



CONFIDENTIAL

CALL ON MR NALLY: 19 JUNE

Mr Appleyard, accompanied by HMA, called on Mr Dermot Nally (Secretary to Government) at the Taoiseach's Office on 19 June. The following is a summary note of the main points raised.

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2. Mr Nally said that the main concern for the Taoiseach was that, if there was any question of negotiating an agreement to transcend the Anglo-Irish Agreement, then the Irish Government should be a party to the discussions throughout. There was room for legitimate debate about how this could best be assured but the issue was fundamental. On present plans there seemed to be some danger that the end of the gap would be reached without the North/South talks getting off the ground. The Taoiseach was concerned at the slippage from the "Concordat" of 19 April and about the attenuation of the Liaison Group. There was great domestic pressure on this last issue.

3. Mr Appleyard said that the British Government were alive to these Irish sensitivities. The Prime Minister and her senior colleagues were kept fully in the picture by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. They were grateful for the flexibility which the Irish were showing on an issue of fundamental importance to them. Mr Brooke would have no difficulty with the Irish requests but he could not deliver the Unionists to North/South talks against their will and was constantly looking for arrangements which would work in practice. Hence his stress on the pattern of the talks developing "organically".

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4. In reply to a question, Mr Nally confirmed that "domestic pressure" over the Liaison Group came from the Opposition and not from Fianna Fail. The architects of the Agreement on the Fine Gael benches were determined that the Irish Government should not resile from what they had achieved; and were inclined to forget that they had made this achievement through secret negotiations. HMA said that Mr Barry and Mr Brooke had been saying that the Irish Government could not be present at the table for the internal talks; Mr Barry had thought that he was denying their right to submit views and proposals under Article 4(c) of the Agreement. It was striking how statesmanlike Mr Barry had become by the time his Dail Question had been reached.

5. Mr Nally stressed the importance of relationships of mutual confidence between Ministers. Mr Brooke had established excellent working relations with Mr Collins and also with the Taoiseach. Mr Haughey liked and trusted him. Without this we would not have got as far as we had. Mr Nally thought that the relationship between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister was also steadily improving. The last meeting at Downing Street had been just like a neighbour dropping in for a cup of tea - which was as it should be. HMA hoped that the "Gulliver" piece in the Sunday Press for 17 June did not reflect some suspicion of Mr Brooke. Mr Nally thought not.

6. Mr Nally stressed the Irish anxiety that the Unionists, having secured suspension of the Conference, would then break off the talks and use them to demonstrate the



