

E.R.

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214/9



Your Ref: PO/PP 30/64/1

Mr Kerr
Director of Prison - M
Operations

cc:-PS/Secretary of State (B)-M
PS/Mr Scott(L&B)-M
PS/PUS(L&B)-M
PS/Sir Ewart Bell - M
Mr Bourn - M
Mr Brennan
Mr Palker - M
Mr Doyne Ditmas - M
Mr Buxton - M
Mr Gilliland - M
Mr Merifield - M
Mr Burns
Mr Lyon
Mr Jackson - M
Mr D McNeill - M
Mr Ginn - M
Mr S McNeill - M
Mr A Templeton - M
Mr A Brown - M



PRISONS : PIRA ESCAPE PLAN, MAZE CELLULAR, INVOLVEMENT OF OFFICER BARR

The Secretary of State has seen your minute of 13 September.

2. He notes with some surprise (paragraph 2) that Mr Barr remains at liberty, having been granted bail. He would be grateful for explicit advice on whether Mr Barr's continuing liberty is a significant further risk to prison security. I should be grateful if you would advise on this within the next few days.

3. More generally, the Secretary of State is concerned about the state of affairs described in your minute. He takes the point that procedural changes, however desirable in themselves, may have little effect if there are staff who are poorly motivated or who may be suborned. He is particularly concerned by PIRA's apparent belief that, in the post-Hennessy era, they could obtain firearms and officers' uniforms, and take control of the key room and the ECR. The Secretary of State would like to have a presentation and discussion

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with officials on the implementation of the Hennessy Report before visiting Maze Cellular, which he intends to do at an early date.

4. In addition, the Secretary of State would like the following action to be undertaken forthwith:-

- (i) Mr Scott to satisfy himself that the physical and procedural changes that have been made are as satisfactory as possible, given the underlying problem of staff vulnerability, and to report back to him; and
- (ii) Mr Bourn to oversee an examination in more depth of the reasons for the continuing unreliability of some staff, and consideration of what new measures might be taken to deal with this central problem (he wonders, for example, whether outside personnel management advice might usefully be taken, and whether there is scope for increased surveillance of suspect officers or more rigorous vetting of new or existing staff).

G K Sandiford

G K SANDIFORD
Private Secretary

19 September 1984