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N O T E

The Minister for Foreign Affairs had a private meeting in New York with Governor Carey in the office of Dr. Kevin Cahill on Monday, September 24, 1979. In an effort to accommodate their respective schedules the meeting was arranged at short notice for 12.45 p.m. and it began in fact with the Governor's arrival shortly after 1.00 p.m. The meeting lasted till 1.45 p.m. Also present were Dr. Cahill as well as Mr. Eamon Gildea of the Minister's Office and the undersigned.

2. The Minister thanked the Governor for his interest and concern, as evidenced by his recent invitation to him and the British Secretary for Northern Ireland. He then briefed the Governor on the meeting in London of the Taoiseach with the British Prime Minister. A meeting, the Minister said, had earlier been scheduled for Dublin in October. However, following the murder of Lord Mountbatten the Taoiseach accepted an invitation to the funeral service in London and, as soon as he had accepted, a further invitation came to meet Mrs. Thatcher after the service. A section of the British press interpreted this invitation to meet as a summons for the Taoiseach to be lectured on security.

3. The meeting was preceded by a working lunch at which the British side, apparently with the intention of dispelling any impression that only security would be discussed, included besides Mrs. Thatcher, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, and his number two Ian Gilmore, as well as Chancellor of the Exchequer

Geoffrey Howe, and Atkins. The Tanaiste and the Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied the Taoiseach.

4. At the ensuing meeting, the question of security was very much in the air and it was necessary to deal with that aspect before the British were psychologically able to consider other matters. It was agreed also that the Minister and Atkins will meet and the question of security will be further discussed between them. This meeting is due to take place in London on October 5.

5. The Taoiseach informed the British Prime Minister that it was necessary to find a political solution for Northern Ireland which must include devolved, partnership government and Mrs. Thatcher appeared to agree. She stated that her Government would be making a decision and "when we make our decision we will allow no one to stand in our way". This statement could mean either that Loyalist extremists will not be allowed to oppose partnership government or that objections by the SDLP will not be considered if there is a British decision to increase political power at local government level.

6. The inclusion of Lord Carrington in the talks was an indication that the present British Government is more sensitive to international opinion than its Labour predecessors, who were inclined to see things very much in terms of domestic British politics. In this connection not only was U.S. interest valuable but so also/^{was} that of the EEC member countries. Additionally the Minister has been asked by the Political Committee of the European Parliament to discuss Northern Ireland with them and he will do so. Paisley and Taylor are an embarrassment to

the British. The Irish Government are in a position to show the British Government that support for the concept of partnership exists in Northern Ireland, i.e. SDLP, Alliance and a section of the Unionist party, as well as among EEC member states and in the U.S.

7. As regards the October 5 meeting with Atkins, further security cooperation on the part of the Irish authorities will probably include expansion of the Garda but there will be no yielding on either a) "hot pursuit", which is so far-fetched that the Thatcher meeting did not raise it, or b) on the British proposal to have RUC members present at the questioning of suspects in Garda stations. It is possible that the British in pushing such a request foresee that if it were to be granted Garda stations would become provo targets with resultant further anti-terrorist measures, such as internment. Any British suggestion that the Irish Government is not serious about border security is refuted by the fact that the cost per head of this item is relatively greater in the Republic than in Britain i.e. £20 per head per annum. The Minister undertook to send fuller figures to Governor Carey and stated that he regarded this factual evidence of Irish security commitment as being important in refuting British propganda. Similarly he regarded Mr. Atkins repeated claims to be ignorant of the Northern Ireland situation as scarcely satisfactory in view of his responsibilities.

8. The Minister continued that the Governor's account of Atkins's initial positive response to the Governor's invitation to meet

together with the Minister in New York, tallied exactly with what the Minister had been informed independently at the time. The later negative British response probably showed a lack of sufficient consideration by them and apparently sought to base itself, formally at least, on some of the phrases used in the Governor's letter of invitation and may also have been affected by the publicity given by the Governor to Atkins's earlier response. The Minister had gone on television immediately the British made their statement that Northern Ireland was solely a UK matter. Before he left the studio, where he had given interviews to three television networks, the British Ambassador, who had heard one of them broadcast, was already calling him to assure him that the British had in no way wished to deny the legitimate interest of the Irish Government.

9. Governor Carey stated his belief that the only people who could solve the Northern Ireland question were the Irish and British Governments. He fully backed the Government in Dublin. He wondered, however, what could be done in the United States in order to help in a practical manner and mentioned that during the present crisis in the U.S. economy it was somewhat strange to be talking about economic assistance. The Minister in reply stressed the necessity of linking any economic aid with political movement so as not merely to shore up the status quo.

10. The Governor felt that a post-Mountbatten propaganda barrage was being carefully coordinated with British interests, especially in the New York Times. He was conscious of the present visit to New York of Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien and he regarded the two articles on the Caucus and Noraid as intended as a warning to Members of Congress to be careful about getting involved in the Northern Irish question, lest they be found to be helping terrorists. The Minister noted that the articles had made a distinction between the Caucus and Noraid on the one hand and the Governor and his Congressional associates on the other but the Governor replied that the distinction had been carefully made only at the end of the article, where many readers, having exhausted their interest span, would not see it. The Minister refused to comment on Dr. O'Brien who was no longer a public representative. He agreed with the Governor that he fully opposed any assertions or propaganda on the theme that : "no political movement is possible now".

11. The Minister informed the Governor that the British Government had been informed of the full support of the Irish Government in the event of the setting up of partnership rule in Northern Ireland, and the Governor requested an indication as to what this might mean in detail. The Minister replied that firstly the Irish Government would be able to use its influence with the SDLP in order to ensure the support of the Catholic Nationalist community in Northern Ireland. Secondly economic assistance within the context of the EEC could be twofold including both cross border projects (as regards which studies

are now reaching completion) and also community funds other than those allocated directly to member states, which the Irish Government could pressure to have applied to Northern Ireland. Finally there was the general attitude of the Irish Government. In this connection the Taoiseach had made a very important speech at the weekend and the Minister would have a copy sent to the Governor. *N.B.*

12. The conversation was friendly and businesslike throughout and the Minister and the Governor posed for photographs before departing to their respective assignments.

G.C.

Gearoid O Clerigh
Consul General.

September 26, 1979.