

CONFIDENTIAL

M Kennedy 21/4/86
How far is any given
or general updating etc.

cc: Dr Quigley

MR BLOOMFIELD

DAY OF ACTION - 3 MARCH 1986

1. You had asked for a detailed report under 4 main headings of the effect on the Northern Ireland Civil Service on 3 March 1986. I have now had an opportunity to discuss the position on the day in question at length at ASEOM and while even now total analyses have not yet been completed I can report with a substantial amount of accuracy the position.
2. Attached at Appendix A and B are the relevant sections of the Pay and Conditions of Service Code and the Establishment Officers' Guide covering the question of attendance. At Appendix C is the analysis of absenteeism by Department and in percentage terms on 3 March. The absenteeism figures shown however can now be further and substantially explained. At ASEOM I issued the following directions:-
 - (a) That staff who reported to any office on 3 March, irrespective of their time of arrival or departure, credit for full attendance would be given;
 - (b) That staff who
 - (i) telephoned in on the day in question to explain their non-attendance; and/or
 - (ii) explained in writing their non-attendance due to either transport difficulties; road blocks of any kind which proved impassable to them; or in cases of intimidation either at home or in approaching their office credit for attendance would be given unless there was strong prima facie evidence on which to challenge their statement;
 - (c) That staff who explained their absence as on strike or in support of the day of action or who offered no explanation would lose a day's pay; and
 - (d) That staff who admitted strike support and were either obvious on picket lines or in intimidation of colleagues would lose a day's pay and further disciplinary action would be taken against them in consultation with DFP.
3. As a result of preliminary analyses of either telephone or written explanation of absence fewer than 1% of the non-industrial Civil Service admits to positive support for the day of action. Detailed information in respect of Industrial staff is not yet to hand but the figure appears likely to be very much higher - around 26%. Of this, DOE's figure is around 31% and DANI's about 10%.
4. There were some significant areas of high absenteeism to which it is worth drawing attention. You will for example note from Appendix C the high absenteeism rate in the Northern Ireland Assembly. All but one of these absentees was in the Messengerial grade where stated support for the strike was very high. This is something which we will have to look into further. It is

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however partially explainable by the areas in which most of these Messengers live and to the implicit rather than explicit intimidation which they would have suffered had they sought to report for duty. Two other areas however I find more worrying. In the case of Security Guards on whom we depend for buildings being opened and made secure etc the turnout rate across the Service was low. DED at Netherleigh for example had no Security Guards present. I have asked my Security Branch to examine in detail the record of the Security Guard service on the day in question and to advise me of alternatives open by way of contracting-out or privatisation against the employment of a direct labour force critical to management needs on which we so obviously have been unable to depend. While in mitigation it can be argued that many of them also live in areas where implicit and probably also explicit intimidation was brought to bear it is a worrying factor on which I will report further in due course. The second area of major worry is in the Department of the Environment's Water and Sewage Service. While at this moment I do not have total and precise figures it is obvious that a very high absenteeism rate occurred, both in industrial and non-industrial personnel, and given the "muscle" which this critically important sector of public service employment has in support of strike action there is a follow-up necessary when the picture is complete. It is obvious for example that next to the power workers the Water and Sewage staff have considerable capacity to cause chaos in the Province in a prolonged strike situation.

5. Other than those areas there does not appear to be any particular pattern either as between Belfast and the rest of the Province or in any major way across Departments. Much on the day in question depended on the location of offices and there were and are many stories of considerable personal heroics on the day in question of staff getting in and out of work and by contrast to the above stated position on Security Guards I am bound to say that those who did turn up behaved quite outstandingly and some are entitled to, and in the case of Rosepark will receive, written commendation.
6. I will report further on the ultimate figure of those who have suffered penalty by loss of pay or other disciplinary action when Departmental sift of explanations has been completed.
7. At Appendix D I have set out the particular effects/problems etc reported by Departments in relation to their offices or other premises on the day. Again there is a substantial range of problems and no common picture can be drawn. It is however noteworthy that the Department of Agriculture (Forest Service) had only 41 industrial staff recorded as absent (including 20 admitted strikers) on the day in question which is in contrast to that Department's Drainage personnel position or to DOE's Roads and Water Service position - where the contrast is very marked in the latter case.
8. At Appendix E I have set out the reported position in relation to the early departure of staff across Departments and giving in each case the nature of the authority and circumstances in which decisions were taken to let staff go home.
9. Arising from all of the above there are a number of points which we now have under consideration. The first of these relates to communication. Rosepark House as you know was a major casualty of communication break-down early in the morning when the Monarch system ceased to function. This led in turn to a highlighted deficiency in the availability of and ability to plug in direct telephone lines. Steps have already been taken to ensure that those

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circumstances cannot obtain again. Although Rosepark has, through its Security Branch, access to Departments via the Gem radio it was not an effective communicative means because in many Departments the receivers were not turned on! That matter is also the subject of inter-Departmental consultation currently and I trust that in any other situation requiring its use the Gem radio network will be fully operative.


10. On the subject of communication also it was abundantly clear that each building, and in particular the designated officer in charge of the building, needs a point of contact with the RUC as well as with DFP to obtain information on which to base any judgments affecting the care and safety of his staff. I am in no doubt that it is for the designated officer in charge of each building to take decisions on the best information available to him rather than await any agreed central line. This is particularly true throughout the Stormont Estate. With the greatest of respect to those occupying Stormont House and its Annexes their perception of the world on the day in question was markedly different from most of the rest of us. The officer in charge of each building is in a position to assess the degree of apprehension in his own staff and the extent to which rumour etc feeds this apprehension. To that information he should be in a position to add information received from Rosepark as the central personnel point and, where appropriate, from a local to his office RUC source. My staff are currently seeking to establish appropriate RUC contact points for each major office and each designated officer in charge of a building will subsequently be given a number within the RUC to contact. Each office will also be advised that unless the designated officer in charge of the building after consultation with such departmental senior staff as occupy the building issues a decision that staff may leave they must stay put. What happened in a number of buildings clearly was down to the individual senior officer or departmental representative and within one building a series of differential decisions were being taken at the same time.
11. The intention certainly will be to firm up within Rosepark House a very specific central point of advice/contact with its own telephone numbers which will be circulated to Establishment Officers and will become the sole contact point between Departments and Establishment Divisions in respect of any similar day of action, strike or whatever where we know in advance what the position is. We are also looking into the possibility, at least within the Stormont Estate, of an inter-departmental telephone contact, ie a simultaneous point between Rosepark and each Establishment of Departments within the Stormont Estate, so that information can be immediately pooled and a single decision taken by way of one simple consultation process. I am bound to say that within all of this I see remarkably little of value in Mr Innes' suggestion that the Head of LOB should be the central contact point. Rosepark will continue to exercise that but if LOB or any other Emergency Committee point has information of value then Rosepark and that point will work in tandem to produce best information available.
12. The other point of concern is the number of sources seeking information on attendance or absenteeism on a day of this kind to pass on to a variety of interested parties. It really became quite frenetic on 3 March when with a

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limited number of telephones in operation in Rosepark so many different sources were seeking the same information at one time.

13. Which really brings me to the point that if there is to be an Emergency Committee then there should be one. I find it difficult some weeks after the event to be convinced that there is one or that it was doing anything. Certainly no meetings were held prior to 3 March in spite of its substantial advance publicity and on the day in question few of us were aware of any valuable service available to us from an Emergency Committee. I frequently was in possession of very much more up to date information than LOB and their best advice which I found very useful was to give me specific contact points within the RUC. I have built on that suggestion in the points made above.
14. Finally I should comment specifically in relation to the Upper Newtownards Road and Rosepark House in particular of the attitude and approach of the RUC on the day in question. I am in no doubt at all that the low key attitude adopted by the Police in relation to the pickets at Rosepark raised apprehension levels very considerably indeed and were in themselves the cause of a very early exit not only from Rosepark but from other parts of the Stormont Estate. My experience was that the Police behaved, certainly in relation to Rosepark, as if this was an industrial dispute where pickets were behaving properly in the exercise of their rights in a strike situation and so long as they actually did not involve themselves in violence but sought to persuade people not to go to work by peaceful means the Police were satisfied. I do not see an analogy between the two situations and I do not regard the picketing as having been peaceful. It did disturb many staff to find that having been assured of protection in and out of work on the day in question they did not find it, and as I have indicated when rumours began to spread on the afternoon of the day of action staff were not comforted by the belief that the RUC would enable them to exit without harassment of any kind. But no doubt that is a point which has very much wider application and is being considered elsewhere.
15. I am bound to record the views of all my colleagues within ASEOM that the attendance on the day in question was quite phenomenally high and that in the main those who were unable to attend had very good reasons for their failure. I am concerned that unless we now block the loopholes which evidenced themselves on 3 March, and particularly Police attitudes in or around the entrances and exits to Government buildings we will not next time, if there is one, have such a high attendance. As indicated above I will let you have the final statistical position as quickly as it is available. This will seek to record the percentages of staff who did not attend any office on the day in question under the headings of transport difficulties; intimidation; road blocks; strike support; and active picketing in support. I am of course happy to discuss any of the above aspects or any others not covered in this report at your convenience.



W J HODGES

Department of Finance and Personnel
Rosepark House

24 March 1986

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317-319 Unallocated.

320 Where an officer is required to be on night duty with the Security Forces or the Retained Fire Service he may be allowed to report to his office not later than 10.30 am on the following morning. If exceptionally such duty is prolonged after 6.30 am special arrangements may be made at departmental discretion. Normally, and if the discharge of public business is not affected, Departments will release officers who are members of the Retained Fire Service, if they are called out during office hours. However, no officer has an automatic right to release.

LATE STARTING
AFTER NIGHT
DUTY WITH
SECURITY FORCES
OR RETAINED
FIRE SERVICE

321 Where an officer is on annual leave when a withdrawal of labour as a "political" protest begins, or where annual leave has been authorised in advance to cover his absence during the period of a protest, no special action is required of him. He should report for duty as usual at the end of his period of leave. Leave will not, however, be authorised specifically to enable staff to take part in the protest, and if an officer on annual leave takes an active part in the protest he may be subject to disciplinary action.

ATTENDANCE
DURING
"POLITICAL"
PROTESTS:
ACTION TO BE
TAKEN BY STAFF

322 Where an officer is on sick leave when a withdrawal of labour as a "political" protest begins he should continue to observe the sick leave regulations and report for duty as soon as he is fit to do so. Where an officer falls ill during a withdrawal of labour he should follow the normal rules for sick leave, that is either he or a member of his household should notify his superior officer as early as possible, on the first day of absence, stating the nature of his illness and when he expects to be able to resume duty. This notification must be followed up by the production of a doctor's statement or a written request for the granting of casual sick leave. Staff are reminded that Departments are entitled to ask for the production of a doctor's statement even for a casual absence should they consider it necessary to do so. If an officer on sick leave takes an active part in the protest he may be subject to disciplinary action.

323 Where, during a withdrawal of labour as a "political" protest, an officer is unable to report to his normal place of duty because of transport difficulties or is unwilling to report to his normal place of duty because of intimidation he should notify his superior officer as soon as practicable, report any intimidation to the police and report for duty to an alternative office in accordance with the following guidelines:

(a) Where there is no alternative office of his own Department within reasonable distance of his home an officer should report to the nearest office of any other Department within reasonable distance;

(b) Staff of the Departments of Health and Social Services and Economic Development living in the Bangor area who are unable to report to their own offices should report to the Social Security Office in Bangor.

All other staff living in the Bangor area who are unable to report to their own offices should report to the Department of Education, Rathgael;

(c) Except in the case of staff who work in RUC stations, these stations should not be regarded by staff as possible alternative offices within the terms of this paragraph;

(d) Each member of staff must follow the above terms even if an alternative office does not carry out his particular type of work.

This guidance must be followed by each officer on a daily basis for as long as normal attendance is prevented, subject to any alternative arrangements which may be notified to him by his Department in the light of local or departmental circumstances (overcrowding of offices, etc). Any such alternative arrangements will be covered by the principles of this section.

324 Where, during a withdrawal of labour as a "political" protest, an officer is intimidated to such a degree that he is afraid to report both to his normal place of duty and to any alternative office he should notify his superior officer as soon as practicable and also report the intimidation to the Police.

ATTENDANCE

ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY ESTABLISHMENT DIVISIONS

325 The following are the principles which will be followed in dealing with any officer who is absent from his office during a withdrawal of labour as a "political" protest:—

- (a) Where an officer is on annual leave at the beginning of the protest, or where annual leave has been authorised in advance to cover an absence during the period of the protest, and he returns to duty on the expiration of his leave no penalty will be imposed. If an officer on annual leave takes an active part in the protest he may, however, be subject to disciplinary action.
- (b) Where an officer is on sick leave at the beginning of the protest and either continues to observe the sick leave rules or reports for duty as soon as he is fit to do so no penalty will be imposed. If an officer on sick leave takes an active part in the protest he may, however, be subject to disciplinary action.
- (c) Where an officer who is not participating in the protest falls ill during the protest and follows the normal rules for sick leave no penalty will be imposed. If he takes an active part in the protest while on sick leave he may, however, be subject to disciplinary action.
- (d) Where an absence is unauthorised, ie not covered by either (a), (b) or (c) above, then:—
 - (i) where an officer contacts his superior officer as soon as practicable and his Department is satisfied that he was not to be blamed for his absence (for example, that he had been intimidated, or that there were transport difficulties and he lived too far from both his own office and from any alternative office to walk to work) no reprimand will be issued and the absence will be regarded as special leave with pay;
 - (ii) where an officer contacts his superior officer as soon as practicable but his Department concludes that his absence was due to fear of intimidation or transport difficulties which he might well have overcome, no reprimand will be issued and the officer will be given the option of covering the absence by annual leave or special leave without pay;
 - (iii) where an officer absents himself in support of a call to withdraw labour or "downs tools" after reporting for duty, and in all other cases of absence during a withdrawal of labour, including absence for any of the reasons set out in (d) (i) and (ii) which has not been reported as soon as practicable, or absence due to intimidation which has not been reported to the police, pay will be deducted at the appropriate rate, a written reprimand will be issued, and further disciplinary action may be taken if appropriate in the circumstances. An example of the type of case for further disciplinary action would be where an officer took an active part in persuading or attempting to persuade other people to withdraw their labour. A written reprimand issued in these circumstances will be regarded as an Adverse Report. It will be placed on the officer's personal file, and may have the effect of disqualifying him from consideration for promotion for a period of at least 6 months. Under the promotion rules it will be seen by any Promotion Board before which the officer appears within a period of 3 years.

In the case of an unauthorised absence which falls under paragraph 6(d) (iii) pay will be withheld until the circumstances have been fully investigated and a decision taken as to whether payment may be allowed.

326 Where pleas are made under paragraph 6(d) (i) that absences were due to transport difficulties, Establishment Division will decide in each case whether the transport difficulties were a sufficient cause for the officer to be absent. For example it would not be unreasonable to expect an able-bodied officer to walk a distance of 4 miles to his office and any officer judged to have too great a distance to walk would be expected to satisfy his Department that he had explored all other possible ways of getting to his office.

ATTENDANCE

231 The rules relating to hours of work, the arrangement of the working week and of the working day, set out in paragraphs 301 to 350 of the Code, provide a framework of general control within which Departments have full authority to arrange the working week to suit the demands of the work of the Department and to arrange working hours to meet the needs of staff. The underlying purpose of this measure of flexibility is to meet the varying requirements of management and staff while maintaining sufficient control of hours worked to prevent abuse. In fixing local variations of the departmental arrangements, the preferences of the staff should be taken into consideration where this is possible without impairing the efficient running of the Department. For example, Departments responsible for offices open to the public will need to provide adequate manning.

**HOURS OF WORK,
ARRANGEMENT
OF THE
WORKING WEEK
AND THE
WORKING DAY**

232 The maximum degree of delegation to line management is desirable, particularly discretion to arrange office hours to meet the needs of staff (men and women) with domestic responsibilities. Within the central constraints necessary (eg such as the provision of a consistent service throughout the country in local offices) line managers should be urged to make proper and full use of discretionary powers. For example, if a member of staff finds it more convenient to take shorter lunch breaks in order to arrive a little later and leave a little earlier, to collect children from nurseries or schools, to care for an aged parent, or simply to avoid rush hours, there should be no management objection, provided the efficiency of the office is not undermined and the staff work the appropriate conditioned hours.

233 Where officers are conditioned to net hours it follows that their hours of attendance must be extended to include the time spent on meal breaks. Accordingly each officer should be advised of the meal breaks provided within his hours of attendance.

**GRADES
CONDITIONED
TO NET HOURS**

234 (1) DURING ABNORMALLY SEVERE WEATHER CONDITIONS

The Head of the Branch should submit to the Establishment Officer a list of the names of officers absent because of abnormally severe weather conditions and showing home and official addresses, which he considers merit the grant of special leave with pay. In cases where he is unable to give such recommendation he should require the officers concerned to furnish a written explanation of the circumstances for transmission to the Establishment Officer with his observations.

**ATTENDANCE
DURING
EMERGENCIES**

Normally attendance, even for a limited period, should be reckoned as a full day's attendance.

(2) DURING CIVIL DISTURBANCES

Absences from duty arising out of civil disturbances should be dealt with on their merit in accordance with Code paragraphs 321 to 325. Special or distress leave, with pay, may be granted as appropriate in exceptional circumstances (eg evacuation or destruction of home).

235 Where demonstrations are called to cause traffic disruption, Departments should seek clearance from the Security Unit, DOCS, before allowing staff to leave early. Where it is considered that the effects on traffic are not sufficient to warrant early departure Departments should ensure that staff are kept informed of the situation.

**EARLY
DEPARTURE
OWING TO
TRAFFIC
DISRUPTIONS**

236 Departments wishing to introduce schemes of flexible working hours (Code paragraphs 329 to 332) should contact DOCS for help and advice and keep in close touch with DOCS during the initial period so that their experience can contribute towards future assessment of the relevance of flexible working hours to different Civil Service environments.

**FLEXIBLE
WORKING
HOURS**

237 Schemes should be consistent with the principles which have been agreed with the Staff Side of the Central Whitley Council and accordingly it is important that DOCS should be consulted before a scheme starts. The underlying principle is that the introduction of more flexible arrangements of working hours should, as far as practicable, neither improve nor worsen an individual's position in relation to his formal conditions of service.

238-250 unallocated.

APPENDIX C

| DEPARTMENT | NUMBER OF ABSENTEES | TOTAL WORKFORCE (PER DEPT) | % OF ABSENTEEISM (PER DEPT) |
|------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Police Authority | 445 | 2928* | 15.2% |
| Assembly | 21 | 97 | 21.65% |
| Economic Development | 375 | 2670 | 14.05% |
| Education | 40 | 596 | 6.71% |
| Exchequer & Audit | Nil | 96 | Nil |
| Finance & Personnel | 167 | 1569 | 10.64% |
| Commissioners for Complaints | 2 | 20 | 10.00% |
| Department of Health & SS | 514 | 6214 | 8.27% |
| Northern Ireland Office | 136 | 1072 | 12.69% |
| Environment (non-industrial) | 981 | 5834 | 16.82% |
| (industrial) | 1330 | 4239 | 31.00% |
| Agriculture (non-industrial) | 304 | 3262 | 9.3% |
| (industrial) | 274 ϕ | 1194 | 22.95% |
| | 4589 | 29845 | 15.37% |

Non-Industrial: absenteeism = 12.2%
 Industrial: " = 29.2%
 Servicewide: " = 15.4%

* This figure includes Police Authority direct recruits and Civilian Search Unit staff.

ϕ Unconfirmed figure as at 10 March 1986.

Offices and Other Premises (particular effects/problems, etc)

Several Departments reported problems created by the day of action.

1. Northern Ireland Assembly

Only one Messenger reported, thereby creating problems on manning of security points. Only the Manageress of the Dining Rooms reported - admin staff helped out.

2. Department of Economic Development

Portadown and Lurgan Job Markets closed mid-morning due to intimidation. Cookstown, Newtownards and Carrickfergus Job Markets closed before lunch due to effects of electricity cuts.

Industrial Science Division closed mid-morning due to electricity cut.

Dundonald, Lisburn, Craigavon and Enniskillen Training Centres closed before lunchtime due to electricity cuts.

Ballymena Training Centre closed early due to roads situation in Ballymena.

No Security Guards reported for duty at Netherleigh.

3. Department of Education

The Department reported excellent co-operation from the RUC in keeping the entrance to Rathgael House clear for staff to enter and leave.

4. Department of Health and Social Services

Portadown SSO did not open due to heavy picketing - staff were unable to gain access to the building at any time during the day.

Lurgan, Newtownards and Larne SSOs closed during the morning.

Ballymena SSO did not open to the public and eventually closed at 2.00 pm.

Ballymoney, Lisburn, Shankill and Knockbreda SSOs closed mid-afternoon.

Because of violence in the streets around the City Hall the following offices closed mid-afternoon:

Office of Social Security Commissioners, Linenhall Street;
ITU, Adelaide Street; and
Office of President of Social Security Appeal Tribunals, Adelaide Street.

The following sub-offices to SSOs were due to open but for various reasons did not:

Portglenone, Ballycastle, Dunloy, Rathfriland, Portaferry, Tandragee, Castlederg, Newtownstewart, Holywood, Maghera, Bellaghy, Bushmills, Portrush, Ballyclare, Annalong and Stewartstown.

Staff had difficulty in gaining access from Upper Newtownards Road to Castle Buildings or Dundonald House.

5. **Department of the Environment**

The Roads Service Depots at Lisburn, Sprucefield, Bangor and Holywood did not open due to absence of staff.

Glenmachan Street Depot closed at 10.00 am due to intimidation.

Lisburn Section Office closed at 9.00 am due to a mob outside - the Newtownards Office closed at 2.00 pm for similar reasons.

Ballymena, Ballymoney, Moygashel and Silverhill Sections/Depots were also closed.

The Water Service Depot at Magherafelt was closed, as were the Sub-Divisions at Armagh and Craigavon.

Armagh LVLO did not open to the public because security staff did not report - admin staff who reported worked all day.

Belfast LVLO closed after 1.00 pm.

Ballymena LVLO closed at 1.30 pm - the Roads Manager decided to close the County Hall complex.

Lisburn Rate Office closed at 11.30 am.

Cookstown Rate Office closed at 11.00 am due to electricity cut - only 2 staff had reported for duty. Telephone kept ringing but callers would not identify themselves.

Craigavon Rate Office closed at 11.30 am - electricity cut.

Ordnance Survey, Coleraine - closed lunchtime - no heat.

VIDTC, Lisburn, did not open - keyholders unable to get to work.

VIDTC, Craigavon, was open until 3.30 pm - no vehicles reported for test.

VIDTC, Londonderry, closed at 12.45 pm.

VIDTC, Coleraine, closed at 3.00 pm - hostile crowd at entrance - police could not be contacted.

VIDTC, Cookstown, closed at 1.30 pm - hostile crowd at entrance.

The Works Service Cambrai Street Store was closed.

6. **Department of Agriculture**

Out of 41 absences recorded by the Forest Service, 20 were "admitted strikers".

7. **Industrial Development Board**

Regional Offices

Belfast closed at 4.00 pm due to lack of heat.

Craigavon closed early afternoon - staff had their photographs taken entering the building.

Ballymena closed at 3.00 pm because of possible adverse reaction from people involved in a passing parade.

8. **Department of Finance and Personnel**

Rosepark House was open throughout the day but access was difficult throughout due to heavy picketing. Very few vehicles were able to gain access to the car park.

EARLY DEPARTURE OF STAFF

- DED - generally staff were allowed to filter home early in view of difficulties.
- IDB - staff were allowed to leave from 3.30 pm - decision was taken by the Chief Executive - the message was relayed by tannoy.
- PANI - junior staff were permitted to leave from 3.30 pm onwards. In the majority of cases decisions were taken by line managers, with regard to local conditions. No public address system announcements were made.
- DENI - Londonderry House was closed between 12.30 pm and 2.00 pm - not a DENI decision. Rathgael House staff were permitted to leave at 4.00 pm following consultation with the RUC - their Permanent Secretary was consulted.
- E&AD - Staff left about 2.00 pm following consultation with DFP Establishment Officer.
- DHSS - HQ Branches stopped work at 2.35 pm on advice from the Police that it would be better for staff to leave to avoid confrontation.
- DOE - Churchill House staff were advised they could leave from 3.00 pm. Decision taken by Under Secretary - no general announcement made.
- Land Registry - River House - staff were advised they could leave from 3.00 pm onwards - no general announcement made.
 - Hydebank - no heating - staff were advised over PA system they could leave if situation became unacceptable.
 - Clarendon House - staff were advised they could leave following riots - decision taken by Heads of Branches - no PA announcement.
 - Commonwealth House - staff were allowed to leave from 2.30 pm - decision taken by Director of Roads Service - no general announcement.
 - Marlborough House, Craigavon - staff were permitted to leave early - decision taken locally.
 - Parliament Buildings - staff were allowed to leave from 3.00 pm. RUC, Central Secretariat and NIO Operations advice taken. Staff were advised over PA system: "As we have been advised of the possibility of further picketing at the gates later in the afternoon staff may go home at any time".

- Ordnance Survey - Colby House - staff were allowed to leave from 3.30 pm. Decision taken by Chief Survey Officer in consultation with Under Secretary. PA system thanked staff for coming to work and advised the building would close shortly after 3.00 pm. Antrim and Portadown Offices closed due to mobs outside the buildings.
 - Water Service HQ - staff were allowed to leave around 4.00 pm.
 - Development Office - Ballymena - gates had to be locked due to mob - staff were allowed to leave from 3.30 pm.
 - Development Office - Antrim - no light and no heat - single unit of staff left about 3.30 pm.
 - Development Office - Ballymoney - staff were allowed to leave from lunchtime.
- NIO - staff were permitted to leave from 3.30 pm. Staff in centre of Belfast left at 2.30 pm.
- DFP - In view of persistent rumours and a mob reforming outside Rosepark House staff who were anxious were permitted to leave gradually from 2.00 pm. No public address announcement was made.

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