State Violence: Northern Ireland 1969-1997
From the Back Cover:
Although the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process have been welcomed by an overwhelming majority of people in both Unionist and Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland, Raymond Murray, who for years has been an outspoken and courageous crusader for human rights, believes that it is essential for the future of the whole community that people do not ignore the abuses of power that occurred over the three decades of conflict.
Before the Northern conflict began in 1969, discrimination against Catholics had been the administrative policy of the Stormont government for fifty years. The RUC was always seen by Catholics as the defence force of a Protestant state and the gulf between the force and the Catholic public was widened by the severe counter-insurgency methods employed by the RUC and the British Army since the outbreak of the Troubles.
In State Violence Murray chronicles the abuse by the British state of emergency laws: harassment and intimidation of civilians; injuries and deaths caused by rubber and plastic bullets; collusion between British security forces, British intelligence and loyalist paramilitaries; unjust killings and murders by the security forces; excessive punishments and degrading strip-searching in prisons - abuses ignored by all but a handful of individuals and civil rights organisations.
According to Murray, it is necessary for the British government
to acknowledge that over the past twenty-eight years it acted
unlawfully and immorally, in the murders of innocent people, in
ill-treatment in interrogation centres and in corruption of the
legal process. He believes that if honesty prevails, there will
be a point in setting up a truth commission.
Raymond Murray is a well-known crusader for human rights in Northern Ireland. He is Chairman of Relations for Justice. With Denis Faul he is co-author of thirty-three books and pamphlets on violations of human rights. His books The SAS in Ireland and Hard Time - Armagh Gaol 1971-1986 are also published by Mercier Press.
Peace and Reconciliation
The Rich and the Poor
The Ghetto Poor and Human Rights
The British Media and Ireland, 1979
Torture and Internment, August 1971
Letter to Jim Fields, Armagh, 1972
Visit to a Long Kesh Appeal Tribunal, 1972
Poem - Long Kesh, 1974
TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT
Torture in Girdwood Park Barracks, 197 1-72
Castlereagh Interrogation Centre: Bernard O'Connor, 1977
Ill-treatment of Women in Castlereagh: Geraldine Crane, 197
Grand Central Army Post: Patricia Moore, 1977
H Blocks: Ill-treatment of Prisoners and Human Rights, 1978
Christ and the Prisoner
Remembering the Hunger Strikers, 1990
Stripping Girls Naked in Armagh Prison, 1985
A Visit with Cardinal Tomas O Fiaich to English Prisons, 1990
Requiem for Cardinal Tomas O Fiaich
The Birmingham Six, 1989
The Birmingham Six: The Truth will Set You Free
Release of Prisoners, 1995
RUBBER AND PLASTIC BULLETS
The Death of Stephen McConomy 16 April 1982
Blinded by Rubber Bullets: Richard Moore, Emma Groves
Teachers and the Sacredness of Human Life
STATE KILLINGS AND MURDERS
Killings by British Security Forces, 1969-76
The Death of Patrick McElhone, 7 August 1974
A Paratrooper Shot Majella O'Hare, 14 August 1976
The Shooting of Michael McCartan, 23 July 1980
Danny Barrett, killed by a British army sniper, 9 July 1981
State Killings in Northern Ireland, 1991-92
Relatives for Justice and the Northern Ireland Office, 1992
The Violation of the Right to Life
Desmond Grew, Martin McCaughey, shot by the SAS, 9 October 1990
Memorial to Fergal Caraher, 30 December 1991
Shoot-to-Kill and Collusion, 1990-94
The Death Toll caused by South African Weaponry
Submission of Relatives for Justice to the Cameron Commission
South African Weapons
The Search for Truth, 1994
The Murder of the Human Rights Lawyer Pat Finucane
3,171 Victims in Northern Ireland, 1969-1994
Peace in a Transition Period
Publications of Denis Faul and Raymond Murray
December 1971 marked a watershed in my life. Political prisoners who had been ill-treated and tortured in Holywood Palace Barracks and Girdwood Park Barracks were imprisoned in Armagh Jail where I was chaplain. I saw the horrific marks on their bodies. I experienced the blatant cover-up of this illegal and immoral behaviour. Directly and indirectly the army, police, doctors, civil administration and government were involved in this criminal action.
Pursuance of the grievances of those who suffered duress in interrogation centres, a never-ending story in the recent long war in Northern Ireland, led Denis Faul and myself into campaigning against other violations of human rights in Northern Ireland in subsequent years: corruption of law; lack of independence in the matter of inquiry into complaints; the abuse of emergency laws; harassment and intimidation of civilians by security forces; injuries and deaths caused by rubber and plastic bullets; collusion between British security forces, British intelligence and loyalist paramilitaries; unjust killings and murders by state security forces; excessive punishments in the prisons; cruel strip searching in prisons. In the 1970s only a few people actively helped to try and stop these violations of human rights: the Civil Rights Movement, the Association for Legal Justice, the National Council for Civil Liberties, Amnesty International and some concerned priests, doctors, surgeons and lawyers. In latter years the Committee for the Administration of Justice, Belfast, and the Pat Finucane Centre, Deny have come to prominence as state watchers. Fr Brian Brady Fr Denis Faul, Sister Sarah Clarke of London and myself worked individually and together from 1971. We were also connected with the Association for Legal Justice where a small number of valiant people worked day and night to take statements and record the plight of the oppressed. I recall them with respect and pride: Frances Murray Clara Reilly Anne Murray Rita Mullen, Rosaleen Boyle, Margaret Gatt, Mary Thornberry, Seán McCann and Paddy Kelly There was also a distinguished group of solicitors who gave advice and took up cases. Paddy McGrory heads the list, honourably followed by Oliver Kelly Eilis McDermot, Pat Finucane, Peter Madden, Chris Napier, Padraigin Drinan, Pat Marrinan, Ted Jones, Francis Keenan and Paschal O'Hare.
There are two kinds of histories, one fact and one semi-fiction. This is the conclusion of my experience in working for human rights. The history put out by the ruling class borders on fiction. Their official communiqués are published first and grab the headlines. They hold attention while a crisis lasts. It is an attempt to legitimise illegal actions by which they maintain their power over the powerless and the poor. It is tyranny's deceit.
The second history is the short and simple annals of the poor, the worm's eye view It is often secret. It is the story of the injustice done to them in order to preserve the power and privilege of a few When power is threatened, the 'lion' and the 'eagle' and the 'bear' will grab the nearest and crush them as an example to the rest. It matters not that they are innocent or guilty. What matters is that they are close at hand and are representative.
Can true history be written? Is it essentially the story of the ruling class? Is it the speeches of President Ronald Reagan and the memoirs of Mrs Margaret Thatcher? Is it not also the story of the unemployed in Birmingham and the deprived blacks in Atlantic City? Must the 'nobodies' remain statistics of birth, death and marriage? There are many 'hidden Irelands' but who has hidden them? The sufferings, the tensions, the spiritual striving for holiness of countless poor families, the injustices done to the underprivileged and the miraculous survival of their traditions in spite of the ever-present monster of power, these are true history. We should give the poor the dignity of their names.
Traditionally too much writing of the history of Ireland was based on state papers and the public judgements of governments and judges. Historical expression was reduced to a truculent embarrassment which silenced the cries for justice of the poor. When the state was wrong it hid the facts and stopped the truth being told. The writer of the introductory history to Liber Munerum Publicorum Hiberniae l152-1827 says, We may observe here once for all that Ireland of itself has no history, properly speaking'. No wonder Padraic Pearse countered such attitudes in his tract, The Spiritual Nation:
But the soul of the enslaved and broken nation may conceivably be a more splendid thing than the soul of the great free nation; and that is one reason why the enslavements of old and glorious nations that have taken place so often in history are the most terrible things that have ever happened in the world.Since we are commemorating in 1998 the bicentenary of the United Irishmen, we might recall the comment on the deprivation of justice by the United Irishman Arthur O'Connor in his address To the Irish Nation:
But, why should I waste time in proving that government, in the hands of Irish administration, has been a system for supporting the few in oppressing the many, instead of yielding impartial protection? Has it not been by sowing, maintaining and fomenting division, that Irish administrations have governed Ireland? Look to the continuation of civil discord, of plunder and bloodshed, which has infested our island, since the Welch landed in 1165, to this instant, that these hell-hounds intituled Ancient Britons are butchering our disarmed people. Look in this century to the writings of wretchedness, of misery, of want and oppression, under the different shapes of White-boys, Right-boys, Hearts-of-oak men, Peep-o-day boys, and Steel-men. Yet where is there an instance on record, in which the Government or Legislature in Ireland have inquired into the causes of their constant unerring marks of oppression? No! A system of smothered war between the oppressors and the oppressed, could not bear inquiry, for it would bear redress. Redress means restoration of plunder and restoration of rights. Therefore sanguinary laws and military outrage, whose expences are endless, have been substituted for justice, whose expences are nothing.Fr Denis Faul and I wrote similar words in The Furrow, April 1984:
The killing of a man involves an obligation to make good the damage to his dependants; stealing means that the object stolen must be given back; if one has taken another's land (or another's country) one must return it as part of the reconciliation process; if one has deprived a person of his character one must restore it; if one has sent people to jail by false witness or by the use of force in extracting statements, then that evil work must be reversed and undone to achieve reconciliation; if one discriminates in the ordering of society, then that discrimination must be reversed to bring about reconciliation. Reconciliation involves the work of justice, of restoring to the other person what you have taken from him and paying for the injury done him, with a determination that that will not occur again.The conflicts of the 1798 period are no different from those of today I have witnessed the state in Northern Ireland kill, torture, bribe, and imprison people unjustly Denis Faul and I tried to stop these violations of human rights by official complaints, by breaking the silence in the media, by publishing books, pamphlets and broadsheets, by noising the problems abroad. This book State Violence in Northern Ireland, 1969-1997, draws together pieces illustrative of the violations of human rights by the state in Northern Ireland. They were written fresh during those years. Most of them have already been published in books, pamphlets and magazines. People who have lived through this period in Northern Ireland will immediately recall the perspective they convey I am sure they will help others understand the frustration of the 'nobodies' who did not get justice and whose voices were almost suppressed.
It involves giving back to people their dignity, self-respect, freedom, human rights, the right to worship and educate their children in their faith, to receive back the place that has been taken and the community/country that has been confiscated and oppressed.
I wrote an essay in Seanchas Ard Mhacha in 1982 on the killing of a prisoner, Thomas Birch, a United Irishman, who was being brought under guard by the Dublin Militia from Glenane in south Armagh to Armagh Prison. When a rescue was threatened, one of the soldiers killed him. The wriggling of legal officials and military personnel to pervertjustice in that case is mirrored true in this present book. Thomas Pelham, Chief Secretary in Dublin Castle, wrote to General Lake,
I received your letter of the 25th and you may rest assured that every sort of attention shall be paid to the sergeant of the Dublin Militia who is to be tried in Armagh. I do not think that any mark of particular favour can be shown to him before his trial but if he is acquitted as I have no doubt he must be I can venture to say that the Lord Lieutenant will be glad to bestow some distinguished mark of favour upon him.We witnessed such an attitude in Northern Ireland over these troubled years. People were assassinated by policy of the British government; witness the Gibraltar murders. None of the RUC or British army did a day in jail for torture and ill-treatment of hundreds of people arrested under emergency laws. None of the middle or high command in the security forces resigned in protest. There were some 150 cases of unjust killings and murders by security forces. Only a few soldiers were convicted of murder. The military establishment and the imperialist-minded campaigned for their early release and a declaration of their 'innocence'. We still await the uncovering of the involvement of British intelligence and loyalist paramilitaries in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 17 May 1974 when 33 people were killed. Successive Irish and British governments stubbornly refuse to reveal the facts. They are terrified of the truth. The law over many years was bent and used as a weapon in counter-Insurgency. People were brutalised and sent to prison on forced confessions or on concocted evidence or on the uncorroborated evidence of accomplices and convicted persons. The 'lion' reaches for the nearest victims: Carol Ann Kelly a child returning home from the shop with a carton of milk, was killed by a plastic bullet fired by a soldier; Richard Moore, a ten-year old boy dashing out from school, was blinded by a rubber bullet fired from a British army post; Mrs Nora McCabe was killed by a plastic bullet fired at point blank range from an RUC landrover on a quiet street while on her way to buy a packet of cigarettes; Patrick McElhone, a farm labourer, was taken from his home and shot by the British army within sight of his aged father. These little people and many others were gravely injured or died at the hands of the state. The long arm of the state and the controlled media tried to bury them under the clay of official files. Of course the power of the state in its civil service and money is immense. This book removes some of the clay.
The rôle of the academic is changing, I hope. Today the historian must live with history as it is being made. We have seen historians expose the hypocrisy of the public statements and the private orders of the last world war and the wars in Korea and Vietnam. I think historians should close the gap and become investigators of current public affairs. They should expose and challenge the prejudice that the ruling class presents through the media and through their spokespersons. Similarly what good are theologians if they can only speak for the past? And why did the philosophers in the universities sing dumb in post-war Northern Ireland while the whirlwind gathered? We had five years of internment and a decade of torture. Only a few notable academics spoke out. Do academics only comment on the dead?
The historian of today should expose the workings of modern government and reveal the enormous amount of truth that is concealed. This book gives examples of the violations of human rights in Northern Ireland, 1969-1997. Fortunately the interest of national security, patronage and power did not suppress all the truth.
The second man to die in the Northern Ireland 'troubles' was John Gallagher, a young married man from my own parish of Armagh, the night of 14 August 1969. I live in rooms three storeys up and I had been watching a loyalist crowd massing in the street outside the City Hall where a civil rights' meeting was taking place. The leaders of the meeting, sensing the build-up outside and the heavy concentration of police, told the crowd to leave and disperse to their homes quietly The crowd were directed to the left by the police when they went outside. A short distance away the street had a left turning. Some of the crowd who turned down this street, Cathedral Road, were met by a party of B Special police who fired killing John Gallagher and wounding some others. The Scarman Tribunal into Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969 was satisfied that the police did fire and that one of them did kill Mr Gallagher while others wounded Mr McParland and Mr Moore. After making allowances for the strange, difficult and frightening situation in which the police found themselves, the report said that there was no justification for firing into the crowd. The tribunal placed a measure of responsibility on a police inspector who put an untrained party of police from a country area into an alarming town riot without briefing or leadership. No RUC man has yet been charged with the murder of John Gallagher. On 22 August 1974 I wrote to Mr Merlyn Rees, the Secretary of State, 'On 14 August, 1969, John Gallagher, one of our parishioners, was shot dead in Armagh. Are police investigations still continuing into this fatal shooting?' The reply was that investigations had closed but would be reopened if fresh evidence was obtainable.
The Scarman Report also found unjustified the killing of Patrick Rooney a boy of 9 years, by the police in Belfast. The report states, We are unable to justify the shooting from the Browning machine-gun which was responsible for the death of Patrick Rooney'. On 19 April 1969 police entered the home of Samuel Devenney on a day of rioting in Deny and beat him up in front of his children. He died in hospital in Belfast on 17 July 1969. He was 42 years old. Following an inquiry conducted by Scotland Yard detectives on the instigation of Sir Arthur Young, Chief Constable, Sir Arthur made a statement. He attributed lack of evidence to a 'conspiracy of silence'.
I mention these deaths at the beginning of the present crisis because it is there the rot set in. You could be shot dead on your own street by the British army or the police and nobody would be made amenable for the killing. Since that time some 60 innocent people have been killed in an unjustifiable manner by British government forces - 14 in Derry on 30 January 1972, 6 on the New Lodge Road, Belfast, 3 February 1973, and so on.
On Saturday 15 June 1974, a 22 year-old man, John Pat Cunningham from my parish, really a retarded boy who had the mentality of a 10 year-old child was shot dead by the British army He was afraid of the soldiers, having been beaten up by them on a previous occasion. The army said they called on him to halt before they fired. There was no independent inquiry into his death. He was shot at 120 yards. The officer said he had his hand in his pocket. If he was a gunman, what use would a pistol be at that distance?
Fr Faul and I documented the cases of Leo Norney aged 17 years gunned down by the Black Watch Regiment 13 September 1975, Majella O'Hare aged 12 years gunned down by the Third Parachute Regiment 14 August 1976 on her way to church, Brian Stewart killed by a rubber bullet October 1976.
By their actions in killing 60 innocent civilians, the British army have violated human rights spelled out in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights: 'Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of the person' (Article 3 of The Universal Declaration).
'Every human being has the inherent right to life. This rights shall s be protected by law No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life' (Article 6 (1) of the Covenant).
Not only were these innocents - people like Patrick McElhone, Pomeroy County Tyrone, taken out and gunned down in the field in front of his aged parents' house and Brian Smith gunned down by the paratroopers while he stood chatting to friends in Ardoyne - deprived of their lives, but they were slandered by malicious lies promulgated by dishonourable officers that they were gunmen.
Why can agents of the British government kill people manifestly innocent in very suspicious circumstances and never pay any penalty? Are they really operating under the law if they are never effectively made amenable to law? Are they above the law? Is there a conspiracy to make them immune from effective prosecution?
On 7 January 1976, the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced
the use of the SAS, the Special Air Service Regiment, in Northern
Ireland plainclothes irregular units. What the real motive of
the British authorities was can only be guessed at but the general
idea seems to have been to terrorise the people by assassination,
by highly unorthodox and criminal methods contrary to Hague Regulations
and Geneva Conventions. Fr Faul and I chronicled the shooting
of Peter Cleary taken out from the house of his girlfriend and
her relatives and killed in a nearby field. So far in the past
year the SAS have gunned down 8 people in cold blood - Colm McNutt
and Denis Heaney in Deny Paul Duffy in Cookstown, John Boyle in
County Antrim, Jim Mulvenna, Dennis Brown, William John Mailey
and a Protestant, William Hanna, in Belfast. This is known as
the 'kill, don't question' security policy and is a massive breach
of the rule of law.
This is part of a speech delivered by me to Congressmen in Washington DC, 3 October 1978, and to the Ad Hoc Committee for Human Rights in Northern Ireland, Philadelphia, 7 October 1978.
Amnesty International celebrated its thirtieth birthday in 1991. People involved in the campaign for human rights in Northern Ireland are grateful to them for their interest in the protection of citizens of the north from the illegal acts of those in charge of the law One calls to mind their reports of February 1972 and June 1978 on ill-treatment of those detained under emergency laws in interrogation centres, and reports in 1988 and 1990 on Killings by Security Forces in Northern Ireland. In their report of 1991 entitled United Kingdom: Human Rights Concerns Amnesty International condemned British government secrecy in police and military investigations. It renewed its call for an independent judicial inquiry into disputed killings by security forces in, Northern Ireland. The report said that Amnesty 'believes that such an inquiry is vital to help prevent future unlawful killings and to ensure that all disputed killings by security forces are promptly investigated and publicly clarified'.
The British government has held inquiries before, but it is clear that they do not want to reveal the truth. On 30 January 1972, in Derry, British paratroopers shot dead 14 unarmed citizens in cold blood.
Nevertheless, the inquiry under Lord Widgery into the events of Bloody Sunday did not fault the actions of the soldiers.
In May 1984, John Stalker, Deputy Chief Constable of the Manchester police force, was appointed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) to investigate three incidents in 1982 when 6 unarmed people were killed by undercover policemen. This did not result in the uncovering of the full facts surrounding these murders. The administrative cover-up became known as the Stalker Affair. Stalker was digging too deep, discovering damaging new evidence. He was suspended from the police on trumped up charges and removed from the case. The Stalker Affair clearly indicated that the authorities have something sinister to hide.
In 1989 Cambridge Deputy Chief Constable John Stevens conducted
an inquiry into collusion of security forces with loyalist paramilitaries.
His report touched only the surface of the iceberg. Its scope
was deliberately limited.
ABUSE OF LAW
Harassment, brutality, ill-treatment, torture, internment, severe prison conditions sanctioned or tolerated by the state have for 20 years distorted the face of Northern Ireland. The non-jury Diplock Courts, the acceptance by these courts of fictitious verbal statements, the use of supergrasses, the blackmailing of young people by the security forces, semi-official assassinations, the widespread and deadly use of plastic bullets and official shoot-to-kill policies have eroded confidence in law The argument for this abuse of law is that the end justifies the means. Faced with the atrocities of the IRA and INLA the illegitimacy of the action of the security forces is blurred by public statements and pleading from the RUC, British army and British government that such counter-insurgency is justified in a warlike situation.
From the deaths of Samuel Devenney and John Gallagher in 1969 at the hands of the RUC to the shooting dead of Peter Mc Bride in Belfast by the British army in 1992, one can list some 150 direct administrative killings, many unjust killings and scores of indirect killings manipulated by the British Intelligence system.
In August 1992 the death-toll in Northern Ireland officially reached 3,000. Other compilations gave the figure as 3,022. I would regard the following killings in 1991-92 as unjust:- Colm Marks shot dead by the RUC in Downpatrick; Pete Ryan, Tony Doris and Lawrence McNally ambushed and shot dead by the SAS at Coagh, County Tyrone; Kevin McGovern shot dead by the RUC in Cookstown; Gerald Maginn shot dead by RUC in Belfast; Kevin Bany O'Donnell, Seán O'Farrell, Peter Clancy and Patrick Vincent ambushed and shot dead by the British army at Clonoe, County Tyrone; Peter Mc Bride shot dead by the British army in Belfast.
The forces of the state have been responsible for unjust killings, direct murder and indirect unjust killings and murder by collusion with loyalist paramilitaries. Mr Ed Moloney in an article in the Sunday Tribune, 9 June 1991, stated that since the 1982 killings investigated by John Stalker 67 civilians and paramilitaries had been shot dead in 'Shoot-to-Kill' operations. Twenty of these were civilians and 47 paramilitaries, of whom only two were loyalists. He wrote then:
A large proportion of the victims were unarmed when they were
killed. Twenty-six, or 39%, had no weapon when shot, while four
were carrying imitation handguns or rifles. Of the 37 who had
access to arms there were claims afterwards that nine were in
no position to use the weapons, mostly because they were on their
way to arms dumps when killed'.
After the security forces kill people they seize the initiative by gaining a first story in the media. This is very hard to counteract. For example, when the British army shot dead an innocent young man, Daniel' Rooney in Belfast in September 1972 the commanding officer said he was a gunman, that he was engaged in a shooting incident at the time he was shot, that he got his just deserts. All these assertions were untrue. Even children killed by plastic bullets have been slandered. Now there is a distinct pattern - when the British army and RUC execute armed or unarmed IRA men, when they could have arrested them, they issue statements giving unsubstantiated and lurid potted biographies recounting the notoriety of the dead men and list the number of murders attributable to the weapons found on the scene. The idea is to show that they deserved to die, to divert attention from their own violation of the law, and to intimidate churchmen and politicians from criticising their action of shooting them.
FOUR CATEGORIES OF KILLINGS
There are four categories of killings carried out by the security forces:
1. A 'bad' soldier or 'bad' policeman who kills from a motive of revenge, hatred, bigotry, racism. He can prove to be an embarrassment to the senior people in the army police and government, but because of the policy not to injure the morale of the forces the crime will be covered up and he will receive protection.
2. Murders and unjust killings by front-line regiments like the marines or paratroopers who do not relish the rôle of 'peace-keepers'. They are eager for trouble. From the beginning of their tour of duty they harass, abuse, beat and threaten civilians. The senior district policemen do not deter them. On their rota these soldiers usually assure themselves of a kill. Their harassment inevitably ends in tragedy Knowing that, the government still retains the paratroopers and marines on the rota tours of duty of British regiments in Northern Ireland. When they kill innocent civilians they are most often than not protected by the authorities.
3. Civilians executed in error by the SAS, other undercover soldiers, or the RUC when they enter an ambush. This is also an embarrassment but it is covered up.
4. Cold blooded ambushes of republican paramilitaries.
No challenge, no arrest contemplated. These murders have the official
backing of the British government. It is administrative policy.
The Gibraltar murders are an example of that. The government will
go to great pains to cover up the truth. The Prime Minister and
cabinet ministers will lie publicly
SAS DEATH SQUADS
In November 1990 I published The SAS in Ireland. It may seem a narrow focus, a fraction of the state killings, but I wanted it to be symbolic of all the state killings. The SAS is an assassination squad, like the South American death squads, and it is acting outside the law They kill persons when they have opportunities of arresting them and they are well known for shooting wounded and incapacitated persons lying helpless on the ground. Such actions are contrary to the moral law, the law of the land and the rules of war. There is no declared war in Northern Ireland between recognised insurgents and state forces. The law therefore is eminent and dominant and must be obeyed by every body including the forces of the law The SAS are not therefore justified in killing civilians or IRA members in planned ambushes.
The state perverts justice by attempting to solve its dilemma following these killings by inquests with limited powers and political decisions not to prosecute members of the security forces for murder. If for example, all the killings carried out by the SAS, and I list 45 fatal shootings in the book, are examined in a continuous account a pattern of defence on the part of the SAS at inquests emerges:- they intended to make arrests; there was a threat to life and limb; the other party 'fired first'. There are cases where forensic and medical evidence, and the evidence of witnesses, do not seem to have prevailed against the word of security forces.
The inquest system is inadequate. The Amnesty International report United Kingdom: Human Rights Concerns, June 1991, outlined its worries on the restrictions on inquests in Northern Ireland, in particular that the coroner s court cannot make the finding of an unlawful killing by a named or an unnamed person as is possible in England and Wales. The unfairness of the inquest system is outlined in a pamphlet Inquests and Disputed Killings in Northern Ireland issued by the Committee on the Administration of Justice in January 1992. Are citizens not entitled to fair institutions in matters of law?
What about the prosecution of security forces in matters of murder and unjust killing? Security forces are not subject to the same interrogation procedures as others and impartiality and persistence in cases involving police and army are in doubt. The DPP is not independent and the attorney-general is on record on restricting justice for reasons of public interest and national security. Are not political considerations and danger to morale of security forces prevailing over legal justice?
LICENSE TO KILL
The Amnesty Report of 1991 noted:
'There have been 21 prosecutions since 1969 of the security forces for using firearms while on duty in Northern Ireland (not including sectarian killings). Nineteen of these were found not guilty. One was convicted of manslaughter and given a suspended sentence. Just one - a soldier - was convicted of murder and released after serving two years and three months of his sentence and had been reinstated in the army A total of 339 people have been killed by the security forces during the same period. Most of those killed were from the Catholic population and many were unarmed; many were killed in disputed circumstances.'In the past decade 10 'joyriders' have been killed by the British army in west Belfast. On 31 July 1991 six members of the Parachute Regiment were charged with the fatal shooting of two teenagers and the wounding of a third in West Belfast in 1990. The charges followed a BBC Panorama programme on 'Shoot-to-Kill' which highlighted this shooting. It is highly unlikely that any soldier would have been charged with the murder of Fergal Caraher and the wounding of his brother on 30 December 1990 by marines if the Cullyhanna people had not organised an unofficial international inquiry to shame the British government into action.
One would like to know from those persons who run the High Court why soldiers or RUC men charged with murder or brutality have the good fortune to find such sympathetic judges. The few that are charged are acquitted in circumstances that are weird. It is almost impossible to have a British soldier convicted of murder in the courts of Northern Ireland. This is in direct contrast with the inordinate judicial revenge in the form of wholesale doubtful convictions against some forty people for the murder of two undercover British soldiers in Casement Park.
Catholics despair of getting fair treatment in human rights from the British government. Its image of keeping the peace between warlike factions is felt to be propaganda. It is beside the point when it comes to the forces of the state doing its share of unjust killing and murder. Catholics do not trust the RUC and the British army and they regard the UDR as a sectarian force. If the main motive and objective is to save human life it seems fruitless to inform the RUC who themselves pursue a 'Shoot-to-Kill' policy and allow the British army to take human life with impunity. The anger aroused in people when the security forces of the state engage in ill-treatment or killing outside the law, and then protect themselves by lies, can lead people into using violence with disastrous results for themselves and the whole community.
The government of the United Kingdom is deaf to pleas for justice
and fair play In its report of June 1991 Amnesty International
called for an independent inquiry which should look into the legislation
and regulations governing the use of lethal force, as well as
into the procedures used to investigate disputed incidents. The
government of the United Kingdom has constantly refused to do
SECTARIAN MURDER - SECRET SERVICE ROLE
In the past 20 years sectarian assassinations of Catholics have been carried out by loyalist paramilitaries and pseudo-gangs tolerated and often directed by the British secret service. The purpose of the 500 murders of the 1970s was to break the nerve and sap the morale of the Catholic population, weaken its powers of resistance and draw off support for the IRA. This included British intelligence support for the Ulster Workers' Strike in May 1974 (which brought down the power-sharing executive government in Northern Ireland), the two Dublin bombings, 1 December 1972 and 17 May 1974, and other bombings in the Irish Republic, and cross-border assassinations and kidnappings. So close has been the collusion between the state and one loyalist paramilitary group, the Ulster Defence Association, that it took twenty years to proscribe them, even though this group has murdered more than 500 innocent Catholics, men, women and children.
The Stevens inquiry was set up in 1989 to investigate the collusion of police and army with the loyalist murder gangs. Collusion, however, has gone on for twenty years. The UDA has been switched on and off as a 'third force'. The Nelson Affair gave the public a glimpse of this underground murder campaign on the part of the British secret service. The manipulation was noticeable after the murder of Airey Neave and the Brighton bombing atrocity. It continues in east Tyrone and south Derry where in the past two years 19 Catholics have been murdered and no one made amenable. At political high-points, too, when indications are that Catholics might have a share in power the loyalist gangs are switched on. The 'taking out' of Sinn Féin councillors and members is systematic. In October 1991 a combination of loyalists groups, UVF and UDA, conducted an assassination campaign which resulted in the murder of 8 Catholics. The campaign was believed to be aimed at forcing Britain to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards unionism in the pre-election period.
There are three main areas where the killing of Catholics takes place - north Belfast, south Derry/east Tyrone, and the Craigavon area extending into Lisburn. Murders of Catholics in these three areas have taken place in the past few years. Let us take the Derry/Tyrone area as an example. Since January 1989 21 Catholics have been murdered there by loyalist paramilitaries and security forces. The UDA under its cover name UFF shot dead Danny Cassidy a Sinn Féin election worker on 2 April 1992. He was hit seven times in the day time. His widow claimed that he had been constantly harassed by the DMSU - the District Mobile Support Unit of the RUC. At his funeral Mass Bishop Edward Daly said that a factor in his killing was the 'undue attention paid to him by some units of police'. The bishop told the congregation that Mr Cassidy had suffered constant cruel and public harassment from some members of the RUC. 'In a society such as ours,' he said, 'with more than its share of sectarian murders, it is unjust, irresponsible and wrong for police officers to pick out and highlight individuals in this public manner, thus putting their lives in mortal danger. This activity is wrong and unjust and it must stop.' Bishop Daly said that a week before Danny Cassidy was murdered a complaint was made by a local representative to a senior RUC officer about the way he was mistreated.
Prosecutions for these crimes are nil. There have been few arrests. Only one person has been prosecuted for indirect involvement This must be the worst record for any police force in the world. Catholics believe there is collusion between the RUC, the UDR and the loyalist paramilitaries. They come from the same background and are politically hostile to nationalists. The feeling of the people of south Derry is stronger than the words of Bishop Daly. They think that the RUC through collusion were responsible for Danny Cassidy's murder.
The same pattern occurs in many of these killings. There is a presence of security forces before the shooting, then they disappear, the loyalist gunmen carry out the shooting, the UDR appear on the roads laughing and mock and harass Catholics. The RUC in most cases do not inform the relatives of the shooting or they do so in a cruel callous manner (like a phone call to Mrs McGovern in the early hours of the morning - 'Your son is in the morgue'). They rarely take statements from the relatives as to recent events in the life of the deceased and his movements on the day of the shooting. It is almost impossible for relatives to have an interview with the investigating detectives.
Here is a list of the Derry/Tyrone killings of Catholics since January 1989. Unless otherwise stated these killings were carried out by the UVF:
14 February 1989. John Joe Davey Sinn Féin Councillor. Car ambushed near home.
29 November 1989. Liam Ryan and Michael Devlin. Shot dead in public house, Ardboe.
26 October 1990. Tommy Casey Member of Sinn Féin. Shot dead at house, Cookstown.
3 March 1991. John Quinn, Dwayne O'Donnell, Malcolm Nugent, Thomas Armstrong. Shot outside pub in Cappagh.
3 June 1991. Three IRA men, Pete Ryan, Tony Doris, Lawrence McNally ambushed by SM at Coagh.
12 August 1991. Padraig O Seanacháin. Member of Sinn Féin. Van ambushed.
16 August 1991. Thomas Donaghy Kilrea. Shot outside work.
16 September 1991. Bernard O'Hagan. Member of Sinn Féin. Shot outside work at Magherafelt.
29 September 1991. Kevin McGovern shot by RUC in Cookstown.
25 October 1991. Seán Anderson shot outside his home in Pomeroy
3 January 1992. Kevin McKeamey shot dead in the family butcher shop, Moy His uncle Jack McKearney wounded in the shooting died some months later.
6 September 1992 Charlie and Theresa Fox were shot dead near the
In revenge for loyalist killings in this area and in the absence of RUC detection of the killers the IRA on 17 January 1992 murdered by a landmine seven Protestant workers at Teebane near Cookstown with the 'excuse' that they worked for the security forces - William Bleeks, David Harkness, James Caldwell, Robert Dunseith, John McConnell, Nigel McKee, Robert Irons. An eighth man - Oswald Gilchrist died on 21 January 1992 from injuries. There was a further repercussion to this slaughter when the UDA murdered five Catholics in a betting shop in Belfast on 5 February 1992 - James Kennedy Peter Magee, Christy Doherty, William McManus, Jack Duffin.
As regards the shooting dead of Thomas Donaghy on 16 August 1991 as he arrived for work at Portna Eel Fishery, an area covered by the Ballymoney UDR, there is some background information which leads relatives and friends to suspect collusion. Thomas Donaghy was an ex-prisoner who left the IRA several years before his release from prison and did not become re-involved. The RUC harassed and tormented him non-stop from the three years from his release to his death.
In the same area Gerry Casey was shot dead in his home on 4 April 1989 by a gang who smashed in his door minutes after he went to bed. The police had already drawn a plan of the bedrooms of his house on a previous raid. His murder came only weeks after two men with a sledge-hammer were stopped at a checkpoint on their way to kill a Dunloy man a few miles from where the Caseys lived. In the same area of Kilrea, John O'Kane survived a booby-trap attempt on his life, 5 March 1988; another man with him, Stephen Kennedy received head and eye injuries. The UDR had been in the vicinity on the previous night. There was a second booby trap attempt on O'Kane's life the following year 1989. A similar type of booby trap was used when a man was injured in an explosion at Kilrea GAA Club Rooms. Other ex-prisoners in this area are constantly harassed by the RUC, particularly by the District Mobile Support Unit. The RUC have told some of these men that their files are missing from Antrim RUC station.
I would suggest that international human rights organisations, besides carrying out post factum investigations and reports, should set up a 'Red Adair' type emergency team of lawyers, forensic experts, photographers, engineers, and doctors to fly immediately to the aid of families after they have a member shot dead by the security forces. Vital information may be lost through a cover-up. One no longer has full confidence in forensic evidence gathered by the authorities. It is important that the families have independent autopsies and that as much evidence as possible is gathered in statements from witnesses. Photography and mapping are also important. The legal experts should then attend the inquests and trials that may emerge. Those who dare to challenge the British authorities, such as solicitors, also are in danger of assassination. On 17 January 1989, Douglas Hogg, a junior government Home Office minister stated in Westminster that 'there are in Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA'. This statement was interpreted as a warning to solicitors not to contest too vigorously cases against British government institutions. Three weeks later, as though to underline this point, Pat Finucane, one of the leading human rights' lawyers in Northern Ireland, who had been particularly active in a number of the cases investigated by John Stalker, was murdered by the UDA in front of his family
Amnesty International in its recent report focuses on this murder:
'A year before his death Amnesty International had heard from a former detainee that during interrogation at Castlereagh the police had said his lawyer, Pat Finucane, would be killed ... Loyalist sources claimed that prior to the killing UDA members detained at Castlereagh had been told by detectives that Mr Finucane and a few other solicitors were IRA members and implied that they should be shot. Although some of them were later arrested by the Stevens team, apparently none of them were questioned about these allegations. Furthermore it was reported that Brian Nelson, the alleged (British) army and UDA intelligence officer questioned by the inquiry, knew that Patrick Finucane would be shot, and indeed had been involved in providing intelligence which led to the lawyer's killing'.All the information that has been disclosed about Pat Finucane's murder would suggest that the decision to kill him was taken by British Intelligence agents. It is clear that the use of UDA death squads has and is being employed by the British authorities for their own sinister purposes.
One welcomes the recent proscribing of the UDA.
The present inquest system in the north of Ireland is inadequate. It is not a large demand to ask for instant reform. It would show some goodwill on the part of the British government in the matter of law and justice. Bereaved relatives are denied elementary standards of justice.
The DPP should give reasons for decisions not to prosecute in cases involving the security forces. He should be answerable to the citizens of the state.
Fewer than 8% of the large RUC force is Catholic. The police force needs restructuring to include nationalists and republicans who are strong elements in the society of Northern Ireland. One suspects that the violation of human rights on the part of the state is linked to this scandalous situation.
One would like an official explanation of 'detention in military custody' which is practised when soldiers are remanded pending trial.
Submission to Initiative '92 and the Opsahl Commission. An
abbreviated form was published by Relatives for Justice in 1991.
On 23 January 19971 submitted a report on human rights in Northern
Ireland to Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman, House Committee on International
Relations, United States House of Representatives, Washington,
DC. In the report I included two examples of unjust killings to
illustrate the violation of the right to life. The shooting of
a civilian, Aidan McAnespie, on 21 February 1988, when walking
by a British army post at Aughnacloy, County Tyrone, is here related
by his sister, Eilish. I give an account of the Gibraltar shootings
of unarmed IRA members by the SAS on 6 March 1988. It is written
by Niall Farrell, the brother of Mairéad, one of the victims.
He is secretary of Relatives for Justice.
THE SHOOTING OF AIDAN McANESPIE
It is of paramount importance that the killing of my brother, Aidan McAnespie, on 21 February 1988, is not viewed as an isolated incident but rather as the result of systematic and routine victimisation for several years by British crown forces. These include members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Ulster Defence Regiment and the British army
My brother, Aidan McAnespie, was the youngest of a family of six children. He was born in Aughnacloy, a predominantly loyalist village on the border with the Republic of Ireland. The area historically had a high unemployment rate, that is, for those nationalists living there. As a consequence, Aidan looked for work across the border and was fortunate enough to get a job in a poultry processing plant in Monaghan town, in the Republic of Ireland, some ten miles south of Aughnacloy To go to work each day, Aidan had to pass through a permanent British army checkpoint at the southern side of the village. As a result, the security forces became familiar with him and often asked him to remove his car from the road for what was termed a 'routine search'. They would then take the car apart, removing door panels and wheels. They would also search through his lunch with their bare hands saying, You'll be late for work today Aidan'. Aidan made complaints to his trade union about these incidents and they made representations on his behalf, but the harassment continued unabated. On other occasions they would ask him to remove his coat, shoes and socks in the rain. When he refused, they would put him on the ground and one soldier stood on his throat while another pulled off his shoes and socks. Aidan made complaints to the local RUC station.
It was not unusual for Aidan to be taken into the British army base for a vehicle search two or three times a week and the car pulled apart. The harassment got so bad that he stopped driving through the checkpoint; instead he would drive to the filling station just south of the checkpoint and would phone my mother. She would then cycle down through the town and out past the checkpoint and walk back through with Aidan. On one occasion a soldier shouted after them, Are you trying to protect your son Mrs McAnespie?'
Aidan contacted newspapers seeking the protection that publicity might have given him and one national newspaper carried a story describing him as the most harassed person in Ireland. He could have wallpapered his room with official complaints made to the RUC both through solicitors and the local parish priest. Aidan's life revolved around the continual threat of harassment and physical violence at best and the real threat of being killed at worst. A soldier stopped my father a year before the shooting and asked, Are you Aidan's father?' When he said he was the soldier said, We have a bullet here for him'.
On 21 February 1988, Aidan parked his car at the northern side of the checkpoint and walked towards the local GAA pitch, which was just south of the checkpoint. He had only walked three hundred yards when a single bullet from a heavy calibre machine-gun cut him down, in the prime of his life, on a lovely sunny afternoon, while on his way to a Gaelic football match. Aidan's life was taken, his killer watched him walk towards the football pitch, aimed and fired to kill. This is the view of our family and many community and church leaders. The then Primate of All Ireland, Cardinal Tomas Ó Fiaich, described the killing as murder.
In stark contrast the British army described the incident as a tragic accident. They claimed, firstly that the gun used was being passed from one soldier to another when it was accidentally discharged. This account later changed to one of accidental discharge when the gun was in the process of being cleaned. Because the Northern Ireland office's statement of what happened supported this version, all subsequent investigations carried out by the RUC were mobilised to support this explanation of events. In actual fact, the security force explanation was so incredible that they had to create evidence to support their claim. For example, eye-witnesses saw a man coming out of a sanger from which Aidan was shot, wearing casual clothes and sports shoes. The next day the British army had a number of their people painting the checkpoint dressed in casual clothing. Aidan's car was parked close to the checkpoint in a nationalist housing estate. On the day of the funeral eye-witnesses saw a man remove it. Our family phoned the local RUC station to report it missing. They said they knew nothing about it but to try CID (Criminal Investigation Department) in Dungannon. CID in Dungannon were not aware of the missing car. We then phoned the local police to report the stolen car. The press got to hear about the missing car and shortly after speaking to the local police, a local journalist could tell the family that the car was removed by police for its safety. It seems incredible that of all the cars parked in the housing estate this was the only car in some kind of danger.
In addition, the army claimed, that due to the accidental discharge of the weapon, three shots were fired, one of which ricocheted off the road hitting Aidan. Local people living nearby say the army reconstructed this account of things when, as darkness fell, a flashing light was placed at the spot where Aidan was shot and three shots were heard fired. It is widely believed that the army fired the shots to mark the road to support their ricochet theory. When challenged by the press, the army claimed that they came under fire from terrorists, a claim denied by the IRA and local people nearby who say no attack of any kind took place.
A soldier, David J. Holden, was charged with unlawful killing. While on this charge he was allowed to go home to his family in England. Approximately six months later all charges were dropped.
At Aidan's inquest, the coroner, Roger McLernon, said the death was a cause of 'profound regret' and 'was avoidable and should have been avoided'. The RUC stated at the inquest, and it was repeated by the coroner, that there was no suggestion that Aidan had ever been involved in any form of illegal activity Guardsman Holden was not compelled to attend the inquest. The coroner advised the jury that, although the soldier was entitled under law not to attend, his unsworn statement should be treated with caution. The only other soldier in the sanger when the fatal shot was fired was conveniently absent without leave for the six months previous to the inquest. The coroner said this was 'amazing' and of 'profound concern.
Our family was not present at this inquest because we had no faith in its ability to discover the truth. We have a series of unanswered questions: Why did the gun that killed Aidan have 'a live round in its breach while being cleaned'? Why was it cocked? Why was the safety catch off? How could David Holden's hands still be slippery and wet ten minutes after he finished washing sanger walls? Is it possible to accidentally exert nine pounds of pressure on a weapon's trigger, pulling it backwards and upwards? Why was Holden out of uniform, wearing what appeared to be a track suit when he left the sanger under police escort after the shooting? How could the Northern Ireland Office release a definitive statement of the shooting less than an hour after it had taken place? Was this a rigorous investigation?
It must be remembered that this is in no way the only incident of its type. The SAS, the British army and the RUC have been involved in the killing of many nationalists in controversial circumstances. On the day of Aidan's funeral the only serving member of the British army, Private Ian Thain, convicted for the murder of an Irish person, Kidso Reilly, was set free after serving just over two years of a life sentence. He returned to active service (in fact he was never discharged from the British army). Holden was subsequently released and was charged before a military tribunal with not taking proper care of a weapon and was disciplined. He was later discharged on medical grounds and is a free man.
THE GIBRALTAR MURDERS
On 6 March 1988 Mairéad Farrell, Dan McCann and Seán Savage were shot dead in Gibraltar by members of the British army's elite regiment, the SAS. While all three were members of the IRA they were all unarmed and could have been arrested. Indeed, independent witnesses stated that Mairéad, who was shot eight times, and Dan, shot five times, had their hands up in surrender when shot. Witnesses to Seán's killing - he was shot sixteen times - said he was given no chance to surrender and was shot as he lay on the ground. In all three instances the scientific evidence pointed to the fact that all three were finished off on the ground.
These killings had all the hallmarks of other Shoot-to-Kill deaths carried out by the British security forces in Northern Ireland. The families of the dead decided to challenge these killings through the courts. Justice was not forthcoming through the British legal system, so seven long years later their case was heard by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France.
The court in a landmark decision found that Mairéad Farrell, Dan McCann and Seán Savage had been unlawfully killed, that the British government was guilty of having breached Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights, the Right to Life. In its judgement the court stated that the actions of the authorities lacked 'the degree of caution in the use of fireanns to be expected from law enforcement personnel in a democratic society'.
The British government responded angrily to the verdict. The Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Michael Heseltine stated: 'If we were faced with similar circumstances as those in Gibraltar, I have not the slightest doubt the same decisions would be taken again'.
There is an eerie postscript to this case. Exactly a year later
a young Irishman, Diarmuid O'Neill, was shot dead by the British
security forces in a house in London. He too was unarmed and the
authorities employed the same excuses for his death as they did
when they murdered the three in Gibraltar. Within Relatives For
Justice we firmly believe that the British government carried
out the O'Neill killing with pre-meditation, as a bloody act of
defiance against the highest human rights court in Europe, the
European Court of Human Rights.
THE GIBRALTAR KILLINGS
On Sunday the sixth of March 1988 at 3.41pm my sister Mairéad Farrell and a companion Dan McCann were shot dead in Gibraltar. Seconds later, Seán Savage who was approximately 100 metres behind them was also gunned down. The killings were carried out by members of the British army's elite regiment, the SAS.
While all three were on active service for the IRA at the time of their deaths they were, however, all unarmed. They were in Gibraltar planning an attack against British army personnel. Since November of the previous year, both the British and Spanish authorities had been aware that such an attack was being planned. And on 6 March the three had been closely followed by the Spanish police as they travelled in two separate vehicles to Gibraltar from Marbella.
The Spanish police have stated since the killings that they informed
their British counterparts that all three were unarmed and were
not in possession of any explosive devices. It is worth noting
that the day following the killings the British government in
parliament thanked the Spanish for their co-operation.
THE ACTUAL KILLINGS
At 12.30pm Seán Savage drove into Gibraltar in a white Renault 5 car. Indeed, he entered the colony using a passport in the name of Coyne, which was known to the authorities. He parked the car in a parking area where on the following Tuesday a British army band was to assemble. He did all this under the watchful eye of the British military.
My sister and Dan McCann crossed the border at 2.30pm and met Seán Savage near the parked car. They then set out to return to Spain with Dan McCann and Mairéad walking together. Seán Savage, who was following behind them, turned at a road junction and walked back again in the direction of the town centre, away from the border.
As the pair passed a petrol station a police siren sounded and they turned to see at least two armed SAS soldiers in plain clothes approach them. According to one of the principal independent witnesses, Carmen Proetta, who lives in a flat overlooking the garage, both Dan and Mairéad raised their hands in surrender. Despite that the soldiers opened fired.
Carmen Proetta was discovered not by the police but by a researcher working for Thames Television which was making a programme on the shootings entitled Death on the Rock. The researcher believed Ms Proetta's evidence because it coincided with another account she had received from a person who did not wish to come forward publicly
Ms Proetta told Thames television, 'They [security forces] didn't do anything ... they just went and shot these people. That's all. They didn't say anything, they didn't scream, they didn't shout, they didn't do anything. These people were turning their heads back to see what was happening, and when they saw these men had guns in their hands they put their hands up. It looked like the man was protecting the girl because he stood in front of her, but there was no chance. I mean they went to the floor immediately, they dropped'.
Another independent witness Stephen Bullock who was 150 yards from the shooting saw Dan McCann falling backwards with his hands at shoulder height. The gunman was about four feet away At the inquest into the killings Mr Bullock, a lawyer by profession, stated, 'I think with one step he could have actually touched the person he was shooting'.
Both Carmen Proetta and Stephen Bullock gave further evidence, along with a third witness Josie Celecia, whose flat faces the petrol station, that the soldiers fired on Dan McCann and my sister as they lay on the ground.
The scientific evidence presented by the pathologist Professor Alan Watson at the inquest corroborated this evidence. Mairéad had been killed by three bullets fired into her back - at a distance of a few feet according to the forensic evidence - all of the wounds were within two and a half inches of each other. The upward trajectory of the bullets meant that the gunman was either kneeling and shooting upwards or that my sister was on the ground or close to it when these shots were fired. These three shots were the fatal ones. Mairéad had died from gunshot wounds to the heart and liver. She had also head wounds, but these were superficial. Professor Watson believed she had first been shot in the face and then in the back. In other words, even after initially shooting Mairéad in the face she was still alive and could have been arrested. In total she was shot eight times.
The pathologist further believed that Dan McCann had been first
shot in the jaw. This had stunned him and then the lethal shots
'when he was down or very far down' were fired. Dan had two entry
bullet wounds in his back which were again close together. The
trajectory of the bullets were also upward. He had an entry bullet
wound at the top left back of his head, which also strongly suggests
he was on the ground when this shot was fired.
THE KILLING OF SEÁN SAVAGE
At the time Mairéad and Dan were shot Seán Savage was walking in the opposite direction towards the town centre. He was being followed by two members of the SAS (referred to as Soldiers C and D at the inquest) who said they were only five or six feet behind Seán when the shots that killed Mairéad and Dan rang out. According to the soldiers Seán spun round at this point and one of the soldiers claimed to shout a warning and then proceeded to open fire; the second soldier then followed suit.
There were three independent witnesses to this shooting. Diana Treacy told the inquest that she saw two men running towards her. After she was passed by the first one, who was Seán Savage, the second man who had a gun opened fire. She saw this same gunman fire up to five shots into Seán as he lay on the ground.
Another independent witness was a British holiday-maker, Mr Robyn Mordue. In the commotion of the shooting he was knocked to the ground when a woman on a bicycle collided with him. He thought there was a madman on the rampage, as he saw a man who had been walking towards him being shot again and again. He got up and ran behind a car where he was sick. He then looked back at the death scene, but what he saw is not clear. Mr Mordue was a very nervous witness. He had reason to be nervous. Before the inquest his identity was only known by the authorities. Nevertheless, in the weeks leading up to the inquest he received a number of threatening phone calls, 'Bastard stay away'. Mr Mordue's telephone number is ex-directory.
Kenneth Asquez was the third witness to this killing. He had alleged in two statements - one hand-written and the other before a lawyer but all unsigned in order to hide his identity - to Thames television that he saw a man with his foot on Seán Savage's chest, firing at him at point blank range. Up until the inquest he had remained anonymous, but he decided to retract this statement. However, Asquez's retraction must be treated with scepticism. As the handwritten statement said, the man with his foot on Seán 's chest was wearing a black beret and the shooting was prefaced by the shout 'Stop, it's okay it's the police.' In fact, one of the soldiers who shot Seán had donned a black beret and the shooting had been prefaced with these words. But until the inquest these two facts had not been publicised. At the inquest many observers believed that Kenneth Asquez had also been put under pressure by those who feared the truth. Mr Asquez must surely have feared being vilified by the British gutter press the same way Carmen Proetta had been for telling exactly what she saw In fact, the Windlesham/Rampton Report records that 'local people were afraid to speak about what they might have seen' to Thames television researchers and that was before Carmen Proetta was slandered.
The scientific evidence produced by Professor Watson was damning.
Seán had twenty-nine wounds in what the pathologist described
as 'a frenzied attack'. He believed that between 16 and 18 bullets
had hit Seán. He had seven head wounds, five of them were
presumed to be entry wounds. Our lawyer, Mr Paddy McGrory, showed
Professor Watson at the inquest a photograph taken by the police
of four circled strike marks within the outline of Seán's
head. This was the first time the pathologist had seen this photograph.
He was asked by our lawyer whether it seemed as though these four
shots had been fired into Seán's head as he lay on the
ground. Professor Watson replied: Yes, that would be reasonable.'
THE ROLE OF THE POLICE
The role of the police in investigating these three killings must be questioned. In the case of witnesses to Seán Savage's death the inquest was told that there were some thirty people who saw the shooting. However, there were only three independent witnesses found and two of them were discovered by the media. The same was true for witnesses to the shooting of my sister and Dan McCann. The police failed, for example, to set up the customary incidents' centres in the vicinity of the killings.
There is in police methodology a universal principle known as the preservation of the scene of the crime. It was applied sparingly in Gibraltar on that day Within minutes of the killings, the police had ensured that it would be extremely difficult to reconstruct the killings. Spent cartridges were collected without first marking where they had been found. The bodies were removed without first photographing them in situ. The bodies of Mairéad and Dan McCann were not chalked around. The killers were not interviewed by the police until two weeks afterwards.
Normal police practice was disregarded just as it was in 1982 when six unarmed civilians were killed in County Armagh, Northern Ireland by an SAS-trained RUC team. There the police, too, failed to preserve the scenes of the shootings. As a result valuable evidence was tampered with and lost. Also the RUC,just like their Gibraltar counterparts, were recalcitrant in the search for eye-witnesses; they too failed to set up the customary incidents' centres in the vicinity of the killings. The similarities between these killings would suggest a set plan for the execution of unarmed dissidents.
In the Gibraltar case the positive obstruction of the establishment of the facts concerning the shootings continued. The pathologist, Professor Watson, was not given the normal co-operation. The hospital had an X-ray machine, which he would need to trace the track of the bullets through the bodies, but it was not put at his disposal. The clothing had already been removed; torn fabric can help determine entry and exit wounds, while the spread of blood stains could indicate whether the three were upright or prone when they were shot. The photographs taken in the morgue were inadequate, the police photographer not being under Professor Watson's supervision at the time.
He was not supplied with surgical assistance. Subsequently he was not given any copies of the ballistic and forensic reports, nor the reports on the blood samples he had submitted in London on his return to Britain. The systematic disruption of routine procedures parallels exactly the persistent refusal to arrest the three suspects at numerous opportunities.
The forensic scientist, David Pryor of the London Metropolitan Police, had also been hampered in his work. The blood soaked clothes had been sent to him in bags. 'The clothing was in such a condition when I received it,' said Pryor, 'that accurate determination of which was an entry site and which an exit was very difficult.'
Another peculiar feature was the fact that the evidence of the
pathologist and the forensic scientist, although complementary,
did not directly follow one another at the inquest. Instead, Professor
Watson testified on 8 September 1988 and Mr Pryor on 27 September,
with the result that the significance of the combined evidence
was deliberately blurred. What Pryor's evidence did make clear
is that the powder marks found on Mairéad's jacket and
Seán Savage's shirt indicated the gun that killed Mairéad
was fired at her from a distance of three feet, and the gun fired
at Seán's chest was at a distance of four to six feet.
In other words, the obvious question arising from the scientific
evidence, too, was: why were these three unarmed people not arrested
rather than killed?
THE BRITISH VERSION
By the time the inquest was held, six months after the killings, the British government had prepared what they saw as a credible story. Despite having publicly praised in the House of Commons the role of the Spanish police in the surveillance of the three, the British authorities began to claim that the Spanish had in fact lost track of the three on 6 March 1988 and that their appearance in Gibraltar took the British security forces by surprise. The British authorities believed, the story goes, that the Renault 5 driven into Gibraltar by Seán Savage - supposedly unnoticed - was packed with explosives. On top of that, the security forces were convinced that the bomb was to be detonated by remote control. The soldiers in their testimony claimed that the movements of the three seemed to indicate that they were about to use a 'button job', as they described it in tabloid-speak, and therefore had to be shot to death.
To back up the claim that the Spanish police had lost the three the Gibraltar police tried to present a copy of an alleged statement from a Spanish police inspector, Rayo Valenzuela, supporting this line. Our lawyer objected to its admissibility as the police inspector, who supposedly made it, would not be attending the inquest and therefore would not be available for cross-examination. It now transpires that this document is totally fraudulent. Not only was the statement unsworn, but the English translation delivered to the coroner was even unsigned.
However, a sworn statement does exist and was sent to the Gibraltar authorities. On 11 April 1990 the Spanish Minister of the Interior told the Spanish Senate that a Spanish police officer made a statement for the inquest, which was sworn before a judge. This statement was never presented to the inquest.
Any attempt by our solicitor, Paddy McGrory, to probe into the surveillance operation was made impossible with the issuing of a Public Interest Immunity Certificate by the British government. Nevertheless, this aspect of the official story was exposed when the head of Gibraltar's Special Branch, Detective Chief Inspector Joseph Ullger, gave evidence. He admitted that the authorities had deliberately allowed the three to enter Gibraltar in order to gather evidence for a subsequent trial. It also became apparent that on 6 March a member of the Gibraltar police was present on the Spanish side of passport control with the aliases and passport numbers of the three. So when Seán Savage crossed the border using the known pseudonym in the name of Coyne he was immediately identifiable.
The British gave no real evidence to back-up their claim that the notional bomb in the white Renault would be detonated by remote control. The only fact presented by Mr O, a senior British intelligence officer, was that an alleged IRA arms cache had been uncovered in Belgium and it had contained a remote control device. This had supposedly led the authorities to believe that the Gibraltar bomb would also be detonated in such a way This has since been shown to have been a lie, because what made the Belgian police believe they had discovered an IRA cache was the fact that the devices for detonating the semtex were not of a remote control variety The remote control detonating theory totally contradicted what 'official sources' told the BBC on the evening of Sunday 6 March 1988, which referred to a bomb that was 'timed' to kill British army bandsmen on the Tuesday The following day the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Mr Ian Stewart, repeated this point on the BBC's Today programme.
The other argument put forward by Mr O to explain the flawed remote control theory was that the IRA by employing this device wanted to ensure that there was not a repeat of the Enniskillen bombing in which many civilians were killed. This argument contradicts the view instilled into the SAS soldiers who carried out the killings. They told the inquest that the three at all costs had to be prevented from using the remote control detonator. If the IRA did not want to incur civilian casualties why would they detonate this notional bomb in the Renault 5 car on a Sunday afternoon when only civilians would be injured? Besides, it was scientifically proven at the inquest that the three could never have detonated any bomb supposedly in the Renault from where they were killed. If the authorities were so certain that there was a bomb in the car, why then did it take them several hours to make the area 'safe'? The probable answer to this question is that they simply did not think there was a bomb at all. Soldier G at the inquest testified that he thought there was a bomb in the car. Further information supplied by the British press since the inquest suggests he was accompanied on that day by two better qualified personnel who disagreed with his opinion. Their presence was concealed from the inquest. This suggestion has never been discounted by the authorities.
Nevertheless, according to the four killers, these three people,
who were unarmed and did not have a bomb or possess any detonating
devices, made threatening movements when they were approached
by armed men. Why should they do such a foolish thing? The true
answer to this question is that they didn't make any threatening
movements. This was revealed to Roger Boulton, the editor of the
Thames television programme Death on the Rock, by a senior
Conservative politician who said: 'Of course there was a Shoot-to-Kill
policy in Gibraltar just as we had in the Far East and in Aden'.
In the days immediately following the killings, as we waited for the remains of our loved ones to be brought home, the families had to endure considerable harassment and intimidation from the RUC. For example, on 8 March I was spotted by the police leaving my parents' home by car with my sister's boyfriend. For no reason other than to insult us the RUC stopped my car and began to make obscene sexual remarks about Mairéad. All the other families were to experience similar harassment throughout this period and, in fact, the McCann family continue to this day to be harassed.
The McCanns own a butcher's shop on Belfast's Falls Road and British soldiers regularly shout obscene remarks in at the parents. Dan's brother almost on a daily basis is stopped and abused by British soldiers while escorting his child to school.
But in the days leading up to the funeral the families were visited by an RUC officer who threatened us with dire consequences if we fulfilled the wishes of our loved ones to be buried as members of the IRA.
The remains of Mairéad, Seán and Dan were flown from Gibraltar to Dublin and from there they were to be brought by road to Belfast. From the moment we crossed the border into Northern Ireland the remains were literally kidnapped by the RUC. As we followed behind the RUC jeeps, it was noticeable how they deliberately slowed down when we passed hostile crowds making us easy targets for missiles. When we reached the Ml, some ten miles from Belfast, an RUC road-block prevented the relatives from following the cortège. The remains of the three were not brought to their homes until much later.
After approximately 30 minutes, the relatives who were in three cars were allowed to proceed onto the motorway while the other mourners were made to take another route. On the motorway, we were stopped by the RUC again and held for at least two hours. Many of the relatives were subjected to considerable abuse. Two aunts had accompanied me to meet the remains in Dublin and they stated afterwards that this period, stuck on the Ml surrounded by hundreds of RUC men, was without doubt the most frightening experience of the aftermath, including the gun and grenade attack on the actual funeral.
The actions of the RUC throughout this whole period underlined time and again how sectarian a force it is. It exposed the nonsense of the Dublin government who considered it a breakthrough when they got the assurance of the British authorities that RUC men would accompany the Ulster Defence Regiment, another sectarian body, when on patrol.
Once the remains arrived home only the McCann's household was subject to intense harassment. Their home was literally surrounded back, front and side by British army saracens. Only on the morning of the funeral, 16 March, did they withdraw.
Quite unusual for the funeral of IRA members there was no British army or RUC presence, despite the fact that the families had been threatened with a repeat of what happened at Lawrence Marley's funeral when the RUC saturated the area and had refused to allow the remains to leave the Marley home until the Irish tricolour was removed from the coffin.
Many believe that the absence of the police and the attack carried
out by a grenade-wielding gunman in the cemetery was no coincidence.
In this attack three mourners were murdered. The killer made his
retreat towards the motorway, which runs beside the cemetery.
Parked on the motorway was a Ford transit van, and it seemed
as though this was the killer's accomplices waiting to help make
good his escape. When the killer was overpowered near the motorway
the van quickly left the scene. It was claimed later that this
was an undercover RUC van. A number of questions arise: why didn't
they intervene to halt the slaughter of mourners and how did the
sectarian killer know that there would not be the usual police
presence? Many believe that there was direct collusion between
the so-called security forces and this murderer.
Five independent civil liberty organisations, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Inquest, the National Council for Civil Liberties (London), the International League for Human Rights (New York) and Amnesty International - all of which had observers at the inquest - have criticised many aspects of the proceedings and have called for further inquiries into the killings in Gibraltar.
The Amnesty International report stated that the inquest failed to answer 'the fundamental issue ... whether the fatal shootings were caused by what happened in the street, or whether the authorities planned in advance for the three to be shot dead' 
The inquiry by its very nature was not equipped to determine the truth. The British authorities, which might have had an interest in concealing aspects of the truth, had access prior to the inquest and during it to identities of witnesses, their statements or possible statements and were to some extent able, on grounds of availability, to dictate the order of calling some witnesses.
In contrast, our legal advisers had virtually no information except one ballistics' report and a pathologist's report.
Amnesty International in its report expressed its concern 'that the legal representatives of the deceased's families were significantly and unfairly disadvantaged in comparison with the representatives for the other interested parties. The system is inherently weighted against the deceased's families in preparing for cross-examination'. Our lawyer, Mr Paddy McGrory, received the other forensic reports after the inquest began. He did not receive any of the witnesses' statements in advance, and even during the inquest he did not receive the statements made by security force personnel shortly after the incident. Without access to these statements in advance he was not able to cross-examine witnesses on the basis of what other witnesses, who testified at a later stage, said about the same incident. Thus, for example, he was not able to question the soldiers, who testified in the second week of the inquest, about information which was presented in later weeks by police officers and civilian eye-witnesses. He also did not have witnesses' earlier statements to compare with their court testimony.
Our lawyer faced numerous obstacles including for example the price of the court's daily transcripts being increased from 50p to £5 per page. Because the price was so prohibitive our lawyer could not avail of them - not so the British Ministry of Defence.
The use by the British government of Public Immunity Certificates prevented Mr McGrory, our lawyer, inquiring into many matters such as the planning of the operation, including the role of the 'accessories before the fact'.
Finally there was the coroner's summing up of the evidence the jury, in which he told them to avoid an open verdict. By doing this he unduly influenced these eleven men. This is especially true as after six hours of discussion the jury was deadlocked, divided 7 to 4 in favour of a 'lawful killing' verdict. In normal circumstances an open verdict would have been a likely compromise, but this had been ruled out. The coroner then recalled the jury and gave them what seemed like an ultimatum to return a verdict. Two hours later they returned stating that they found, by 9 to 2 - the smallest majority allowed - the killings lawful.
Despite all the disadvantages faced by our solicitor, Paddy McGrory,
a man with lifelong experience as a lawyer, he firmly believed
that the verdict went against the weight of the evidence, that
it was a perverse verdict'.
SEVEN YEAR QUEST FOR JUSTICE
The United Kingdom government insisted that the Gibraltar Inquest, despite its fundamental flaws, was the final word on these controversial killings. It consistently thwarted through the use of Public Interest Immunity Certificates any attempt by our families to have our case examined in the Northern Ireland courts.
Eventually we brought our case first to the European Commission of Human Rights and then in February 1995 to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. On 27 September 1995 - seven years and six months after the actual killings - the court found the British government guilty of having unlawfully killed our loved ones. It was a landmark decision, it being the first time that a signatory to the European Convention of Human Rights was found guilty of breaching Article 2 of the Convention, the Right to Life.
The British government said it would 'ignore' the verdict. The Deputy Prime Minister went as far as to say that the government would do the same again. Almost exactly a year after the verdict a young Irishman, Diarmuid O'Neill, was shot dead in very similar circumstances in a house in London.
The stance of the British government must be viewed as quite unacceptable. If Britain continues to refuse to operate within the constraints of law, both national and international, if it continues to refuse to meet its specific obligations with regard to the 'right to life' under the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, then it must be ostracised and no longer treated as being part of the democratic family of nations.
|1||European Court of Human Rights, Judgement, paragraph 212, Strasbourg, France, 27 September 1995.|
|2||The Guardian, 28 September 1995.|
|3||The Windlesham/Rampton Report on Death on the Rock, p. 92, paragraph 85, Faber & Faber, London 1989.|
|4||Op. cit., p.53.|
|5||Op. cit., p. 55.|
|6||Op. cit., p. 92, paragraph 86.|
|7||Roger Boulton, Death on the Rock and Other Stories, p. 305, W H. Allen Optomen, London, 1990.|
|8||United Kingdom: Investigating Lethal Shootings: The Gibraltar Inquest: Summary, p. iii. Amnesty International, April 1989.|
This is an extract from the pamphiet Collusion 1990-1994: Loyalist Paramilitary Murders in North of Ireland published by Relatives for Justice, 1995. It lists murders committed by loyalist paramilitaries 1990-1994 and specifies those caused by South African weaponry.
For twenty-five years the counter-insurgency methods of the British government in Northern Ireland has involved a Shoot-to-Kill policy, in direct ambushes when both innocent victims and suspects have been shot dead without warning, and in a sinister indirect campaign of murder which involves manipulation of loyalist paramilitaries who are provided with security information and who then kill with the knowledge that they are free from prosecution. This policy is pursued by small groups of RUC personnel and British army and the secret intelligence network of MI5 and MI6. A section of the Northern Ireland administration is aware of this policy, protects it by withholding information, insincere cosmetic investigation, non-prosecution and curbing of inquests. The families and friends of the victims not only suffer the insult of cover-up and lies but they often become targets for harassment and abuse from the British army and the RUC. They seek redress in publicising the truth to the world and will not cease to bring their grievances before governments and international human rights' bodies.
This Shoot-to-Kill policy has already been outlined in The SAS in Ireland 1969-1989 (Raymond Murray) and in a pamphlet entitled State Killings (Raymond Murray) published by Relatives for Justice. The policy became a virtual campaign in the 1980s.
From the time of Sam Marshall's death in Lurgan on 7 March 1990 until John O'Hanlon's death on 1 September 1994, loyalist paramilitaries have killed 185 people (3 others not in these figures were killed by an RUC member in a Sinn Fein office in Belfast in 1992). Of the 185 killings 168 of them were sectarian or political in motive. The remaining 17 deaths were internal and non-sectarian. There were also over 300 attempted killings and other attacks during the same period. In 103 of the sectarian/political type killings there is evidence of some form of collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and the security forces.
The RUC informed some of the victims that their personal details, contained in official British Intelligence files, were in the hands of loyalist paramilitaries. Some victims were killed by loyalist gangs with members of the security forces in their ranks. Some were killed by weapons reportedly stolen from members of the security forces before their deaths. Some were killed by weaponry acquired by loyalist paramilitaries with the assistance of a number of British Intelligence agents, Brian Nelson being the best known of these. Nelson, when he appeared in court in January 1992, was suspected to have played a vital role in 10 murders and the targeting of a further 16 people who were later murdered or wounded. An apparent deal was made and he was convicted of less serious offences.
Brian Nelson received a l0-year sentence in February 1992 for his r6le in loyalist violence. He was a British military agent. He was also the UDAs intelligence officer, responsible for setting up people to be killed. He had unlimited access to security forces intelligence documents on nationalists and republicans. Such information was supplied to the UDA by himself or by security forces sympathetic to loyalist paramilitaries. The effects of Nelson's work in refining the UDAs intelligence department is still being felt.
'The legacy is that since Nelson's arrest another 6 people have been killed and 3 injured. These people's names were among the 369 found in Nelson's possession at the time of his arrest'. (BBC Panorama Programme The Dirty War 1992.)
The role of Nelson and other British agents in assisting loyalist paramilitaries to acquire an arms shipment from South Africa has had a great impact on loyalist violence. The significance of the South African weaponry to loyalist death squads, and how they acquired it, was exposed in a report on BBC's Insight Ulster on 28 January 1993. British intelligence services alleged a breakdown of their own intelligence and surveillance. The shipment, it was reported, had been monitored by British Intelligence from South Africa to the north of Ireland, but a breakdown occurred when it arrived and they lost trace of it. The report pointed out how the South African weapons have enhanced the killing capacity of loyalist paramilitaries, revealing that before the arrival of such sophisticated weapons loyalist killers were more likely to have used home-made machine-guns, sawn-off shotguns and old revolvers.
The murders in Cappagh, at the mobile shop in Craigavon, the Hyster factory in Lurgan, the Ormeau Road and Oldpark 'bookies', and Castlerock, the pub massacres at Greysteel and Loughinisland, were all carried out by loyalists using weaponry imported from South Africa. They also used them in many individual killings. In fact from the Milltown killings in March 1988 to the slaughter of six men watching a football match on television in a public house at Loughinisland, County Down, in June 1994, all loyalist multiple killings have been carried out with South African weaponry.
Note the following comparison. In the six years before the arrival of these weapons, from January 1982 to December 1987, loyalist paramilitaries murdered 71 people of whom 49 were sectarian/political. In the six years following, from January 1988 to 1 September 1994, loyalists murdered 229 people, of whom 207 were sectarian/political.
Brian Nelson was arrested in January 1990, following the investigation of Cambridgeshire Chief Constable John Stevens into the leaking of security forces' intelligence files. The UFF had boasted that they used security forces' intelligence files in the murder of Loughlin Maginn in August 1989. Stevens ended his inquiry in May 1990. In his report he was able to conclude 'that members of the security forces have passed on information to paramilitaries' and that 'there was no organised campaign of leaks'.
But, if his recommendations were introduced, he said, 'then there is every hope that future collusion between the security forces and paramilitary groups will be eradicated'.
Among the 83 recommendations of John Stevens were the blurring of copies of files when files were photocopied and a system to identify user access to computer records on suspects. Amnesty Inter-national in a statement following the release of people charged with possession of leaked files in October 1990 said, 'It is obvious from all the evidence that collusion remains a fact of life and that the government is not prepared to confront it'.
The belief of Amnesty International that the Stevens inquiry was a failure can be seen in the continuing evidence of security forces' intelligence files going missing and ending up in the hands of loyalist paramilitaries.
The continuing flow of security forces' intelligence files to loyalist paramilitaries led to the return of (now Northumbria) Chief Constable John Stevens to Northern Ireland in August 1993. As in September 1989, the content of his investigation was not disclosed. A report on the second investigation was sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in February 1994. In July 1994 the DPP asked Mr Stevens to make further inquiries. The DPP's request, it was reported, was made following an examination of the findings of Mr Stevens' recent inquiry. To date there has been no indication of charges being brought.
Amnesty International in reports published in 1993 and 1994 again criticised the British government and the RUC for their handling of the collusion issue and for their failure to establish an independent inquiry.
The Nelson case focused on another suspicion of the nationalist community, namely that British troops patrolling nationalist areas have had on occasions a role in loyalist attacks. In the murders of Gerard Slane and Terence McDaid in 1988, both of whom were set up by Nelson, relatives claimed there was suspicious activity by the security forces near their homes prior to the loyalist attacks. Gerard Slane's home was raided by the security forces two weeks before his death. Both families believed the activity of the security forces was a reconnaissance in preparation for the loyalist killings.
The most common accusations of collusion concern the removal of checkpoints, some of which were in place before loyalist attacks. Some areas where loyalist attacks have taken place have witnessed saturation levels of security forces patrolling and searching prior to attacks. The suspicion of collusion was supported in January 1993 by remarks made by their commanding officer in the north, Sir John Wilsey When asked what was his attitude to employing agents like Nelson and the morality thereof, he replied that he was 'certainly not ashamed of Nelson's role'.
Information and weaponry are not the only forms of collusion between the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries. During the period covered by this article, 51 serving and former security forces' members were charged or convicted of terrorist-related offences ranging from illegal possession of arms to murder.
Political and clerical leaders in the Catholic community and their local press have criticised the security forces' lack of response to appeals for adequate protection. Loyalist death squads have used the same routes again and again to enter nationalist areas and to flee after murders. Lanark Way off the Springfield Road in West Belfast was opened in the summer of 1986 and, despite it being used as an escape route by loyalists in eight murders and numerous attempted killings, it was not closed until the murder of Philomena Hanna in April 1992. She was the ninth victim of loyalist violence. North Howard Street, Rosapenna Street and the Donegall Road are other examples where persistent pleas for closure of thoroughfares used by loyalist death squads have been ignored.
A recent example of security forces ignoring requests by Catholics for protection occurred on the night of 27 April 1994 in west Belfast. Paul Thompson and a friend were in a car and were making a U-turn at the bottom of Springfield Park, which is a cul de sac. Unknown to both men, loyalist gunmen had gained access to the street through a hole in the pallisade fencing which was part of the 'peace line'. The gunmen opened fire on the vehicle killing Paul Thompson and wounding his friend who saved his life by driving away One of the first on the scene was a woman resident of Springfield Park. She had noticed the hole in the fencing earlier that day and, realising the danger (there had been at least 16 murder attempts in the Upper Springfield Road area in the previous three and a half years), telephoned the RUC and the Northern Ireland Office immediately She was told by those who received the calls that the matter would be looked into and resolved as soon as possible. But the fence was neither repaired nor security in the area increased. Several hours after her plea, as she stood at the front door, she witnessed what she feared might happen, the murder of an innocent person.
This inadequacy of the security forces in protecting nationalists was revealed again in the failure of British army and RUC bases, despite sophisticated surveillance equipment, to detect, deter or arrest loyalist murder gangs. The murders of Sam Marshall in Lurgan and Thomas Hughes, Martin O'Prey, James Carson, Kieran Abrams, Joseph McCloskey and Seán Monaghan in Belfast, are examples where the gangs responsible could have been observed by security forces in their bases. There are other examples of this situation in a number of attempted killings.
Another persistent complaint of nationalists concerns the failure of the security forces to respond promptly to some killings and attempted killings by loyalists. When they arrive on the scene their reaction has been misdirected. It is often nationalist areas which feel the brunt of follow-up operations rather than the areas to which the killers escaped. There have been murders and attempted murders where there have been no follow-up operations. Relatives and friends of the victims of loyalist violence have complained about the bad behaviour of security forces arriving in the aftermath of a murder or attempted murder. Their conduct at the scene of the Sinn Fein office killings, the Peter McTasney killing in Bawnmore estate, the Seán Anderson murder near Pomeroy and the murder of Theresa Clinton in Belfast was insulting and oppressive. Funerals of some of the victims of loyalist violence have been disrupted by an undue heavy force of RIJC and British army presence either around the family home while the body was waked or at church and graveyard. Mourners have been stopped, searched and on occasions abused. Mourners at the funerals of Thomas Donaghy, Kilrea, Kevin McKearney Moy and Conor Maguire and Mark Rodgers in Belfast were severely harassed.
RUC forensic teams investigating killings and attempted killings have sometimes failed to remove all relevant material from the scene of the incident. The bag, with spent shells inside, used by the RUC member who murdered three people in the Sinn Fein office on the Falls Road, was found in the office after the forensic team left the scene. Similarly after the forensic team left the home of teenager Gerard O'Hara, having spent a number of hours in the house, bullets fired by the gunmen were found in the living-room where the young man was killed. One of the bullets had blood on it.
RUC forensic teams have been reluctant to disclose the ballistic history of weapons used by loyalists. In the mid-Ulster and north Armagh areas demands for this information by nationalist politicians and others have been ignored. When information has been released, it has tended to be general rather than specific. For example, following the murder of four men in Cappagh, County Tyrone, on 3 March 1991, the RUC confirmed that the weapons had been used before in seven killings in two years in the Lurgan, Stewartstown and Cooks-town areas, but they did not specify which killings. 'It is not our policy to give the history of firearms for evidential reasons' was how an RUC spokesman responded to a demand for information on the weapons used to kill Tommy Casey in October 1990 near Cookstown. This attitude contrasts with the release of the ballistic history of weapons used by republican groups. The most recent example followed the shooting of Jimmy Brown in Belfast by the IPLO in August 1992. Within hours of his death the media had a frill record of the weapon used to kill Brown and previous victims.
Catholic complaints about the British army and the RUC in regard
to their attitude to loyalist violence may be summarised as follows:
|1.||Failure to respond to nationalist demands for protection.|
|2.||How do RUC and British army bases fail to detect or deter loyalist murder gangs when they enter Catholic areas since they are equipped with sophisticated surveillance apparatus?|
|3.||The response of the RUC after loyalist attacks is slow and complacent.|
|4.||Injury is added to injury when the RUC and British army oppress Catholic areas following loyalist attacks. They do not direct their attention to the areas into which the loyalists have escaped.|
|5.||There have been incidents when there have been no follow-up operation of the RUC.|
|6.||British army and RUC have sometimes insulted and abused the families of the victims and have beaten and insulted mourners at funerals of their murdered relatives even when the funerals have had no paramilitary trappings.|
|7.||RUC forensic teams have been wilfully negligent or incompetent in gathering evidence at the scene of murders carried out by loyalists paramilitaries.|
|8.||The RUC is selective in releasing ballistic information m regard to killings. Prior to court cases it releases the history of weapons used by republican paramilitaries but withholds such information regard to loyalist paramilitaries and of course state forces.|
On 20 March 1998 investigative journalists John Ware and Geoff Seed, with Alasdair Palmer, published an article in The Sunday Telegraph unveiling documentary evidence that the British army colluded in murder with Brian Nelson. They called it assassination by proxy A combination of Nelson's diaries and the British army's records show in their estimation that Nelson was involved in 15 murders, 15 attempted murders and 62 conspiracies to murder. Secret files provide evidence that the British army's Force Research Unit (FRU), a branch of Military Intelligence responsible for running agents in Northern Ireland, was associated with murders carried out by the UDA between 1987 and 1990. The documents are secret records of meetings between FRU and Nelson, commonly known as 'contact records'. The theme of the article is that British army handlers planted Nelson in the UDA, provided him with detailed profiles of republicans, and directed him to refine the UDA's wide target of 'any Catholic will do' to 'taking out' republicans. This was a return to the tactics of the 1970s when army intelligence under the name of the Military Reaction Force had recruited 'pseudo gangs' to assasinate 'republicans'. The return to such a risky course of action followed the thwarting of the 'Shoot-to-Kill' policy by the Stalker report. The journalists claim that Nelson was paid £28,000 a year by the British army In the article they highlighted the attempted murder of Alex Maskey Sinn Fein councillor, and the murders of Gerard Slane at 4. 15am on 23 September 1988 and of Terence McDaid on 10 May 1998. Nelson organised and planned Slane's murder, providing the assassins with his address, picture and logistics of surveillance Slane was suspected by the UDA of having links with a republican paramilitary group. The evidence was flimsy Nelson checked out Slane's photograph with people who witnessed the murder of a UDA associate, William Quee. Two of these said he might have been the gunman but they were not sure. This was one of the killings which prompted Nelson's British army handler to write, 'his targeting information is already of a high quality and recent attacks have proved this accurate'.
Nelson also suggested Declan McDaid as a target to a UDA assassin called 'Winkie' Dodds. He believed he had a republican link. He provided Dodds with a photograph but mistakenly gave the address of McDaid's brother Terence. The UDA murdered Terence McDaid who had absolutely no association with the IRA. The army handler placated Nelson when he discovered his mistake by telling him that Terence McDaid had been 'traced as Provisional IRA.'
The journalists expand on Nelson's background. He was born in 1947 and grew up on the Shankill Road, Belfast. He joined the Black Watch regiment when he was seventeen. Within five years he was discharged, officially on medical grounds but, as they say, 'he had been absent without leave and was known to be wild and reckless'. He joined the UDA in the early 1970s. He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment in 1974 after his conviction of kidnapping and torturing a partially-sighted Catholic. After his imprisonment he rejoined the UDA but at the same time offered to work for British army Intelligence. He went to work in Germany in 1985 after being involved in shootings. In 1987 Colonel J of the Force Research Unit asked him to return. He was then planted in the UDA once more to target IRA activists. Naturally he became their chief intelligence officer since he had access to security files. The journalists speculate that there had been a 'battle between the army and MI5 as to who was to secure his services'. Of course MI5 was fully aware of Nelson's trip to South Africa to ship arms to the loyalists in January 1988.
In 1992 the BBC Panorama team in a programme drew on a 90,000 word account which Nelson wrote on his work for the military Force Research Unit.
It was the UDA themselves who laid Nelson open to discovery when they could not resist boasting of the excellence of their intelligence following the murder of Loughlin Maginn at his home Rathfriland, County Down, on 25 August 1989. They published a confidential security force file on Maginn. Public opinion forced the RUC to hold an inquiry. It was led by the Deputy Chief Constable in Cambridgeshire, John Stevens. The army warned Nelson not to reveal to the inquiry that he worked for them. They called in Nelson's entire collection of intelligence 'P cards' which they had helped to compile lest he should hand them over to the inquiry. Stevens first report concluded that the leakage of intelligence was occasional material available to every policeman and soldier. Then Nelson's fingerprints, traceable from his criminal records, were found on confiscated leaked documents. The inquiry team planned to arrest him on 11 January 1990. Nelson, obviously tipped off, fled to England the evening before. That same night, by an extraordinary coincidence, many of the inquiry team's statements and documents were destroyed by fire in their office within a secure area of Carrickfergus RUC complex. On his return to Belfast, Nelson was arrested. He revealed that he was an army agent. It was only when Stevens's deputy, Detective Chief Superintendent Vincent McFadden, threatened to arrest senior army officers on a charge of obstruction of justice that the 'Contact Forms' written by Nelson's handlers were handed over. Colonel J, head of FRU, told the inquiry that the policy was to use Nelson to persuade the UDAto target republicans rather than just Catholics. He indicated that the protracted time it would take the UDA to gain intelligence could give the army enough time to warn the RUC Special Branch who was at risk and thus save lives. 730 intelligence reports, he said, which identified threats to 217 individuals, had been passed to the RUC. The RUC denied the value of this information. One Special Branch superintendent testified that, 'I have been asked if I can name an individual whose life was saved as a result of Nelson's information and I cannot'. Special Branch officers testified that only two cases received from FRU were specific enough to anticipate an attack and put preventive measures into action. One of these intended victims was Gerry Adams. Notes of Nelson's army handlers show that in at least 92 cases FRU knew who the UDA was going to murder.
The Stevens team compiled a second report. It was never published. John Ware and his associates wrote, 'In that report, it set out the evidence that the army's Force Research Unit had colluded with the UDA in targeting members of the Provisional IRA. The file was passed to the DPP, Northern Ireland. In consultation with Sir Patrick Mayhew, then the attorney general, it was decided not to prosecute Colonel J or any of Nelson's army handlers: only Brian Nelson was to be charged. In the event, there was no trial. Nelson was persuaded to plead guilty to five charges of conspiracy to murder. In a hearing in 1992 before a judge on the length of his sentence, Colonel J once again stressed that he believed that Nelson's intelligence had enabled his unit to pass on to Special Branch reports that identified 217 individuals. The judge at the hearing accepted this. In sentencing Nelson he said that he gave special weight to the fact that he passed on what was possibly life-saving information in respect of 217 individuals.
Nelson was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. He was released in 1997. The article continues, '(He) is now believed to be living with financial assistance from the army But his legacy continues. Nelson distributed his "P" cards to several other Protestant paramilitary groups, which may have used them in the planning of assassinations. Colonel J was awarded the OBE. Some of Nelson's handlers have been promoted and given medals. One went on to give lectures on "agent handling'' to Military Intelligence.
The Sunday Telegraph says that the Force Research Unit, set up for the sole purpose of running agents in Northern Ireland, had no authority to mount such an operation. It consisted of around 50 officers and soldiers and ran more than 100 agents. It was disbanded in 1990 after Stevens' second report. It suggests that it was reconstituted under another name.
The editorial in the paper on 29 March 1998 was critical of the British army 'No less than the police or the judiciary in Northern Ireland, the army has always been expected to observe the due process of law: soldiers face trial for murder if they fail to follow the procedures laid down for the lawful use of lethal force. Indeed, it is this belief in legality which has helped draw a completely unambiguous distinction between the necessary use of force by soldiers and the murderous violence of the terrorist gangs. It is this basic distinction which army intelligence jeopardised by colluding with loyalist paramilitaries and taking sides in the conflict. Those officers involved demeaned the moral authority of the crown. Their defence was little more than a moral fig-leaf: that, since the UDA was going to kill people anyway, it should kill identifiable republican terrorists, rather than randomly selected Catholics. But even judged by their own supposedly military criteria, Nelson's handlers failed abysmally.'
BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS
The Mailed Fist: A record of Army & Police Brutality from Aug. 9-Nov 9, 1971. Issued by the Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland in collaboration with the Association for Legal Justice.
British Army and Special Branch RUC Brutalities. December 1971-February 1972. First printed 1972. Reprinted 1972. Compiled by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh.
Whitelaw's Tribunals. Long Kesh Internment Camp, November 1972- February 1973. Compiled by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray Armagh.
The Hooded Men. British Torture in Ireland, August, October 1971. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. July 1974.
The Iniquity of Internment. Long Kesh, August 9th 197 1-August 9th, 1974. Compiled by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh.
Corruption of Law. Memorandum to the Gardiner Committee on the Working of Emergency Legislation in Northern Ireland, from Fr Brian J. Brady Belfast, Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray Arrnagh. September 1974.
Internment 1971-1975. By Fr Brian Brady Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1975.
The Shame of Merlyn Rees. 4th Year of Internment in Ireland, Long Kesh 1974 - 1975. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1975.
The Flames of Long Kesh 15-16 October 1974. By Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray Armagh. December 1974.
The Triangle of Death. Sectarian Assassinations in the Dungannon-Moy- Portadown area. By Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray Armagh. Three separate editions with added material. 1975.
A British Army Murder. Leo Norney (17 years) killed by Black Watch regiment, 13 October 1975. By Fr Brian J. Brady Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray September 1975.
The RUC: The Black and Blue Book. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray First published 1975. Reprinted 1983.
Majella O'Hare. Shot dead by the British Army 14 August 1976. By Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray September 1976.
British Army Terror. West Belfast, September, October 1976. (Brian Stewart). By Fr BrianJ. Brady Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1976.
The Birmingham Framework. Six Innocent Men Framed for the Birmingham Bombings. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1977. Reprinted 1984.
SAS Terrorism - The Assassin's Glove. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray July 1976.
The Castlereagh File. Allegations of RUC Brutality 1976/1977. By Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray Printed 1978. Reprinted in USA 1979.
Violations of Human Rights in Northern Ireland 1968- 1978. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1978.
The Sleeping Giant. Irish Americans and Human Rights in N. Ireland. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1978.
H Blocks. British]ail for Irish Political Prisoners. By Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray 1979.
Moment for Truth on Northern Ireland. By Denis Faul and Raymond Murray 1980.
H Blocks and its Background. By Denis Faul and Raymond Murray 1980.
Michael McCartan. An Innocent Catholic Boy Shot Dead by the RUC, 23 July 1980. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray September 1980.
The British Dimension. Brutality, Murder and Legal Duplicity in N. Ireland. By Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray 1980.
Hunger Strike. H Blocks, Long Kesh, Northern Ireland 27 October 1980. Published by a group of lawyers and priests.
Rubber & Plastic Bullets Kill & Maim. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1981.
Danny Barrett. A British Army Murder. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1982.
Plastic Bullets Plastic Government. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1982.
The Sacredness of Human Life: An Invitation to Debate. By Denis Faul, Raymond Murray October 1982.
The Stripping Naked of the Women Prisoners in Armagh Prison 1982-83. By Denis Faul. Published by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray Easter 1983.
Angela D'Arcy. Irish Catholic Girl Shot Dead by a British Army Soldier in Enniskillen 25 November 1981. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray Published 1983.
The Alienation of Northern Catholics. By Denis Faul, Raymond Murray February 1984.
Collusion 1990 -1994. Loyalist Paramilitary Murders in North of Ireland. By Arthur Fegan and Raymond Murray Issued by Relatives for Justice, 1985.
The SAS in Ireland. By Raymond Murray Mercier Press. First published November 1990. Sixth Printing 1997.
Hard Time: Armagh Gaol 1971-1986. By Raymond Murray Mercier Press, 1998.
Whitelaw's Tribunals. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1 June 1979.
The Hooded Men. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1972.
The Shame of Merlyn Rees. Fr Raymond Murray Fr Denis Faul. 9 August 1975.
The Birmingham Framework. Fr Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 4 July 1977.
SAS Terrorism - The Assassin's Glove. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 6 July 1976.
The Black and Blue Book. Fr Denis Faul. Fr Raymond Murray February 1975.
H-Blocks. 'British jail for Irish Prisoners'. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1979.
Michael McCartan. September 1980. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray
LEAFLETS AND BROADSHEETS
Know Your Rights. Issued by Fr Denis Faul with NCCL (National Council for Civil Liberties) Abbey Printers (Cavan) Ltd. Undated (1975).
Legal Rights for Those Detained. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon. Printed both in blue and black. Undated (1976).
Legal Rights for Those Detained. Fr Denis Faul. June 1977.
Legal Rights. Fr Denis Faul. Dungannon, 1/3/78.
Legal Rights for Those Detained. Fr Denis Faul. February 1979.
Legal Rights for Those Detained. Fr Denis Faul. January 1980.
Whitelaw Violates Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1972.
The Courts. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray Armagh. 1972.
Anti-Catholic Bias in the Courts of Northern Ireland. A Sample Study March 1974. Association for Legal Justice.
Anti-Catholic Bias in the Courts of Northern Ireland. A Sample Study April 1974. Association for Legal Justice.
Anti-Catholic Bias in the Courts of Northern Ireland. A Sample Study May and June 1974. Association for Legal Justice.
Anti-Catholic Bias in the Courts of Northern Ireland. A Sample Study July to October 1974. Association for Legal Justice.
Anti-Catholic Bias in the Courts of Northern Ireland. A Sample Study November 1974 to June 1975. Association for Legal Justice.
Desert Labour. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray Armagh. Undated (1975).
The Law No Longer Protects Me. An Analysis of the Use of Supergrasses. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray October 1983.
20 Points against Internment. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon. Undated (1972).
List of lnjuries and Inhuman Treatment meted out to Political Remand Prisoners in Cage 8 - since 11th September 1972. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland.
List of Injuries sustained by Remand Prisoners in Compound 6, Long Kesh, on Friday 22nd September, 1972. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Fr T Connolly Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray Fr John McKean.
Long Kesh Internees. PatrickJ. McClean. 1972.
Ill-treatment of Political Prisoners in Long Kesh, The Maze, July 4,1973.
Selective Releases from Long Kesh Internment Camp - Christmas 1973. Association for Legal Justice.
Remember Long Kesh. May 20th, 1975. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon.
Remember Long Kesh, No Negotiations under Duress. Issued by Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray Armagh. Undated (1975).
20 Reasons why an Amnesty should be given to all imprisoned because of alleged misdeeds committed because of a lack of security or justice in society. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon. Undated (1975).
Amnesty. Holy year 1975. Fr Brian Brady Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray
Five Reasons why Political Status - Special Category - is a Fact of Life in Northern Ireland. Published by Fr Denis Faul with some families of political prisoners. 1976. Arguments for Politcal Status (or AMNESTY). Lurgan relations 1976.
Mal-administration of Prisons. Published by the families of political prisoners, Lurgan April 1976.
H-Blocks Protest. The No Washing, Non-Cooperation Phase. April 1978. By Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray Issued in blue and black.
H-Block. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1978.
H-Block. The Care and Welfare of Prisoners in Northern Ireland. Produced by Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray Easter 1978. Issued in black, red, green, blue, pink.
Die Politische Haftlinge in Nordirland. Eine Frage von Krieg oder Frieden. 1978.
Rapport Fra et Faengsel i Nordirland. 1978.
An Information Sheet. From the Relatives Action Committee of South Derry and West Antrim. September 1978.
H-Block. Christmas 1978. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray Issued in red and blue.
Appeal to Irish Voters in Britain and Scotland. 1979.
Appeal to Irish Voters in Britain and Scotland. Issued by the County Tyrone and Armagh parents of families. Poster. 1979.
Remember H Block and Forget Labour. Parents of County Derry Prisoners in H Blocks. 1979.
H-Blocks. A Letter Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1 June 1979.
H-Block. The Year of the Child. Issued by South Deny and South West Antrim Relatives for Action Committee, November 1979.
H-Blocks. A letter from a blanket man to the Association for Legal Justice. 1979.
H-Block. Christmas 1979. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray
American Delegation to H-Blocks and Armagh Jail. Issued by Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray September 1980.
Remember H Blocks and Armagh Jail. Issued by South Derry and South West Antrim relatives Action Committee. Autumn 1980.
Hunger Strike 2. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray March 1981.
Hunger Strikes - The Search for Solutions. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray May 1981.
Deputation of Anti-Unionist Councillors, Dungannon District Council, to Mr Michael Alison, Minister of State, on Tuesday 21st July 1981. Prisons.
Prison Problems and the Alienation of Catholics in N. Ireland. Statement of Help the Prisoners, 13 June 1984. Issued by Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray
Women in Jail in Northern Ireland. By Fr Denis Faul. July 1978.
Prevented from Going to Mass. Armagh Prison, Northern Ireland. Undated (1980).
Black February. Armagh Prison. Beating Women in Prison. Compiled by Fr Denis Faul. 1980.
Armagh Prison. The Parents Speak. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1980.
The Stripping Naked of Women Prisoners in Armagh Gaol. November 1982 January 1984. The Shame of James Prior and Nicholas Scott. Fr Denis Faul.
Stripping Girls Naked in Armagh Prison. A Letter to Nicholas Scoff. Minister for Prisons by Fr Raymond Murray. 11 January 1985. Published by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray Armagh Social Action Group.
Torture, Torture. Torture. Association for Legal Justice. November December 1973. (Forced feeding of Dolours Price, Marion Price, Hugh Feeney Gerard Kelly Roy Walsh). In English, French, German.
Brutality in Albany Prison, Isle of Wght. Repression of Irish Catholics in the Fourth World. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray Armagh. 1976.
'In Prison in England'. Christmas 1977. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray Arinagh, with the help of Sister Sarah Clarke, London.
The Birmingham Pub Bombing Case. Synopsis of the forensic evidence, presented by Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray February 1980.
Parole for Fr Patrick Fell. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray. March 1980.
The Need for Security. Treatment of Prisoners in Portlaoise. By Fr Denis Faul, Dunganon, and Fr Raymond Murray Armagh. 1977.
Questions a Candidiate should Answer. Issued by the Relatives of Prisoners. Undated (1981).
Portlaoise Prison. By Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray Armagh. June 1984.
The Murrays. Must they hang in Dublin? Issued by Murray Defence Committee (Northern Ireland). Correspondence Secretary, Fr Denis Faul.
THE CATHOLIC COMMUNITY
Some Examples of Attacks on Catholic Church Property. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. 1972.
The Plight of Catholics in Newtownabbey. 16th February 1974.
Short Brothers Limited, Belfast. A Case Study in Anti-Catholic Discrimination. By Rev. Brian J. Brady Published by Irish National Caucus, Inc., Washington DC, April 1983. Reprinted by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray July 1983.
Memorandum to Members of Parliament taking part in the Debate on Northern Ireland, Westminster. June 3-4, 1974. The Ulster Workers Council Strike. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland.
The Alienation of the Catholic/Nationalist People in N. Ireland. 20 Reasons for Alienation. Reply to the Northern Ireland Church of Ireland bishops. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray Armagh, 30 November 1984.
25 Methods of Brutality by Military and Special Branch RUC, December 1971 -February 1972. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray 1972.
Ballykelly, RUC Special Branch Interrogation Centre. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh. 1973.
20 Reasons Why Catholics Should Not Give General Support to the RUC. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, November 1974.
Unacceptability of RUC in 1975. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Fr Denis Faul.
The Harassment of the Mulgrew Family June to October 1976. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. By Fr Brian Brady Fr Denis Faul and Fr Raymond Murray
Allegations of Brutality, Signing of False Statements and Threats of Assassination Made by Regional Crime Squad Members in the Strand Road RUC Station, Deny City, 22- 25 November 1976. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray, Armagh.
What Happened to Eddie Rooney on the Night of 28 February 1977? Oppression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray Armagh.
Allegations of Brutality in Armagh RUC Station. March 1977. Catholic families in Co. Armagh complain of RUC ill-treatment. Printed on white and green paper.
Serious Allegations of Ill-treatment in Omagh and Dungannon RUC Stations. April 23rd - May 12th, 1977. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray Armagh.
20 Methods of Brutality in Castlereagh and Other RUC Interrogation Centres. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, and Fr Raymond Murray Armagh. 1977/78. Printed in blue and black.
Ten Years On: Violations of Human Rights 1968-78. A Letter. 25 October 1978. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray
Brutality against Persons Arrested under Emergency Powers. Fr Denis Faul. March 22nd 1979.
Second International Tribunal of Inquiry into Deaths and Injuries by Plastic Bullets, Belfast, N. Ireland, 16 October 1982. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray
Plastic Bullets. Shootings that Shame the State. Raymond Murray September 1985. Issued by Fr Denis Faul,, Fr Raymond Murray
RUC: Abuses of Law, 1985. Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray An Alternative Police Force in Northern Ireland. By Fr Raymond Murray Submission to Initiative '92 and the Opsahl Commission. May 1993.
THE BRITISH ARMY
65 Priests Working in West Belfast issued the following statement on Monday 20th November, 1972. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. Presented at a Press Conference in Belfast by Fr Desmond Wilson, Ballymurphy Fr Brian Brady Andersonstown. Fr A Reid, Clonard.
Statements by Luke McKiernan and Kevin Clancy of Derrygosh, Newtownbutler, Co. Fermanagh. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. August 1974. Issued by Fr Denis Faul.
The Amazing Dis-Grace of the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards at Eglish, Dungannon. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. June 5-6th, 1976. By Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon.
The Behaviour of the 3rd Parachute Regiment in South Armagh, June -July 1976. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. June 5-6th, 1976. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray Armagh.
The Behaviour of the Royal Marine Commandos in Crossmaglen on Tuesday evening, 31st August 1976. Fr Denis Faul, Dungannon, Fr Raymond Murray Armagh.
Terror Tactics of the British Army. Royal Marine Commandos at Crossmaglen. October, 1976. Repression of the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland. By Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray
The Killing of Martin Malone. Catholic Youth of 18 Years shot dead by the Ulster Defence Regiment 30 July 1983. Published by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray
Second International Tribunal of Inquiry into Deaths and Injuries by Plastic Bullets, Belfast, N. Ireland, 16 October 1982. Conclusion of the Tribunal. Issued by Fr Denis Faul, Fr Raymond Murray
State Killings in Northern Ireland. By Fr Raymond Murray Issued by Relatives for Justice. 1991.
Unveiling of Memorial to Fergal Caraher, Cullyhanna. Fr Raymond Murray 30 December 1991.
CAIN contains information and source material on the conflict and politics in Northern Ireland.
CAIN is based within the University of Ulster.
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