
Home Postal
District
Number
% of
Total
Incident Postal
District
Number
% of
Total
14
248
8.75
12
326
9.88
12
242
8.54
14
272
8.24
13
180
6.35
35
268
8.12
15
164
5.78
13
223
6.76
11
146
5.15
48
197
5.97
48
113
3.99
15
191
5.79
35
91
3.21
11
129
3.91
5
87
3.07
7
104
3.15
71
86
3.03
1
98
2.97
7
79
2.79
71
89
2.70
47
74
2.61
70
78
2.36
60
70
2.47
60
77
2.33
36
66
2.33
5
74
2.24
70
59
2.08
47
71
2.15
6
48
1.69
61
64
1.94
61
46
1.62
34
59
.1.79
34
45
1.59
92
54
1.64
66
44
1.55
9
45
1.36
62
43
1.52
66
44
1.33
45
42
1.48
62
43
1.30

With respect to local victims, postal districts BT14, BT12, BT13, BT15 and BT11 stand out. All are in Belfast and, indeed, define the North and West of the city. BT47 and BT48 define Derry. BT34 and BT35 cover Newry and South Armagh while BT60, BT61 and BT71 define 'Mid Ulster'. All these areas illustrate the spatial intensity of violence.

Belfast is the most extreme case. Here the impact of violence is revealed by the ward analysis in Table 5.5.
 
Table 5.5 The Number of Fatal Incidents and Resident Deaths in each Belfast Ward
Wards
Incidents
Victims
Location
Ballymacarret
25
38
E
Island
16
7
E
The Mont
8
15
E
Ravenhill
7
12
E
Ballyhackamore
6
4
E
Sydenham
6
3
E
Woodstock
6
14
E
Bloomfield
4
3
E
Stormont
4
8
E
Knock
2
6
E
Orangefield
2
3
E
Belmont
1
3
E
Cherryvalley
0
1
E
Ward average
7
9
 
StAnnes
106
39
N
Ardoyne
71
67
N
New Lodge
58
62
N
Duncairn
56
24
N
Cliftonville
43
35
N
Waterworks
41
42
N
Crumlin
40
22
N
Highfield
35
30
N
Ligionel
35
26
N
Chicester Park
34
26
N
Ballysillan
26
29
N
Glencairn
24
24
N
Woodvale
24
23
N
Castelview
18
12
N
Fort William
6
12
N
Bellvue
4
4
N
Cavehill
3
14
N
Ward average
37
29
 
Shaftesbury
55
30
S
Botanic
49
33
S
Blackstaff
25
11
S
Ballynafeigh
21
23
S
Windsor
11
11
S
Stranmillis
9
7
S
Rosetta
8
5
S
Malone
2
11
S
Upper Malone
2
8
S
Ward average
21
15
 
Falls
90
57
W
Clonard
70
56
W
Whiterock
50
55
W
Shankill
44
24
W
Upper Springfield
44
46
W
Falls Park
30
20
W
Andersontown
26
28
W
Beechmount
25
20
W
Glencolin
24
20
W
Glen Road
14
25
W
Ladybrook
10
19
W
Finaghy
4
8
W
Ward average
36
32
 

The wards have been assembled under the headings of East, North, South and West of the city to provide an indication of the spatial concentration of deaths within it. The North and West of the city have the highest averages for both incidents and resident deaths. In East Belfast, only two wards had scores in double figures and only this area contained a ward in which there were no violent incidents resulting in death. It can be seen that some wards were virtually unaffected on this measure whereas some, like Falls, had more than the total for East Belfast. The number of incidents in St Anne's was even greater but this was a city centre ward affected by the violence taking place there. Accordingly, the number of resident deaths is considerably lower than the number of incidents.

These figures accord with everyday experience, i.e. there are parts of Northern Ireland which have only been marginally touched by the conflict. Within Belfast, the intensity of violence has been skewed towards the North and West of the city. One of these has the highest proportion of Catholics in its population and the other has the highest concentration of sectarianly segregated wards.

Another matter of debate has been the relationship between violence and deprivation — has deprivation been the breeding ground for violence? The Irish Congress of Trade Unions argued that 50,000 jobs would do more to end the conflict than 50,000 guns (Carlin, 1979). In the early 1 990s an exercise in plotting spatial deprivation was undertaken by the Micro Statistics Centre at the University of Manchester (Robson et al., 1994). Thus it is possible to compare the death rates for particular places with their deprivation scores. Table 5.6 depicts the six district council areas that were ranked highest for fatal incident per 1000 population and gives the corresponding ranks for the rates of resident deaths and its deprivation score.
 
Table 5.6 A Comparison of Violence (1969—98) and Deprivation (1994) in Selected Districts
District Council
Rank
(fatal incidents)
Rank
(residents deaths)
Deprivation
Rank
Belfast
Newry and Mourne
Dungannon
Derry
Armagh
Cookstown
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
4
4
4
4
4
1
1
1
1
13
8

Of the six districts ranked highest on fatal incidents, four were among the six worst deprived — the exceptions being Armagh and Cookstown. Strabane ranked highest on deprivation in the region and was ranked eighth on the rate of fatal incidents. There would appear to be some relationship between deprivation and violence, but it is not a simple one. The correlation coefficients of the two violence scores with the deprivation score across all 26 districts were .76 and .52, respectively. It would thus appear that there was a higher level of association between fatal incidents and deprivation than resident deaths and deprivation. The former is a better measure of the intensity of the violence that affected these areas. Many areas untouched by violence saw their residents die elsewhere. Thus, intensity of violence and deprivation do seem to be positively associated.

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