

NATIONAL ARCHIVES

IRELAND



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ROINN AN TAOISIGH

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To:

From:

SECRETNORTHERN IRELAND

1. A meeting was held in the Taoiseach's Office from 8.00 p.m. to 9.30 p.m. on 1st May to discuss the forthcoming Forum Report and other issues. The meeting was attended by the Taoiseach, Tanaiste, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for Defence, Minister for Finance and Minister for Justice. Mr. Donlon, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Lillis, Assistant Secretary, also attended.
2. Following discussion of the attached draft Memorandum on Joint Authority, it was agreed that a summary should be prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs, indicating the main issues for discussion or decision at Government.
3. Points touched on in the discussion included -
 - (1) the provision to be made in the event of disagreement between Governments;
 - (2) the importance of consent on the part of the governed and the involvement of Unionists in any political solution;
 - (3) the question of how and when negotiations should be conducted with the British;
 - (4) the question of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, raised, as a sine qua non, by the British Cabinet Secretary during his visit in March.


Secretary to the Government
3rd May, 1984.

cc Mr. Sean Donlon, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs.

Joint Authority

1. In a recent informal and secret memorandum on the current situation in Northern Ireland, the MFA undertook to present to the Government, in consultation with the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste, proposals for new arrangements for the Government of Northern Ireland which might be presented to the British.
2. The background to these ideas, including certain exchanges with the British, will be outlined orally to the Government.
3. This paper attempts to envisage a structure of Joint Authority involving in a maximal way the Irish and British Governments together governing Northern Ireland.
4. By and large, no attempt is made here to discuss the problems of negotiating such a structure. These problems will be central to the character of what is agreed and will have to be considered in detail separately. It will also be necessary to test in detail the constitutional and legal viability of the model.

Outline

5. The detailed legal analysis recently prepared for the New Ireland Forum established that a Joint Authority structure of government is, for practical purposes, unprecedented. The analysis describes the concept as "innovatory" and "radical". It follows that both Governments will have to be prepared to contemplate governmental structures which, at first sight, might appear bizarre. In view of what is known about British thinking, it is also clear that it will be for the Irish Government to develop the concept in its widest sense.
6. In presenting its ideas to the British, the Government will have to have regard, not only to nationalist desiderata, but to British assumptions which are of course pragmatic and self-serving as seen in London. In other words, the concept will have to

be justifiable as inherently and minimally necessary to the establishment of "stability", the fundamental British concern.


7. Assuming that for our political purposes it is necessary to achieve the widest possible form of Joint Authority, the concept could be defined as the sharing between the Dublin and London Governments of the structure of government within Northern Ireland.

8. In practice this might take the following form in crude outline:

- A Joint Authority comprising equal ministerial (including Prime Ministerial) representation of both governments to which all levels of authority in Northern Ireland would be subsidiary and from which all public agencies in the North would derive their authority;
- The Executive of government in Northern Ireland to which certain powers would be devolved to be nominated by the Joint Authority;
- The elected Assembly in Northern Ireland to be subsidiary to the Joint Authority and subject to its veto for certain purposes;
- All civil servants in all public agencies at all levels in Northern Ireland to be specifically nominated by the Joint Authority;
- New security arrangements which would consciously acknowledge and accommodate the divided loyalties of the community: these new structures to be directly and exclusively responsible to the Joint Authority;
- An All-Ireland Court charged with trying scheduled offences and perhaps interpreting certain human rights provisions (e.g. the European Convention of Human Rights);

[The structure and functioning of the Court will be developed by the Attorney General.]

- These are other possible All-Ireland structures which might be attractive to both sides in Northern Ireland e.g.



Agricultural policy including, European Community to be dealt with in the first instance by the Joint Authority and, in the international sphere, possibly by recognised agencies of the Dublin Government.

It would be a matter for negotiation to determine if, when and how these particular structures could be included.

Legal Base: The Question of Sovereignty and Joint Authority

9. The Joint Authority system would itself be based on an Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Agreement would be enacted into the legislation of both sovereign states. In our case it is probable that this would require constitutional change.
10. Assume that it is the objective to establish the appearance and the reality of the sovereign character of the Irish participation in the Joint Authority to the maximum degree possible. In other words, assume that the objective is to interpose, as it were, between London and Northern Ireland, a new source of authority, a Joint Authority, from which all authority exercised within Northern Ireland would be derived. This Joint Authority would itself be fed by a double source of authority in which London and Dublin would be equal and which would not diminish the existing sovereignty of either.
11. Assume also that the constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the U.K. cannot be changed. The irreducible essence of the distinction between Joint Authority and Joint Sovereignty

is seen in London strictly in this territorial sense. In other words the one concession that we know the British will not make is to diminish the literal element of the guarantee set out in the British Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973:

"1. It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland remains part of Her Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom, and it is hereby affirmed that in no event will Northern Ireland or any part of it cease to be part of Her Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section in accordance with Schedule 1 to this Act."

There are, of course, elements other than the territorial involved in the concept of sovereignty e.g. citizenship, internal and external security, foreign policy, parliament, currency, judicature, taxation, distribution of resources. The political problem is to determine which elements in the government of Northern Ireland could be assigned to the Joint Authority so that the package would be consistent with the objective of securing as wide a range as practically possible and the reality of the political and economic limits on our own resources. That package should at a minimum be adequate to reverse the tide of alienation which now threatens the stability of the island and it should be adequate for the foreseeable future.

12. The doctrine that has emerged with the strongest claim to novelty within the Forum is the equal validity of the two identities in Northern Ireland and the right of both to satisfactory, secure and durable administrative and political/symbolic expression. The next question is: how best can this concept be institutionalised in the Joint Authority System?
13. Yet a further basic political issue to be resolved is the British "guarantee" to the Unionists, widely seen by nationalists as an obstacle to any political movement in Northern Ireland, but felt by most Unionists to be a democratic and basic right. Here the question is: is there any way that this "obstacle" could be unblocked in a structure of Joint Authority without undermining the fundamental rights of Unionists as perceived by themselves?
14. To summarise: is it possible to devise a structure which would:
 - reconcile the maximum possible measure of Anglo-Irish Joint Authority with the present consittutional position of Northern Ireland;

- institutionalise the equal validity of the two identities;
- unblock the obstacle of the British "guarantee" without the Unionists' sense of their security which now rests on that guarantee being undermined?

15. A solution would have to contain several elements. These would have to be credible long-term guarantees by both governments to both traditions of satisfactory, secure and durable administrative and symbolic/political expression of their identities, regardless of any change in the constitutional position which might supervene. In other words, the substitution for the present unilateral guarantee by one government to one community of two sets of double guarantees. The essential novelty of the concept would involve the juxtaposition in the normal order of permanence and preeminence of the concept of Joint Authority over the concept of sovereignty. In other words, a new concept of enduring joint authority with potentially shifting sovereignty i.e. enduring Anglo-Irish Joint Authority over Northern Ireland with U.K. or Irish or possibly Joint Sovereignty. This concept would, in the case of Northern Ireland, have the merit of addressing the long-term anxieties of unionists (e.g. a demographic shift to a Catholic majority) as well as their sense of their present fundamental rights, while meeting the requirements of nationalists. Note: It is clear that it would not be viable in Irish nationalist terms that Anglo-Irish Joint Authority would be envisaged as an inviolably permanent arrangement. It is suggested that the powerful reassurance to both unionists and nationalists of stable government continuing, regardless of any changes in sovereignty, could to a significant degree be secured by agreeing that, while the constitutional position of Northern Ireland could be changed by a majority of those voting in a poll, a separate decision would be required to bring an end to Joint Authority and that that separate decision could only be undertaken after it had been decided to change the constitutional position of Northern Ireland: it could be envisaged that this separate decision on Joint Authority would only be put before the people after a given period of time (10 years?) had elapsed after the earlier decision.

16. An Agreement would seem to offer the best, most durable and most credible framework for incorporating this new concept. The two Governments, through the agreement, would thus:

- each solemnly recognise and guarantee the equal validity of both the nationalist and unionist identities in Northern Ireland (perhaps as defined by the Forum);
- each guarantee that both identities must have satisfactory, secure and durable political, administrative and political/symbolic expression;
- together establish a system of Joint Authority for the government of Northern Ireland (in detail);
- agree that the system of Joint Authority would endure regardless of any changes in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland which a majority of the people of Northern Ireland might agree from time to time and which both Governments would facilitate and that system of Joint Authority, to be changed, would require a separate decision of the people of Northern Ireland to be made no sooner than 10 years (?) after the decision to change the constitutional position of Northern Ireland had been effected.

17. The Agreement might also identify certain powers and responsibilities reserved to the sovereign power e.g. external defence, foreign policy and certain financial responsibilities. The Agreement might envisage that the question of the responsibility for some of these areas could be reviewed subject to agreement by both Governments and following consultation of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Thus, some of the all-Ireland structures and possible aspects of EC policy envisaged under 8 above could, precisely because the idea might be attractive to unionists, shift from one "sovereignty" to another. In other words, like territorial sovereignty, the issues reserved to the sovereign power could "shift" either to the shared "joint" area or conceivably to the other sovereignty. It might be a mistake to insist on these issues being put on an all-Ireland footing at

the outset: this would be seen by unionists as a reappearance of the "Trojan Horse". It might be better to establish the legal structure first and then take on these issues with unionist agreement.

18. A further reason to envisage an Agreement as a legal base for Joint Authority might be that the All-Ireland Court could, in addition to its responsibilities for certain scheduled offences and certain human rights provisions, be the final court of appeal competent to interpret the Agreement itself (on the model of the European Court of Justice and the Community Treaties). There may be objections to this from the point of view of judicial practice: that it is wise not to involve the Court in what are potentially political issues. There would nevertheless be considerable advantage in ensuring that issues in the Agreement that arise for judicial adjudication could be definitely adjudicated by this Court rather than, for example, the House of Lords.

The Distribution of Powers

19. Assume that it would be the object of policy to devolve, to maximum extent possible, a range of devolved powers to an Executive for an elected assembly in Northern Ireland. There would thus remain reserved to the Joint Authority itself certain reserved powers and to the sovereign power (Britain) certain excepted powers. As envisaged under paragraph 7, it might be agreed that the excepted powers could shift to the Joint Authority or to the other sovereignty (Ireland), subject to agreement of the two sovereign governments, following consultation of the Assembly.
20. It would seem desirable to develop a legal concept for incorporation in the Agreement which would require that all governmental action within Northern Ireland, whether in the excepted, reserved or devolved areas, would be undertaken in the name of and under the authority of the Joint Authority. In practice this would create particular difficulty in the case of

the excepted powers e.g. taxpayers would ideally pay their taxes to the Joint Authority (not the U.K. Inland Revenue) which would in turn transfer them to the U.K. Consolidated Fund. The object of the idea is to address the core of the problem of alienation i.e. the refusal to recognise or accept the existing U.K. authority in Northern Ireland and this could be argued with some force to the British who accept the analysis about alienation. The greater difficulty would be to give political substance to what would otherwise be purely a messenger box system in the case of the excepted powers. On the one hand, we would have to accept that there are real limits involved here: (a) we would not be the paymasters nor, for the time being, could we contemplate so being, (b) we for the moment would, by the Agreement, in practice acquiesce in the fact that Northern Ireland would be part of the U.K. On the other hand, an answer might be to have it accepted in the Agreement that, so far as the excepted powers are concerned, the British would, on request from the Irish side, consult within the Joint Authority on some or all of these matters. It might thus be necessary to built into the Secretariat of the Joint Authority a system whereby consultation on at least some of these issues could take place e.g. the Secretariat could on a permanent basis include officials from the Department of Finance as well as the Treasury to ensure consultation on excepted revenue and financial matters. Alternatively, this work could be carried out in a number of commissions which would include officials from London and Dublin Departments and which would report to the Joint Authority. Note: it is conceivable that we would not wish to be consulted on certain excepted matters e.g. external defence; it might be, moreover, that we would also wish to exclude from the purview of the Joint Authority one area of governmental action within Northern Ireland i.e. British security activities in their NATO context.

21. As to the reserved powers, these might include:

- nomination of the Northern Ireland Executive;
- security;
- the Courts;

- certain issues of identity e.g. flags and emblems, languages, placenames etc.;
- harmonisation of the criminal law;
- broadcasting;
- posts and telecommunications.

Broadly speaking, these powers constitute the powers now reserved to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, i.e. the powers other than the powers at present excepted to Westminster, which could not be devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly.

22. The Joint Authority might comprise the two Governments and it might succeed or substitute itself for the existing Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council. It might, however, be necessary to assign at least one Minister of Cabinet rank on a full-time basis (with a separate Department ?) to the Joint Authority. It would also be necessary to establish a permanent Secretariat of the Joint Authority headquartered in Belfast with offices in Dublin and London, which would advise the Joint Authority on the decisions it would be called upon to take. The Dublin-based and London-based members of the Secretariat staff in the Belfast office would be equal in number and would remain permanent members of their respective national Civil Services.
23. The question must be faced: what happens when the two sovereign powers disagree? Let us leave the question of security for separate consideration, as it involves, unlike the other areas, a multitude of decisions at a variety of levels on a day-to-day basis. For the other six areas, it might be possible to anticipate solutions to as many of the issues as possible in the body of the Agreement. For those problems unforeseen by the Anglo-Irish negotiations or those which could not be resolved by reference to the provisions of the Agreement itself (e.g. certain issues in the area of cultural and political identity could conceivably be referred to the Court), one solution would be to refer those issues to an external arbitrator whose identity might be agreed from time to time by the Joint Authority. It might

be agreed by Treaty that that person could be a Minister of the Government of the country exercising Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the Community, which changes every six months. This notion is not necessarily as far-fetched as it may seem at first sight: it would provide a structural link between the settlement and the Community itself. It would seem unlikely that the Council of Ministers would refuse a joint British/Irish request aimed at giving the Community a role in bringing peace and stability to a corner of one of its Member States. If agreed, the arrangement might be given effect through a protocol to the existing Community Treaties, thus giving the Anglo-Irish Agreement an additional layer of international solidarity and conferring on Northern Ireland itself something of the status of a Community Protectorate.

24. It is envisaged that there would be a local Executive and an Assembly which would together operate the full range of the devolved powers. The Executive might be nominated by the Joint Authority and it could be chosen from within or without the Assembly or on a mixed Assembly/non-Assembly basis. The legislature acts of the Assembly might require a 70% vote to be made effective or, alternatively, they could be subject to veto by the Joint Authority itself or (if it were in part or in whole chosen from outside the Assembly) conceivably by the Executive. One possibly conceivable variant would be that the Executive would be elected by the Assembly but that its acts would be subject to a 70% vote requirement in the Assembly or veto by the Joint Authority. It could be provided in the Agreement that failure of the Assembly to elect an Executive according to the requirements of the Agreement would result in the Joint Authority itself operating the devolved powers which would be withheld by the Joint Authority until the Assembly succeeded in electing an Executive. There are many possible variants for structures of devolved government and it is suggested that this should be the subject of a separate paper which the Minister for Foreign Affairs will submit to the Government.

Security

25. This would be probably the most difficult and yet the most important area of Joint Authority in its initial phase. It is likely that the Joint Authority system would in the first instance

be attacked by subversives on both sides of the community - the security system would therefore be the most exposed and vulnerable component of the whole structure. It would also be called upon to deal in the most direct and immediate terms with the difficult problem of alienation on the nationalist side i.e. the rejection of the present system of British authority by a large proportion of the nationalist community, a sizeable number of whom are now practised in extreme forms of street violence and some of whom are seasoned murderers.

26. It would naturally be preferable to us that a new security force to patrol nationalist areas, itself amenable to nationalists, be recruited from within Northern Ireland. The practical and inescapable problem is that, in the first instance, until the new Joint Authority system (of which security would be the sharpest and most perceptible edge) had found its feet and established its credibility, it would be impossible to find recruits for such a force. Should it seem conceivable that Catholics would join such a force immediately, it would take time to train them. The question arises: who would maintain security in nationalist areas during that vital period? The British Army, RUC or UDR? That would be precisely to undermine the basis of the concept of Joint Authority in terms of its acceptability and specifically its accommodation of the nationalist identity of the alienated - at the moment of highest exposure and vulnerability of the new system.

27. It might also be suggested that, in order to deal with this problem, units of the *Gárda Síochána* only could be deployed in nationalist areas to encourage recruitment and organise training. The problem that would then arise would be: to whom would the *Gárda Síochána* have recourse in the fairly likely event of widescale armed attack on them or the community from the IRA or the UDA/UVF or uncontrolled units of the UDR or even RUC? The British Army? Again the same fatal deficiency would arise at the worst possible moment.

28. It is very difficult to see how, for a time at least, a system of Joint Authority could be established and maintained, without the involvement of Irish military forces in support of the

Gárda Síochána. If this cannot be contemplated, then it would seem that the whole system is beyond our competence. For not only does it seem necessary that we be directly involved in the provision of a new system of security, particularly in nationalist areas, but it is highly desirable from the political point of view of ending alienation. The argument that our forces would be in great danger is entirely cogent. One can only assume that, in those circumstances, British forces on the ground would themselves be very considerably reinforced, and that both sides would, at least on a temporary basis, take extraordinary measures to deal with terrorists on both sides of the community divide.

29. A workable solution would thus necessarily seem to require an involvement in the first instance of the Gárda Síochána and the Army. Recruitment to a new force or to two new forces (a police force and a new military unit) could begin forthwith. The two Governments might foresee this new police structure in the Agreement and, moreover, express their hope to withdraw their military forces (to barracks?) in say, two years (?).
30. The organisation and distribution of Southern or emerging local new nationalist security forces is a highly technical and complex issue not within the purview of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It would, however, be essential that in its first deployment, account be taken of the political complexity of Northern Ireland. One might, for example, envisage:
- nationalist forces patrolling nationalist areas;
 - those forces using their Irish insignia;
 - mixed forces, perhaps without insignia, patrolling certain mixed urban or rural areas;
 - British and/or RUC forces patrolling loyalist areas using their insignia.
31. The question arises again: which side would have command? Aside from the political requirement that the Irish nationalist component should have equal status with the British/Loyalist

component, the MFA cannot envisage a system in detail.
The following ideas could serve as a basis for discussion.

32. So far as the military are concerned: there might be, under the Joint Authority, a Joint Military Commission which would:
- delimit areas of exclusive competence;
 - organise systems of command for mixed operations;
 - organise coordination.

The command of the Joint Military Commission might alternate in agreed equal cycles.

33. It is conceivable that the police would be broken down into new and separate Divisions. In instances where joint operations were necessary, an overall Joint Police Commission, involving alternating command, as in the case of the military, could administer the system.

34. While it is possible, from a political point of view, to conceive some involvement by the RUC in new security arrangements, it would seem that we would have to demand that the UDR either be stood down or temporarily disarmed. The UDR is seen by Northern nationalists as a brutal and sectarian force and many of its members have done much to justify this reputation. It is likely that the British would be reluctant to undertake this request but it could be strongly argued on objective grounds that the continued existence of the UDR under arms in the transitional period at the beginning of the Joint Authority regime would be to risk its stability and viability.

The Joint Authority and Westminster

35. An objection that could readily be made to these ideas of a Joint Authority system is that Westminster would continue to be sovereign and thus (a) that Westminster could terminate the arrangement at will and (b) that the Irish state would in a Joint Authority be acting in a subsidiary role. There are a number of possible answers to these points viz.:
- that the Joint Authority would be based on a international agreement which it would be highly abnormal for either side to repudiate (provision might be made in the Agreement whereby five years notice would be required for either side to abrogate the Agreement);
 - that the prerogatives of the Joint Authority, which extended to the whole area of government of Northern Ireland, thus could not be capriciously abridged by Westminster;

/...

- that for Britain to repudiate the Agreement would in effect be to invite civil war;
- that the provisions of the Agreement were such that the equality of the status of this State with Britain was clearly secured;
- that the distinction between Joint Authority and the question of ultimate sovereignty laid down in the Agreement and indeed the preeminence given therein to the Joint Authority over sovereignty (paras. 15 and 16 above), reinforced the undiminished status of the Irish State in the arrangements.

36. There remain nevertheless two problems:

- How would the issue of Northern Ireland be dealt with at Westminster;
- What are the implications for Joint Authority of the fact that there are 17 Members from Northern Ireland in the House of Commons?

It seems likely that we would have to accept that the British Government would in practice have to take questions in the normal way about Northern Ireland. It might, however, be helpful if at regular periods (on the same day every six months?), both Governments reported to their respective legislatures on the work of the Joint Authority and gave time for a debate on developments. This might have the effect of concentrating a good deal of whatever attention either legislature was prepared to give to the new system, in the period following the initial hectic phase, to set-piece debates at these particular times. As to the Northern Ireland MPs, one would in the initial phase have to assume that some of them would use the House of Commons to oppose the new arrangements. Given the Prime Minister's support, this should not cause serious problems. Nevertheless, as the system developed, as the accommodation of the two identities and of the fundamental sovereignty requirements of unionists were borne in on the unionists themselves and on their supporters at Westminster, and as the focus of politics in

Northern Ireland shifted, the problem arising at Westminster would decline.

The Joint Authority and the Oireachtas

37. Participation in the Joint Authority would entail no diminution of the sovereignty of this State. The question arises whether it would be desirable or feasible to involve elected politicians from Northern Ireland in either the Dáil or the Seanad. Aside from the constitutional difficulties of doing so, it would seem that election of Northern Ireland politicians to the Dáil would be dangerously provocative to Unionists in the first instance. It should, however, be possible whether, from the Taoiseach's "eleven" or by the device of a constitutional change, to arrange for a number of delegates from the parties in the Assembly to be nominated or otherwise returned to the Seanad. Should there be a demand from Unionists for Dáil representation that could be accommodated by constitutional amendment which it would seem would not be likely to be strongly opposed as it would of course provide for nationalist as well as unionist representation in practice. Such a requirement would itself evolve if territorial sovereignty over Northern Ireland or certain of the excepted powers (e.g. financial supply) "shifted" over time to Dublin (paras, 15 and 17 above).

Parliamentary Tier

38. It might be of advantage to devise a Parliamentary Tier for the Joint Authority with equal representation for the Houses of the Oireachtas, on the one hand, and Westminster, on the other, while perhaps giving a disproportionately weighted representation to the Assembly. The Tier could meet at regular intervals and consult with and perhaps question the Executive of the Joint Authority on reserved and excepted matters.

International Support

39. By acting jointly, the British and Irish Governments should be able to secure significant assistance from the U.S. and also the

European Community to support the new structures of government in Northern Ireland.

It should be conceivable to secure from the U.S. with a bipartisan support for the Joint Authority a large sum for each of its first three years. (\$500m?) some of which might be "devolved" to the Northern Ireland Executive for job-creation purposes.

It has been envisaged earlier above (para. 18) that the decision-making process of the Joint Authority might be tied into the Community system. Following the principles of the Haagerup Resolution, it should be possible to secure from the Council of Ministers a specific commitment to develop Northern Ireland as a unique priority area.

Political Balance Sheet

40. The following is a crude assessment of the political viability of the Joint Authority system as envisaged in this memo in the perspective of the principal protagonists to the Northern Ireland problem: the Northern Ireland Unionists, the Northern Nationalists, Dublin and London. The assessment is attempted under a number of key headings.

A. Overall Institutional Gains and Losses

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| Northern Unionists: | + Possible stability |
| | + constitutional position of Northern Ireland in the U.K. secured; |
| | + identity and British link secured even after possible change of constitutional position; |
| | + change in Irish constitution vis-a-vis Northern Ireland |
| | - involvement of the Irish State in the government of Northern Ireland. |

Northern Nationalists:

- + Possible stability
- + nationalist identity established for the first time on an enduring and equal basis;
- + possibility of change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland facilitated by the enduring character of the Joint Authority system and the process of reconciliation it would involve;
- change in Irish Constitution vis-a-vis Northern Ireland;
- Northern Ireland remains in the U.K. until a majority supports change.

Dublin:

- + Possible stability (political, economic implications);
- + same as above perceptions of Northern Nationalists (vicariously);
- + no requirement to change the Constitution on Church/State issues;
- + no requirement to undertake major changes of foreign policy (e.g. NATO membership);
- + no requirement to undertake major financial responsibility for Northern Ireland.

London:

- + Possible stability;
- + constitutional position unchanged;
- + decline in international criticism (esp. in U.S.);
- + change in Irish Constitution vis-a-vis Northern Ireland;
- continued financial responsibility for Northern Ireland.

B. Court, Human Rights, Security

- Northern Unionists:
- + Enhanced security through possible diminution of nationalist alienation;
 - + end of obstacles to full security cooperation;
 - involvement of Southern State;
 - disbanding/disarming of UDR.
- Northern Nationalists:
- + Acceptable Security, Court and Human Rights structures;
 - + Protection by "their own";
 - + Removal of UDR;
 - Possible threat from Protestant or IRA reaction to introduction of Irish forces.
- Dublin:
- + As for Northern Nationalists (vicariously);
 - + improvement in relations with Northern Nationalists;
 - possible threat to stability arising from likely domestic public reaction to possible attacks on our forces;
 - budgetary implications.
- London:
- + Hope of considerable reduction in attacks on British forces;
 - + possible budgetary implications over time.

C. Internal Government of Northern Ireland

- Northern Unionists:
- + Possible economic improvement;
 - + If majority rule even subject to veto or 70% rule;
 - if power-sharing;

- + Continued British role in Government;
- Dublin role in Joint Authority.

Northern Nationalists:

- + Possible economic improvement;
- ± divided opinions on majority rule if subject to veto or 70% rule;
- + If power-sharing Executive;
- Continued British role in Joint Authority;
- + Northern Nationalist reactions
- (vicariously);

Dublin:

- + Central role in government of Northern Ireland.

London:

- ± Probably divided view of Dublin involvement.